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In January, 2010, the biggest internet search engine, Google, announced its 
potential exodus from the Chinese market due to China’s practice of censorship. Many 
foreign commentators have criticized China’s practice of censorship. But what are the 
views of Chinese citizens? This research focuses on a special group of Chinese netizens 
called “returnees” [overseas Chinese who are living in between China and elsewhere], 
who have experienced both the domestic and overseas cyber-worlds. Through studying 
their perspectives on censorship, this research seeks to understand how those who have 
lived outside China understand internet censorship within China.. 
Some informants view internet censorship as a negative intrusion and a 
representation of an untruthful government while others consider it as a necessity in 
managing China’s cyberspace due to the special cultural context of Chinese society. 
Though their perceptions vary, my informants expressed a paradoxical nationalism, 
defending a government they felt ashamed of; this was expressed repeatedly during 
interviews. In this thesis, by bringing censorship and nationalism together, I analyze in 
depth my informants’ paradoxical and conflicting attitude toward these two concepts, in 
order to better understand Chinese censorship and how it may be justified. I argue that 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In this thesis, I examine what censorship means to Chinese returnees, and to what extent 
they resist or accommodate to censorship. Censorship is a classic representation of 
Chinese-style paternalistic and totalitarian governmentality. This tradition has been 
extended to the virtual world and has been showing its impact on people’s everyday 
lives. The research uses “the Google China affair” as a window through which to 
investigate how Chinese netizens view the issue of internet censorship. While this is a 
means to better understand to what extent Western ideas of neoliberalism and individual 
rights have been accepted at a local level, it may also more broadly, enable us to better 
understand how the progress of globalization/Westernization affects China, a historically 
self-contained and self-enclosed country. Focusing on Chinese returnees, a subgroup of 
people who are cross-culturally cultivated, may provide a useful lens to look at these 
issues since they not only have distinctive internet-using experiences but also the 
background of being assimilated to Western culture. In short, this thesis is about 
understanding how those who have lived outside China understand Chinese internet 
censorship in order to provide a useful glimpse into a current transformation of 
nationalism within a globalizing China.  
This thesis is different from many other examinations of internet censorship in 
that I am sometimes quite critical towards my informants. I tried to stand back and be an 
observer rather than a commenter during my fieldwork, but not in my subsequent 
analysis of their words. Being a Chinese returnee myself, it provides me a chance to 
better understand my informants’ arguments and be empathetic towards them, but also to 
see flaws in their arguments, since I understand their situation well. Considering my 
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personal background that I have been living outside mainland China for seven years, my 
comments are analytically valid, I believe.  
The first two chapters provide an introduction which includes background 
information about my research, the general situation of censorship in China’s cyberspace, 
and a literature review. The main body of this thesis covers ethnographic data and 
analysis.  
 In this opening chapter, I first discuss the significance of this research: it is 
important because censorship is actively changing the ecology of China’s cyberspace, 
which is a social arena for Chinese people today. I also provide in this chapter 
information on the informants I have chosen for this ethnographic research, and discuss 
my methodology. This chapter also presents the general situation of cyberspace 
development in China, as well as the issue of censorship from a historical perspective, 
and discusses how serious censorship really is in a Chinese context. By comparing the 
situation in China to other countries, we can have a clearer picture of the true magnitude 
of the censorship problem in China.  
 
Introduction: “The Google-China Affair” 
Internet censorship has become a much publicized issue in China, with no resolution in 
sight. In this thesis, I use “the Google-China affair” as a means of understanding how 
Chinese netizens view the issue of censorship in a Chinese context.  
China’s cyberspace contains rich and varied cultures that have an impact on off-
line China. From the widespread usage of micro-blogs to the vigorous development of 
on-line communities, it is not hard to see that the internet is playing an essential role in 
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China’s social affairs. It is already an indispensable part of Chinese people’s everyday 
life. However, this flourishing development of China’s cyberspace is being limited and 
controlled by censorship of the Chinese state. In the popular Australian TV current-
affairs program “Hungry Beast”, an episode examined “the Great Firewall of China”; the 
host mocked the Australian government’s practice of internet censorship by saying, “if 
you (Australian government) want to get a firewall, do it properly, do it like China!” 
(Hungry Beast 2010) Many countries monitor the web and practice some control over 
what is available, but China has been thought of as having by far the most impressive 
censorship program. This is one of the major reasons why Google once considered 
leaving China. Many scholars are interested in how the internet as a new medium may 
change China; I am interested in how individuals conceive and react to internet 
censorship.   
However, with the number of Chinese netizens reaching hundreds of millions, it 
is difficult to generalize their perceptions on this issue. Many Chinese internet users 
have overlooked this problem of censorship, since the situation has already long been a 
part of their taken-for-granted daily lives. For this reason I make Chinese returnees my 
target informants: those who have lived overseas for a number of years and returned to 
China. I explore how those who have lived outside China understand internet censorship 
within China in order to provide a glimpse into how nationalism and internationalism 
interact within a globalizing China. By situating censorship not only in the discourse of 
liberalism or its challengers in the West, the thesis provides a basis for understanding 
broader conceptions of censorship and its contestation in today’s China.  
This may sounds a little peculiar—that we need to principally study this special 
group of people in order to figure out Chinese attitudes as a whole towards censorship. 
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The main reason to focus on this group of people is the special features that Chinese 
returnees possess. Let me now discuss this in detail.  
 
Chinese Returnees  
Chinese returnees, as a group who have experienced both domestic and overseas cyber-
worlds, have views on internet censorship that are important and valuable, because their 
distinguishing experiences have given them a privilege that others don’t have. They 
possess a knowledge that allows them to go beyond the imaginative world created by the 
Chinese state. This empowers them when reacting to the state’s discipline of internet 
censorship. They can, in a sense, be seen as the “landing party” of China’s globalization. 
Their cross-cultural experiences may cause them to have more informed opinions on the 
subject of censorship.  
Returnees by definition are people who have been abroad and have returned to 
their place of origin. The majority of those who were selected for this research are still 
living in between two places. They have spent much time abroad, while returning to 
mainland China during holidays and vacations. One could argue that this is a very 
specialized group, better educated than and unlike other Chinese. However, from my 
interviews, and from studying comments on the Chinese internet about censorship, I 
have found that this is not necessarily the case. My informants have a very wide range of 
views concerning internet censorship. Their attitudes toward the issue reflect most of the 
popular views that can be found among common netizens. The differences between this 
well-travelled, well-educated elite and the rest of the netizens in China is not so much in 
their views towards censorship as in their informed explanations of their different views.  
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Among the 58 returnees I’ve interviewed, the majority went abroad for several 
years seeking better education or better working opportunities in the U.S., Hong Kong, 
Australia and Europe. More than half are still living abroad, either working on their 
degrees or careers, although I interviewed most in Beijing. They typically choose to 
come back to China for visits as frequently as possible. Some of them haven’t yet made 
their decisions about where to live once their current stay overseas ends. Others have 
made their minds up and have permanently returned to China for various reasons.  Some 
have been quite influential in cyberspace, as I show in later chapters. In this information 
age, one doesn’t have to be physically present to be influential. The on-line social 
network provides them a channel to share experiences and thoughts with peers, 
especially those who haven’t gone abroad.  
 
The Nascent Public Sphere, Censorship, and the Google-China Affair 
Before I enter into discussion of my informants’ opinions toward internet censorship, I 
first will discuss some background information and arguments concerning cyberspace 
discussed by different scholars, which I will get back to in the later part of this thesis. In 
the subtitle of this section, use the phrase “the nascent public sphere” to describe China’s 
cyberspace because the internet today should not be merely seen as an information 
source. As Andrew Chadwick (2006: 236) argues in his book, inevitably what is online 
is political. Thus we should pay more attention to the form with the internet is taking and 
the consequences the internet is bringing to politics. In the same book, he claims that one 
of the most important effects of the internet is the decentralization of politics (Chadwick 
2006: 35) The launching of the second generation of the internet – the adding of new 
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features on the Web, such as YouTube and Facebook, which allow internet users to 
participate online – has enabled the evolution of the internet from a static information 
provider to an interactive media. When websites like Wikipedia, YouTube, and 
Facebook fill the screens of our computers, netizens no longer focus on what they 
“need”,  nor even what they “want”, but start to think about what they “can” do on the 
internet (Leadbeater 2007). The audience changes from passive consumers to 
“participants.” As Larry Sanger, the co-founder of Wikipedia, said, “We are undergoing 
a revolutionary shift in our society, which is at the same level as the invention of 
printing press. It’s that big!” (Sanger 2008).  
This second generation of the internet, known as Web 2.0, shrinks the gap 
between social elites and the masses of people since it provides ordinary people with 
another arena to realize their ambitions, to express their desires and have a voice in 
social issues or governmentality. It also has transformed the internet from an information 
source to a social-network-based technology. Many studies on cyberspace or the 
development of ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) as well have 
argued that the internet, by providing enormous amounts of information, has brought 
individuals a new power that may cause alterations in the relationship between the 
nation-state and its citizens (Kalathil and Boas 2003:1-3). For example, optimists like 
Charles Leadbeater believe that this change in the internet will bring liberation and 
democracy to the world, especially to developing countries (Leadbeater 2007). He 
implies that the internet will work as a power driving the development of democracy and 
overthrowing authoritarian regimes, especially in underdeveloped regions. However, 
pessimists like Heather Sayigny believe, on the contrary, that what the internet is 
providing is just an illusion of “the public sphere” (Sayigny 2004). Skeptics like Andrew 
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Keen worry that the so-called mass innovation is in fact destructive, and that hyper-
activated interactions may cause the dismissal of all authority and an eventual state of 
chaos (Keen 2007).  
If we discuss how the internet as a technology influences modern society without 
putting it into any specific cultural context, the discussion runs the risk of being too 
abstract. In developed countries, the spirit of liberalism and democracy had been 
growing for centuries, and citizens have relatively more approaches to political 
participation. Thus it may be that citizens in developed countries haven’t felt as much 
excitement about the Web 2.0 as people in developing countries like China, for whom it 
may seem quite important. 
Constrained by historical factors and the current social and political situation, 
Chinese people have limited chances to participate in the political domain. As Smith 
pointed out almost 120 years ago in his book Chinese Characteristics (1897), Chinese 
people are used to being governed in a paternalistic form. The government is often seen 
as being like a parent while its citizens are seen as being like children (Smith 1897: 107). 
This metaphor may also be applicable today, in depicting not only a prominent feature of 
Chinese governmentality but also in the implication that Chinese people are amenable to 
authority. Wittfogel used the theory of the Asiatic Model of Production that originally 
was devised by Karl Marx during the 1950s (International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences 2008) to argued that the willingness shown by Chinese people when they have 
to follow the instructions given by authorities is necessary and inevitable (Wittfogel 
1957). Although starting from different points, both scholars came to the same 
conclusion: They argued that traditionally China has been a country full of shunmin [顺
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民], people willing to follow rather than resist authority. In contemporary China, 
although imported Western ideologies such as democracy and individual rights are 
popularly espoused, the rate of ideological change in the society is still relatively slow, 
and censorship is observed in many domains.     
However, the emergence of the internet is changing this situation in various ways. 
First, despite censorship, the internet has opened a window to Chinese netizens and 
allowed them to have a fuller view of the outside world. They can obtain information 
from different sources instead of being restricted by the authorized news. On an 
individual level, censorship can be overcome by many means. “The Great Firewall” is a 
term widely used by netizens as well as scholars to refer to China’s  internet censorship 
system. The most popular way to get over this “Great Firewall of China” is to get a VPN 
account online and access the internet through it.  Another way is to get friends outside 
China to send news via email or social networks. Some Chinese netizens volunteer to 
forward information to those who live inside the Great Firewall. Despite the cliché of 
agreeing that “free information” is for everyone, one motivation to convey information 
from outside the Great Firewall is that the page-view number of one’s own websites will 
mount if these websites bring fresh information to viewers inside the wall. Sharers and 
viewers benefit from this action at the same time. Since it is a win-win situation, it is an 
informal but sustainable way of spreading information blocked by the government.   
Second, the internet represents freedom and anonymity that to a great extant 
provides a sense of security to Chinese netizens and makes them more willing to share 
thoughts online. This is extremely important to a society that lacks free speech. Third, 
the internet is a written, language-based medium. China, as a vast country, has hundreds 
 9 
 
of dialects, but its written language is united. This gives Chinese netizens a 
communicative advantage when using a writing-based medium like the internet. 
Consequently, in China, the internet is not merely an extension of existing media. It is a 
wholly new space for the flow of public opinion and a new field for a carnival of 
discourse. From the Deng Yujiao incident
1
 to the milk powder scandal
2
, from the anti-
CNN movement
3
 to the establishment of “Charter ‘08”4, Chinese netizens have been 
using the internet as a platform for political action, and to converse with the government 
as well as with outsiders.  
Since China plugged into the virtual world in the early 1990s, various scholars 
and experts have claimed that the internet will change China fundamentally; these 
claims have become familiar to those who pay attention to international affairs. Many 
western politicians and scholars are convinced that an open internet will end the closed 
political regime in China. For example, President George W. Bush asserted that the 
internet will bring freedom to China, while Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that 
                                                 
1 “The Deng Yujiao incident occurred on 10 May 2009 at a hotel in Badong County, Hubei 
province. Deng Yujiao, a 21-year-old female pedicure worker, rebuffed the advances of Deng Guida, 
director of the local township business promotions office, who had come to the hotel seeking sexual 
services. She allegedly stabbed her assailant several times trying to fight him off, resulting in his death. 
Badong County police subsequently arrested Deng Yujiao and charged her with homicide and refused to 
grant her bail” (Widipidia 2011). The case resonated with public anger over the behavior of corrupt and 
immoral officials, and garnered over four million forum posts across the country Chinese netizens 
protested in cyberspace as well as organizing demonstrations in Beijing. As a result of the national outcry, 
Deng was released eventually. This was widely considered a victory of Chinese internet resistance, since 
without the support of Chinese netizens, Deng would probably have been executed. 
2
 This refers to the 2008 Chinese milk powder scandal, a food security incident that involved infant 
formula. Extra chemicals were added into milk powder that caused infants’ kidney malfunctions. The 
incident raised concern over food safety throughout China. Chinese netizens successfully used the internet 
to call public attention to the scandal, to arouse protests, and to call for compensation for the victims.  
3
 In 2009, the ethnic conflicts in Tibet and the Xinjiang region aroused strong feelings of patriotism among 
Chinese youths. They accused Western media of incorrect reporting, and claim that there is a conspiracy 
behind Western media’s misreporting. Subsequently, they started the anti-CNN movement online and tried 
to unite Chinese people all over the world against Western media. See more at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkYbw7yLEqE   
4
 Chart 08 is a manifesto that was published on 10 December 2008 to honor the 60th anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It became more famous after one of its authors, Liu Xiaobo, 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010.    
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“the rise of democracy and the power of the information revolution combine to leverage 
each other” (Kalthil and Boas 2003: 1). Business leaders and media commentators 
generally concur: former Citicorp chair Walter Wriston has argued in Foreign Affairs 
that “the virus of freedom…is spread by electronic networks to the four corners of the 
earth” (Wriston 1997). This faith in technology’s potential to challenge authoritarian 
rule indicates that the central government of China might have to face a great challenge 
in maintaining its absolute power in today’s China.  
It is interesting that the CCP [Communist Party of China] and its authoritarian 
regime adopted Marxism as its governing agenda, and altered it by added nationalism. 
Nationalism is utilized by the CCP as one of its essential ideologies to legitimize its 
policies and to stabilize its domination, and to justify the practice of censorship. But 
what do Chinese netizens, such as the returnees I interviewed, think about this 
justification? Does the practice of censorship effectively help the government filter news 
that does not place them in a favorable light, and slow down the challenges brought to 
them by the internet? Or does the practice of censorship make people such as my 
informants resent the government and doubt its ruling ideologies? This thesis argues that 
uneasy feelings toward censorship are commonly found among Chinese returnees; the 
practice of censorship has provoked a certain degree of resentment against the 
government and its policy of information control. But as I will discuss, my interviews 
show that it has not had a negative effect on feelings of Chinese nationalism. Indeed, this 
thesis argues that internet censorship contributes to today’s Chinese nationalism. Of 
course it is true that conflicts between the state-party and society are being catalyzed 
because of the internet; but for many Chinese, “nation” and “state” are different entities. 
The concept of nationalism has been transformed; it is not the same nationalism that was 
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promoted by the CCP decades ago. This argument will be explored throughout this 
thesis.  
After China first became connected to the internet in 1993, the use of the internet 
has developed at an incredible rate. In June 2010, there were approximately 420 million 
netizens in China, which means that China has the largest number of internet users in the 
world (CNNIC 2010).
 
The rapid development of China’s cyberspace has not only 
boosted information flows, but also has created a new form of social interaction between 
the state, the media, the social elites, and ordinary citizens (Shen and Breslin 2010: 4). 
“The fact that the party-state has made use of this social interaction while at the same 
time remaining worried about the negative impact of the same netizens is a fundamental 
characteristic of the nature of the relationship between the [Chinese] state and the 
internet community” (Shen and Breslin 2010: 4).  
 In its pervasiveness, the internet may be seen as increasing the process of 
liberalism by empowering individuals and making information available in the 
marketplace; it also to a degree impairs the power of the state. This is not the first time 
that the state-party has had to deal with the tension between liberalism and its 
authoritarian rule. During the past few decades, two Western ideologies were influential 
in Chinese society: the market economy and democracy. In 1979, when the market 
economy was- re-introduced to China, debates took place as to whether China’s 
economic and social circumstances were ready and suitable for an open market. Now, 
history repeats itself. The advocacy of a “free flow of information” and “free speech” 
has stepped into the spotlight and became the main subjects in a new round of debates 
(Palmer 2010). Hence, this thesis uses “the Google-China affair” as a window through 
which to understand how the issue of censorship is conceived by Chinese returnees and 
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how it reflects problems caused by the unmatched development between the economy 
and ideology. The Google-China affair is chosen as the leading event to be discussed in 
this thesis not only because the affair drew much attention both domestically and 
overseas, but more importantly, because the debates and tensions the affair brought out 
have had far-reaching effects on Chinese society. I attempt in this thesis, to offer, along 
with the analysis of my interviews with informants, a detailed description of the Google-
China affair in order to reveal the major issues in China’s cyberspace management.  
While many studies have examined the internet’s impact on Chinese society, 
including its censorship,, and an increasing number of studies approach the discussion 
from a political perspective, we have little idea of how individual interests and group 
interests are being balanced by internet users in China. How do people like my 
informants understand the censorship policy, especially after being widely exposed to 
western ideologies in this age of globalization? Is there any shared cultural consensus 
regarding this issue? How do Chinese returnees understand the concept of freedom in 
cyberspace? These are the questions this thesis tries to answer.  
Internet censorship definitely has more negative effects than positive ones on the 
development of civil society in China. It certainly poses obstacles for people to get 
information freely and practice free speech in the age of information. Nonetheless, 
although pathological, internet censorship has become normal in today’s China, a part of 
netizens’ daily life. To many of my informants, the problem is not so much one of how 
to overthrow censorship but rather how to flourish or get by inside the structure of 
censorship. Most of them, willingly or not, accept censorship as a “normal” thing in 
China’s cyberspace. Most routinely overcome “the Great Firewall” of Chinese internet 
censorship by using VPN, special website browsers and other means mentioned earlier 
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in this chapter. However, even this resistance is a part of what they see as the normalcy 
of censorship. Moreover, through my interviews, I found that instead of provoking 
rebellion, censorship is more generally helping to create a new collective memory 
belonging to the generation growing up with the internet. My informants told me that 
internet-censorship-related events are popular topics for their daily conversations with 
their peers. For those who are living overseas, censorship is often something they claim 
as a very “Chinese” phenomenon that can’t be understood by the foreigners around them. 
This helps enhance the bonding between those returnees when they are abroad. Their 
Chinese identity has been stressed, which also reinforces their nationalistic emotions. In 
the last part of this thesis, I provide an analysis of the relation between internet 
censorship and Chinese nationalism.   
 
An Historical Perspective 
“Orientalism” as a concept was raised by Edward Said (1980). He points out a 
constellation of false assumptions underlying Westerners’ understanding of the East.  He 
argues that the romanticized image of the “East” is a cultural construction based on 
Westerners’ own perceptions, and that the dualism of “West-East” is arbitrary. This 
imagination of “Chinese versus Western” opposition also exists in China. Chinese 
people construct the image of “the West” based on their rough understandings on what is 
“us” and what is “other”. “Western society”, in this depiction, is labeled as having 
democracy, and higher public transparency, whereas, Chinese society is seen as having a 




If we see China as a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, its history can be 
traced back to 221 B.C., when Qin Shi Huang united China for the first time. Before the 
establishment of Qin, there was an era of great cultural and intellectual expansion in 
China, known as “one hundred schools of thought” [zhu zi bai jia诸子百家 or as bai jia 
zheng ming 百家争鸣] during the Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods in 
Chinese history. Philosophers and schools flourished during those periods. People 
enjoyed freedom of expression and developed numerous schools and ideologies such as 
Confucianism and Daoism that have had far-reaching effects. However, after Emperor 
Qin united the nation, he burned books and buried Confucianists alive [fen shu keng ru 
焚书坑儒]. He united the nation but also its ideology. From then on, to unite through 
ideology became a protocol for administrating this vast country for empires from 
virtually every dynasty.  
The Confucian official Dong Zong Shu [董仲舒] defended Confucianism and 
tried to convince the emperor to make it the dominant ideology for the whole country in 
134 B.C. Finally, his suggestion was adopted by Emperor Wu of Han in 140 B.C. and 
Confucianism became the official imperial doctrine for Han. Meanwhile, other schools 
were deposed and forbidden. Neo-Confucianism had been well developed during the 
earlier Song dynasty, and had been used by the governor to discipline subjects’ thoughts. 
It developed into the new interpretation of Confucianism, and mastery of the Confucian 
canon was required in order to pass the bureaucratic examinations during the Ming 
dynasty. Qing as a minority defeated the Ming Empire; as such, its rulers were sensitive 
to public feelings toward them and worried about the return of Han. That might be one 
of the reasons why the literary inquisition known as speech crime [wen zi yu 文字狱] 
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was treated seriously in Qing. The Qianlong Emperor used literary inquisition to silence 
objections to his rule. He was also responsible for the editing of Siku Quanshu
5
, which 
was completed in about ten years. During those years, 3100 works, about 150,000 copies 
of books in all, were either burnt or banned (Guy 1987). The editing of Siku Quanshu 
was actually an endeavor of modification and deletion of existing knowledge. Except for 
those that passed censorship, most publications were banned. Censorship in China grew 
in scope and ferocity in later eras as well, such as during the 18th century (Guy 1987).  
The monarchy was overthrown by a group of revolutionaries in the year 1911. 
The earlier Republic of China (ROC) had revolution as its theme, which made the highly 
authoritarian political environment became relatively relaxed. Censorship was quite 
weak from 1915 to 1925. People could enjoy the freedom of sharing news publically, 
and founded private newspaper offices. During these ten years, “Mr. De” [德先生; 
Democracy] and “Mr. Sai” [赛先生; Science] were introduced to Chinese people along 
with other Western ideas. The May Fourth Movement took place in 1919. Marxism was 
imported, and the Communist Party of China (CCP) was founded in 1921. These ten 
years were a golden period for the Chinese news industry (Lin 1936: 175), but they 
didn’t last long. After the warlord of BeiYang Army Zhang Zongchang [张宗昌] came 
to control Beijing in the 1930s, the freedom of expression was taken away (Lin 1936: 
175). Censorship became a main theme of Chinese society again. Because of its fear of 
the development of communism, the BeiYang government practiced harsh censorship on 
all kinds of publications. The government pursued a number of measures, from punitive 
                                                 
5
 Siku Quanshu (四库全书) is variously translated as the Imperial Collection of Four, The Emperor's Four 




deterrents for the newspaper offices to persecution of intellectuals for their writings. 
During that period, freedom of expression and publication was less than any time after 
1900 (Lin 1936: 179). Thousands of people were imprisoned because of speech crime; 
hundreds of books were officially banned (Lin 1936: 180). This situation remained until 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.  
In the first two decades after the PRC was founded in 1949, the government 
focused more on establishing laws, developing the economy and reconstructing the 
whole institutional structure. Marxism and Maoism were the most powerful ideology of 
that time. The Cultural Revolution started in 1966 and officially ended in 1976 with Mao 
Zedong’s death. It caused the control of citizens’ minds to reach a new level, and was a 
classic representation of the governmentality of a totalitarian state. Following the social, 
political and economic upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution, China entered a new 
epoch of reform and opening-up. The reformation initially focused on economic 
development, and then showed its influences on the political field during the 1980’s. The 
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 released the desire for a democratic regime among 
many Chinese youth. Although it was suppressed by the conservatives in the CCP, it had 
a great social impact. The desire for political reconstruction came to be a part of the 
cultural consensus shared by many Chinese people and the government.  
 “Technology will make it increasingly difficult for the state to control the 
information its people receive…the Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by 
the David of the microchip”, said Ronald Reagan in a speech at London’s Guildhall on 
June 14, 1989 (Kalathil and Boas 2003:1). The world has changed greatly since 
Reagan’s speech. Many subsequent events have partially verified his prediction. 
Certainly, China has been experiencing great social change after its first connection to 
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the internet in 1993. Western political leaders like Bill Clinton espoused the idea that the 
internet will bring freedom to places like China since it is inherently a force for 
democracy (Kalathil and Boas 2003:1).  Nonetheless, two problems were hidden in such 
an assertion.  
First, we tend to see a link between technological advances and democratization.  
Obviously, the assertion imputes a political character to the internet itself (Kalathil and 
Boas 2003:2).  The internet, however, is just a set of connections. It could be used for 
expressing different political opinions and work as a public sphere in Habermas’s term 
(1962). It also could be used for other purposes. Rather than the technology itself, the 
users are the key. Second, the government is also an active party. It uses many means to 
shape the physical and symbolic environments in cyberspace. Indeed, censorship has 
been expanded from the physical world into the virtual one, and China’s cyberspace is 
restricted by regulations inherited from the pre-reform years (Kalathil and Boas 
2003:13). According to a report published by the OpenNet Initiative in April 2005, 
“China operates the most extensive, technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching 
system of internet filtering in the world” (OpenNet Initiative 2005).  
The internet as used by the populace in China has eroded authoritarian control in 
numerous ways. Successful online protests have served as evidence of this, for example, 
Deng Yujiao’s incident which was mentioned earlier in this chapter. But while Chinese 
netizens are pressing for democracy in cyberspace and complaining about the current 
government of China, popular nationalistic sentiments can also be found online. Thus, 
the second problem of these political leaders’ visions of the development of the internet 
in developing counties like China is that although the internet is definitely making 
changes in China, these changes are not necessarily in support of democracy.  
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         A market-driven approach to economic and social policy has been gradually 
accepted by the Chinese government and Chinese people, especially after the economic 
reformation in 1979. But this of course does not mean that the market for ideas has 
become unregulated by the state. As mentioned above, censorship has been practiced as 
a necessary governing method and expanded into cyberspace. “Control of information 
has been central to the Chinese Communist Party’s governing strategy ever since it came 
to power” (Kalathil and Boas 2003:17). The tension caused by the dissonance between 
economic modernization and political control has been growing for decades. During the 
Maoist period, the media’s function was to serve the state. Mao’s regime used the 
vertical control of communication to impose ideological hegemony (Kalathil and Boas 
2003:18). That could be effective because telecommunication networks were accessible 
only to social elites in those days. But with 423 million netizens in China today (CNNIC 
2010: 2), using a medium that allows unprecedented access to multiple sources of 
information, a political challenge has necessarily arisen towards an autocratic style of 
leadership. The old-style Confucian teaching, “the people may be made to follow, but 
may not be made to know” (The Analects 8:9), may not be sufficient today. Conflicts 
between the governing and the governed invariably exist, and complaints toward the 
government from citizens can be found anywhere. Therefore, it is worth asking how 
serious and strict is censorship in China’s cyberspace? Are Western accusations about 
this problem reasonable? One cannot answer these questions without using situations in 
other countries as references.  
Generally speaking, developing countries pay more attention than developed 
countries to controlling cyberspace for reasons of ideology, cultural preservation, and 
religion (Li 2009: 101). For example, most governments in the Middle East have their 
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own proxy server which is used to filter information from cyberspace. Only selected 
websites are accessible. The websites they block usually contain anti-Muslim ideas or 
pornography (Yan 2001). In India, sites containing derogatory references to Islam are 
blocked by ISPs (Internet Service Providers). The government worries that such content 
could potentially inflame religious sensitivities and create social disorder. Under the 
name of protecting social harmony, many well-known search engines have been filtered 
in India since they may lead internet users to “inappropriate” information (OpenNet 
Initiative 2006). Religion is the primary justification those governments have used for 
practicing censorship; in countries like China, religion is not so much an issue compared 
to those mentioned above.  
South Korea, which shares a cultural background of Confucianism with China, 
also has a set of strict rules for censoring the internet. Actually, it is South Korea which 
built the first government internet surveillance institution in the world (Du 2006). The 
South Korea Information and Communication Ethics Committee (ICEC) has far-ranging 
rights in “internet jamming”. In response to the growing sophistication and dynamism of 
the internet, the South Korean government is authorized to exercise discretion over 
“illegal” online content and “harmful” materials for young people. Besides, the South 
Korea government agency also enforces real-name registration requirements for its 
netizens in order to closely monitor their online activities (OpenNet Initiative 2010). 
The management of information in Western cyberspaces is not as open as 
sometimes thought, although the state plays a relatively weak role. The operation of the 
internet in most developed countries relies more on the market rather than on state 
control (Li 2009: 105). Instead of making new regulations and laws concerning control 
of the internet, existing laws are used to keep activities in cyberspace well disciplined, 
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for example, laws on electronic commerce and laws protecting intellectual property. 
Generally speaking, governments from developed countries are more cautious when they 
are trying to use political power to make interventions in cyberspace. Commonly, they 
use an “online information rating system” that is similar to the well-known “motion 
picture rating system” and “industry self-regulation” as their principal means of 
administration. They rarely ban or block information directly, as the Chinese 
government does (Fan 2002). Using different countries as a reference, we thus can have 
an overview of how serious censorship is in China. While compared to developed 
countries like the United States, cyberspace in China is quite closed. Unlike other 
authoritarian regimes, such as those in Islamic countries that carefully mete out access to 
the internet, the Chinese government has chosen to encourage mass internet usage and 
education (Kalathil and Boas 2003: 25).  
           Those who criticize the Chinese government and its censorship policy hold a 
presupposition that individual rights, which usually are associated with economic and 
political freedom, are more important than collective rights, which usually are associated 
with social control; those who defend the Chinese government think it should be the 
other way around. The former view focuses on the tension between individual freedom 
and public authority, while the latter view concentrates on reconciling the conflict 
between individual freedom and social order. One may say that the former view 
represents a Western idealism that some say is impractical for China. However, along 
with China’s growing economy, economic liberalism is becoming the new theme in 
contemporary China. In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Milton Friedman said that 
economic freedom is an extremely important component as well as a necessary 
condition of total freedom (Friedman 1962). After satisfying citizens’ needs for 
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economic freedom, the requests for a more open ideology will surely be put on the table. 
Therefore, it is interesting to see what the ideological landscape looks like through the 
eyes of individual internet users in China. In an age of globalization, many Western 
ideas have been pouring into China. Chinese people are adjusting to the situation while 
localizing these ideas. The issue of internet censorship is a typical example of this, as we 
will see in this thesis.   
 
Methodology  
In order to accomplish my research goal, I conducted fieldwork both in Beijing and 
Hong Kong from June through August 2010, during which I interviewed 45 people in 
depth. I used purposive sampling and chain referral sampling. Among my informants, 21 
were returnees who came back from the U.S., 4 were local Beijingers whom I 
interviewed simply to compare with those who returned from overseas, and the 
remaining 20 were returnees who came back from Hong Kong, Australia or Europe. 
They were aged from 20 to 40. All of them were heavy internet users who were online 
more than three hours per day. All of them have a university education and have been 
overseas for varying numbers of years.  
Additional fieldwork was conducted in February 2011. The site was Richmond, 
Virginia (U.S.). The site was chosen based on personal connections with people who fit 
my informant profile. Those connections were provided by one of my former key 
informants, who helped me in looking up potential informants. During this second 
period of fieldwork, I interviewed 13 more Chinese who were studying or working in 
Richmond. This second fieldwork mainly focused on finding data that related to social 
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events that happened after my initial fieldwork, for example, the case of Liu Xiaobo, the 
Nobel Peace Prize winner imprisoned by China, and the Chinese Jasmine Movement. 
Since the particular social context one lives in, and significant others one lives with, may 
alter one’s ways of answering questions about controversial issues, settings are also 
crucial for ethnographic research. Therefore, I felt that it would be a good idea to 
interview Chinese who are not in China but overseas as well, in order to enrich my data. 
Besides these two periods of fieldwork, I have kept in touch with most of my 
informants, getting updated information from them every month. Shortly after I came 
back to Hong Kong from the U.S. in early March 2011, Ai Weiwei was arrested. In 
order to include this significant case in my thesis, I did follow-up interviews with my 
informants through Skype.  
Although I chose my informants largely based on prior contacts, and thus they do 
not represent a random sample, the themes I explore in this thesis transcend individual 
views; they explore ideas familiar to most educated Chinese. As such, while the results 
presented in this thesis do not represent everyone in China, they are still a fair 
representation of how educated Chinese people understand the contradictions between 
traditional paternalistic and totalitarian governmentality and Western liberalism. 
For interviewing, I used both unstructured and semi-structured interviewing 
strategies. According to Bernard, “unstructured interviewing is excellent for building 
initial rapport with people, before moving to more formal interviews” (Bernard 2006: 
213). This gives an advantage for investigating sensitive topics like censorship and 
nationalism. On the other hand, semi-structured interviewing works particularly well in 
projects that deal with high-level bureaucrats and elite members of a society (Bernard 
2006: 212), who make up an important segment of my informants. Each interview was 
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taped, and lasted approximately two hours, during which topics such as “the accuracy of 
online news”, “the Google-China affair”, “the anti-sansu6 movement [反三俗]”, 
“cultural imperialism”, “the 314 Tibet movement and the anti-CNN movement”, “the 
experiences of fanqiang [翻墙; leaping over “the Great Firewall”]”, “the effect of 
Weibo” and so on, were covered. I also held a focus group in Beijing, in which seven 
university students who studied in the U.S. attended. Each informant chosen for this 
group had at least three years’ overseas living experience.  I taped and transcribed this 
focus group interview as well. 
The questions that I posed at the beginning of the research and the discussions 
offered by my informants sometimes proceeded in quite different directions. This of 
course is an inevitable part of ethnographic research. Each of my informants chose their 
favorite parts of cyberculture to talk about, although I also had my own strict list of 
topics to be covered concerning internet censorship. As a researcher, I was interested in 
how my informants viewed and interacted with censorship in their daily internet use. But 
interviews also ended up discussing other social issues, such as gossip concerning 
Google, interesting net language usage, international politics, the Sino-America and 
Sino-Japan relationships, the CCP’s governmentality, rumors about certain officials and 
ongoing social issues, and so on. Our range of topics touched different subjects rather 
than only censorship itself. Although at the time it sometimes seemed to me that the 
focus of my interviews had been diverted, nonetheless the subjects we discussed were 
actually interrelated and together contributed to an understanding of my informants’ 
introspections concerning the issue of internet censorship. The subjects included in my 
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interviews could be divided into three categories based on three different key 
components of internet censorship: technology, the state, and users. All discussions 
revolved around two themes: freedom/discipline and resistance/accommodation, as I 
will be discussing throughout this thesis.  
Beijing was chosen as my primary field site because of my previous experience 
in the city and prior contacts with informants. From an analytical standpoint, Beijing is 
suitable for doing this research since my target informants are returnees. According to 
the data from the China Education Association for International Exchange [CEAIE 2010] 
nearly 30% of Chinese students abroad are from Beijing. More than one billion RMB is 
spent on education for overseas students by Beijing citizens every year. Evidently, 
Beijing exports many more Chinese students to other countries compared to other cities 
in China.  
 
Chapter Breakdown  
Chapter 1, the introduction, has discussed the significance and main content of this 
thesis and provided background information concerning the current situation of China’s 
cyberspace, as well as my methodology. Chapter 2 provides a literature review, 
delineating the various ways in which anthropology has explored the realm of 
cyberculture and cyber-politics, as well as the nationalism that is the underlying context 
of this research. Following these initial two chapters, I enter into the main part of the 
thesis, analyzing what my informants told me. The sequence of this part of the thesis 
follows a simple logic, using the “Google-China affair” as a basis for discussion. 
Chapter 3 is a detailed narrative of the affair and my informants’ views on this affair. 
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Chapter 4 is about the issue of “freedom of access to information” and Chapter 5 is 
about “freedom of expression”. The former chapter is about information input, and the 
latter chapter concerns information output.  
Chapter 6, the conclusion, presents the patterns I found in my informants’ 
accounts, focusing particularly on nationalism, and the nationalistic emotions released 
through debates on internet censorship. I discuss how nationalism is generated, 
expressed, and utilized by Chinese netizens and the Chinese government in cyberspace, 
and consider how internet censorship works not only as a policy for disciplining people, 
but also in creating social memories for internet users in China. The confrontations with 
internet police and web managers, the online protests, and the experiences of fanqiang 
[翻墙; bypassing “the Great Firewall”]shared by the generation growing up with the 
internet are all helping to create new collective memories that serve certain social 
functions such as increasing social solidarity. I argue in this concluding chapter that 











Chapter 2. Literature Review  
This chapter offers an overview of significant literature published on internet censorship 
and Chinese nationalism, within which I contextualize my own research. There are three 
sections in this chapter. The first section depicts the historical context of the 
anthropology of cyberspace, and then discusses how to study the web anthropologically. 
The second section of the chapter focuses on the situation in China. Both overseas and 
domestic researchers’ writings on how the internet is influencing Chinese society and 
how the current governance of cyberspace affects Chinese society are examined. The 
third section discusses the major theories and research on nationalism, especially 
Chinese nationalism.  
 
The Anthropology of Cyberspace 
The term “cyberspace” first emerged in William Gibson’s book Neuromancer (1984). 
The prefix “cyber” was coined in mathematician Norbert Wiener’s book, Cybernetics or 
Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948). “Today, the prefix 
‘cyber’ refers generally to computer and information technologies and how humans 
interact with and through them” (Budka and Kremser 2004: 213). Arturo Escobar 
identified the anthropological fields of enquiry regarding cyberspace (Escobar 1994). He 
created the concept of “cyberculture” to analyze the fundamental transformation of 
structure and meaning of modern society due to the development of information and 
biological technologies. Ever since, the term “cyber anthropology” has been used to 
refer to the anthropology of cyberculture. For Escobar, cyberculture includes both 
informational technology and biotechnology. In this thesis, following a common practice 
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of those who study cybercultures, I have limited my scope to the study of informational 
and communication technologies (ICTs). 
 “Cyber-anthropology or anthropology of cyberculture deals with technologies 
and how they are constructed and implemented in society and culture” (Budka and 
Kremser 2004: 214). In this respect, cyber-anthropology is not new, since works 
exploring the relationship between technologies and society have taken place since the 
1950s. Many earlier anthropological works on technology and society concentrated on 
studying underdeveloped societies (Budka and Kremser 2004). 
Apparently, similar approaches to understanding the relationship between 
technology and social actions cannot be directly adapted to highly complex modern 
societies. However, with the invention of the internet, cybernetic research also emerged 
in modern societies. Among the different ways in which the internet is used and 
investigated by anthropologists, three are identified as follows:  
1. The internet is simply used as a research tool, for searching out information, 
keeping in touch with informants, etc.  
2. The internet is understood as an object and brought into the field of research. 
This type of project focuses on interpreting the effects and consequences of the 
internet on certain societies.  
3. Cyberspace is considered as the field site. Research like Coming of Age in 
Second Life: An Anthropologist Explores the Virtually Human (Boellstorff 2008) 
is a typical example. These researchers treat cyberspace to be as real as physical 
space, and apply traditional anthropological research methods (participant 
observation) to online communities.  
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These three ways of doing research on cyberspace are not exclusive to each other, 
but are mutually influential and inseparable. Current research has used them to 
understand the impact of the internet to modern societies in a variety of ways. In this 
thesis, all three methods are used to a different degree, although the research was mainly 
conducted through face-to-face interviews.  
 
How to Study the Web Anthropologically 
To study the Web anthropologically, three things are important. First, the researcher 
needs to be familiar with the administrative policies of the portion of cyberspace he/she 
studies. In my case, Chinese cyberspace is different from much other cyberspace 
because of the state’s practice of censorship. In China, officials use a number of 
different tactics to control online content, including keyword filtering, banned content, 
and human monitors (Xiao 2011: 207-209). “A list obtained by the China Internet 
Project in Berkeley found that over 1,000 words, including dictatorship, truth, and riot 
police, are automatically banned in China’s online forums” (Xiao 2011: 207). Aside 
from words, certain topics are also automatically filtered, in a list of “sensitive words” 
and “sensitive topics” that is continually updated. Although the central government has a 
particular department in charge of censoring online information, the government’s 
primary strategy for shaping online content is to transfer the responsibility to internet 
service providers and internet access providers. Those business parties, then, are made 
responsible for the behavior of their customers. This is known as the “self-
censorship/regulation” policy. Because of this strategy, business operators like Baidu 
have little choice but to proactively censor information provided by their own sites (Xiao 
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2011: 207-208). On the other hand, as business operators, companies like Baidu are also 
market-oriented. They can’t just focus on following the central government’s desire for 
censorship and neglect internet users’ desire for free information. They need to find a 
way to balance these two desires. This has led to the differentiated cyber environments 
provided by different internet operators in China. Thus, internet censorship in China is 
not merely a matter of government control but also a matter of individual managers’ 
interpretations concerning the central government’s policies, and their own definitions of 
“sensitivity”. When conducting interviews, I avoided questions like “Do you think 
censorship in China is a serious problem?” This could be a misleading question since it 
oversimplifies the situation and overlooks the dynamic between the state, internet 
operators, and netizens. Instead, more concrete questions were used during my research, 
for example, questions focusing on specific cases.  
Second, participant-observation as the classic anthropological research method is 
valid to use when studying an online community. Even though people use pseudonyms, 
their true identities are not concealed in terms of what they say and do online. People 
may be more honest when they participate online than offline because the faceless nature 
of the internet makes them felt secure (Boellstorff 2008). That’s why during my research, 
although interviews were the fundamental method I used, I also followed my 
informants’ online activities to see whether there is a difference between their oral 
narrative and their online participation. Many publications have contributed to this type 
of study in which the internet is considered as a cultural vehicle, for example 
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Third, to study the internet anthropologically, it is important to remember that to 
a large degree what is happening online can be seen as a reflection of what happens in 
physical reality. Stewart M. Hoover and Jinkyu Park discovered the dynamic between 
these two realities by focusing on discussions about how traditional religious beliefs 
have been affected by the internet and how new kinds of religions are initiated in 
cyberspace (Hoover and Park 2005). In another example, Aihwa Ong (2007) examines 
how Chinese ethnic identity has been enhanced globally through cyberspace, and Zhou 
Yongming’s study of Chinese minjian writers (2005) also shows the interplay between 
the internet and physical reality.  
In this thesis, I take a similar approach examining the myriad ways in which the 
internet and society affects each other and contributes to the emergence of a new 
ideological landscape in contemporary China. Methodologically speaking, this thesis is 
written mainly based on old fashioned ethnographic interviewing.  
 
Research about Cyberspace  
Anthropologists Daniel Miller and Don Slater (2000) for the first time holistically 
studied the use of the internet in a specific culture. They analyzed “how members of a 
specific culture attempt to make themselves at home in a transforming communicative 
environment, how they can find themselves in this environment and at home” (Miller 
and Slater 2000: 1). They examine how local people in Trinidad, in the Caribbean, make 
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 Brenda Danet’s research on “rainbow” activity studied an online community in which people connect to 
each other via online chatting and playing  “rainbow”, which is a game of creating figurative images. 
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use of the internet in different social realms, such as religion and the economy. Their 
research covered almost every aspect of how the internet influenced that particular 
society. They were convinced that internet usages “have become forms of practice” 
rather than just a technology. It is a material culture rather than merely a kind of 
technology (Miller and Slater 2000: 193). During my own fieldwork, I discovered that 
my informants also saw cyberspace as an extension of physical space. Rather than using 
the internet as a simple source of information, they used it as a way in which they can re-
connect to their motherland and be “present” in many current social events while living 
overseas.  
Besides Leadbeater (2007), who argues that the internet could provoke the 
development of democracy (Chapter 1: 6), Everette E. Dennis and Robert W. Snyder 
also have collected a series of articles (1998) examining the relationship between the 
internet and democracy. Unlike Leadbeater’s optimistic view, the articles in Dennis and 
Snyder’s book argue that the emancipatory role of media, whether in mature 
democracies of the West or fragile new governments in developing countries, shouldn’t 
be assumed. They held a rather conservative attitude towards the potential positive 
impact of the internet on democracy. Nonetheless, even though these scholars realize the 
complexity of the relationship between the internet and democracy, generally they still 
believe that free information can make people more rational and have effects on 
democratization (Dennis and Snyder 1998: 16).   
However, Cass R. Sunstein takes a different stand, arguing that cyberspace is not 
an “anarchic zone” created by individuals, but a “republic.com” constructed by their 
governors (2006). He argues that the overload of information created by the internet is 
not a help for building a better and more democratic society, but a burden to it. He 
 32 
 
disagrees with the popular idea that more information makes individuals more rational, 
and argues that the overload of information may not eliminate but rather reinforce the 
biases held by individuals. He uses the term “information cocoon” (Sunstein 2006: 9) to 
describe the situation that despite the large amount of diversified information individuals 
can potentially receive, they tend to only pay attention to that which they like and only 
talk with those who share their same interests. Individuals, whether ordinary people or 
political leaders, are largely shaped by their preconceived ideas. Therefore, Sunstein 
argues, cyberspace and the information within it are not providing us an opportunity to 
be more objective but rather offer supporting data for the biases we already have 
(Sustein 2006).  
The internet and Web 2.0 are transforming our lives in many ways. “Computer 
simulations may soon be so pervasive that life itself will require some sort of mark of 
authenticity. Reality, in other words, may one day come with an asterisk” (Slouka 1995: 
7). What this indicates is that the internet and cyberspace will blur the boundaries 
between physical and aphysical environments, which can bring tremendous changes to 
social life. Slouka puts forward the concept of the “virtual political” to refer to those 
political changes that may happen because of the missing boundaries between the virtual 
and the physical. Although the internet changes our social life in many respects, Slouka 
chose to examine its impact on politics alone because “no technology is ever a neutral 
force” and the core issue of the digital revolution, like all other kinds of revolutions, lies 
in power relations, he argues (Slouka 1995: 8).  
As for power relations in cyberspace, Tim Jordan attempts to answer the question 
of what kind of knowledge leads to cyberpower, presenting a wide-ranging introduction 
to “the politics of the internet” (1999). Cyberpower has three intertwined levels, he 
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argues (Jordan 1999). If we see cyberspace as a playground for individuals, then 
cyberpower will appear as a possession which an individual can use. If we see 
cyberspace as a social field where communities exist, cyberpower will appear as a 
technopower in which greater freedom is offered for those who can most manipulate 
internet technologies. This second kind of cyberpower is usually possessed by elites like 
Bill Gates, Kevin Mitnick, and Linus Torvalds. The third level of cyberpower resembles 
the idea of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). When cyberspace is understood 
as a digital nation, cyberpower refers to the imagination through which individuals 
recognize each other and commit to a virtual life in this imagined community. In his 
book, Jordan focuses more on the first two levels of cyberpower, claiming that 
“cyberspace and the internet are riven by a sociological, cultural, economic, and political 
battle between the grassroots and elites” (Jordan 1999: 1). In this thesis, I focus more on 
the third type of cyberpower and discuss how Chinese nationalism has been nourished in 
the age of the internet.  
Battles between elites and the general public have shaped the new media 
landscape (Nunziato 2009). Nunziato, as a promoter of free speech, argues that we 
should rethink the role that free speech plays in facilitating liberal democracy and put 
this issue into the context of the new media landscape. Commonly, only the right of free 
expression is applied against government censorship. However, the media landscape has 
changed. Private speech conduits have become more important than free speech 
(Nunziato 2009). Thus self-regulation is just as important and as influential as state 
censorship.  Communication giants like Google and Comcast enjoy increasingly 
unchecked control over speech. Therefore, the changes in free speech law make the state 
the only entity that needs to refrain from censorship: companies can just “self-regulate” 
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(Nunziato 2009: 194).  His critique reminds us that the nation-state is not the only entity 
that can interfere with online free speech.  
The question of “who rules/should rule the net?” has been raised by Thierer and 
Crews (2003). They try to answer this question: “Since no single entity or any nation-
state owns or controls the internet, is it appropriate to found a ‘cyber-UN’?” (Thierer and 
Crews 2003: 503) When clashes of values happen in cyberspace, how can the problem 
be solved? Thierer and Crews suggest that we should consider the state as a bureaucratic 
institution in society but not the specific government of any nation, and use different 
criteria to make laws and politics in cyberspace as compared to physical space (Thierer 
and Crews 2003: 15). What role the state should play in cyberspace is always a 
controversial issue. Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas maintain that authoritarian 
governments use two methods, “reactive” and “proactive”, to combat the challenges 
brought by the internet. “Reactive” ways of regulation are more noticeable, and 
commonly used by these governments. These include strategies like filtering information 
and blocking websites. “Proactive” ways of regulation focus more on diverting public 
attention. These two ways of cyberspace management are not incompatible, but rather 
are typically used together by authoritarian governments. And they are quite commonly 
practiced in China’s cyberspace.  
“Freedom of expression” is the core issue brought out in almost every one of 
these books concerning cyberspace.  Indeed, “freedom of expression is a treasured 
human right but it has never been assigned an absolute value” (Timofeeva 2006: 13). It 
is not easy to find the appropriate means to regulate cyberspace, although it is important 
that the free flow of information and ideas in cyberspace be in some way regulated. 
While Antonia Z. Cowan argues that “because the internet is a means, not a location, it 
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exists and functions outside the traditional governmental spheres of central control, 
sovereignty, and regulation” (Timofeeva quoted 2006: 45), Timofeeva suggests that 
government can regulate the Web by controlling “input users” [online content creators], 
“internet service providers”, “output users” [online content receivers] and “indirect 
points of control” [referring to the control of big companies like Google]. To Timofeeva, 
“everything is objectionable” (Timofeeva 2006: 18). Thus, online content can be 
objectified, categorized, and disciplined. She argues that certain online restrictions are 
necessary, although “any filtering technology inevitably overblocks” (Timofeeva 2006: 
105). 
Narain Dass Batra treats “freedom” as a variable rather than a constant. He 
believes that “freedom” emerges from the dynamics of the core values of a social system 
(Batra 2008: 3) and is convinced that the internet as a communications technology has 
immense power that can change the traditional definition of freedom in different cultures 
and can disturb the dynamic equilibrium in those societies. Consequently, it may help 
create a new system of guiding and controlling values that would alter the original 
trajectory for how the concept of freedom may evolve naturally. Instead of seeing free 
speech as a civil right from a legal perspective, as does Timofeeva, he treats it as a 
cultural concept which has no absolute value. He focuses more on exploring the tension 
between the boundlessness of the internet and the boundaries of the marketplace rather 
than simply addressing “freedom of expression” as a universal right owned by all 
autonomous beings.   
Besides this published research of individual scholars, the OpenNet Initiative, as 
a collaborative partnership of different institutions, also contributes to our knowledge on 
cyberspace development by periodically publishing online reports. Most of their work 
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aims at investigating, exposing and analyzing the practice of internet censorship around 
the world. 
 
China’s Cyberspace  
Although the internet penetration rate in mainland China was still relatively low in 2008, 
at 28.7% (IWS 2009), compared to more mature markets such as the U.S. (76.3%), 
Japan (75.5%) or Iceland (93.2%), given the size of the Chinese population and the 
country’s rapid economic growth, the number will continue to rapidly increase (IWS 
2009). Internet use climbed to 31.6% by the end of July 2010 (IWS quoted CNNIC 
2010).  According to the last statistics offered by CNNIC [China Internet Network 
Information Center], the number of netizens in China has reached 420 million, the 
largest number of internet users in the world (CNNIC 2010). The quick development of 
the internet has raised heated debates not only in academic circles but in society at large. 
Much recent research has focused on the internet’s effects on China’s authoritarian 
system. Some argued that the digital society in China should be seen as a new social 
formation that has emerged from the interactions between the internet and civil society 
(Yang 2009: 17). Even with highly concentrated censorship, the internet as an 
informational technology is altering the old social structure of Chinese society, Yang 
argues, in his another article which discussed social protests in China (2008). Although 
Karsten Giese used the phrase “virtual panopticon” to portray the Chinese internet in 
order to emphasize the power of the state (quoted in Yang 2008:62), Yang gives more 
credit to individual agency. As he writes, “Chinese internet users and activists are skilled 
social actors. They have developed creative ways of negotiating and fighting Internet 
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control” (Yang 2008: 62). Because there is neither a triumph of total control nor of 
resistance, the internet is able to serve as a central field for political struggle. Chinese 
netizens are frustrated by government controls (Yang 2008: 63), with demands for 
governmental transparency, accountability and free speech continually increasing. The 
new struggles are “diffuse, fluid, and guerilla-like, both organized and unorganized, and 
networked both internally and externally, online with offline” (Yang 2008: 63), quite 
different from former struggles.  
Rather than being passive receivers, the internet has enabled Chinese people to 
act as independent watchdogs over governmental decisions, Zhou argues, as shown by 
how minjian [民间; unofficial] political writers work and speak under censorship. The 
relationship between the government and minjian writers is dialogic and dynamic in its 
tensions and negotiations (Zhou 2005) ever since the internet made these writers’ works 
more visible than before. However, He Qinglian portrays a different picture in Wusuo 
Zhongguo (2006). He thinks censorship in China’s cyberspace can be overwhelming. He 
denies any causal relationship between the market economy and media liberalization and 
argues that the internet cannot bring the dawn of information and expressive freedom in 
China, and is useless in improving the situation (He 2006). He also claims that the 
Chinese government just uses protection of less-educated Chinese people as an excuse 
for censorship.  
Unlike He’s pessimistic arguments on censored cyberspace, Xiao Qiang, on the 
other hand, argues that “the expansion of the internet and Web-based media are 
changing the rules of the game between society and state” in China (Xiao 2011: 203).  
He details the emerging dynamics of the “cat and mouse game” being played by Chinese 
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netizens and internet polices by offering a series of concrete cases, such as the 
Chongqing nail house
8
, environmental protests in Xiamen
9




Besides censorship, cyber nationalism is another important topic in China’s 
cyberspace. After examining the evolution of the Chinese internet over the past two 
decades, Xu Wu clarifies the concept of Chinese cyber nationalism by defining it as “a 
non-government sponsored ideology and movement that has originated, existed, and 
developed in China’s online sphere over the past decade (1994-present)” (Xu 2007: 2). 
He argues that Chinese cyber nationalism is a natural extension from China’s traditional 
nationalism but different from both the CCP’s version of patriotism and Chinese 
nationalism in a historical sense (Xu 2007:2-3). Therefore, Chinese cyber nationalists 
“focus primarily on those international issues involving China and strive to retain 
China’s historical status as a respectable power” (Xu 2007: 3).  
The multifarious discourses concerning international relationships or domestic 
political issues in China’s cyberspace has been interpreted as a “discourse carnival” by 
David K. Herold. He borrows Bakhtin’s carnival theory and asserts that the major 
motivation of netizens’ online participation is seeking emotional catharsis. Thus, it is 
reasonable to claim that the online “discourse carnival” indicates resistance (Herold 
                                                 
8
 “Nail house” is a neologism in China, “At a time when many urban homes are being demolished and 
residents relocated, the term has sprung up to describe houses in which the owners refuse to budge. Like a 
nail sticking up through a plank of wood, they are difficult to remove” (Li 2007). The Chongqing nail 
house refers to an extreme case in which a house owner resisted a local developer and refused for two 
years to vacate his house. [http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy/china_nail_4500.jsp] 
9
 This refers to Xiamen Citizen’s protest against a PX chemical plant. It is always cited as the first and 
most dramatic display of a growing willingness among Chinese people to confront local government and 
its development plans, specifically over environment issues.   
10
 This refers to a series of forced labour cases in Shanxi, China. Thousands of Chinese people including 
children had been forced to work as slaves in illegal brickyards in Shanxi. They had been tortured by the 
owners of the brickyards. Some of them even had been beaten to death. Netizens protested online and 
requested the central government punish the brickyards’ owners as well as the local government. The 
protest made certain impacts but the results were not so well marked (Tencent News 2007).   
 39 
 
2009). However, if we see this phenomenon from Max Gluckman’s point of view, this 
“carnival” can be considered as a “ritual of rebellion” (Gluckman 1954). The animosity 
from rebels in Gluckman’s account can only exist in a ritualized form. Such “resistance” 
helps release social tensions by providing controlled expression of hostility which 
ultimately promotes social cohesion rather than destroys it (Gluckman 1940: 187-221). 
In additional research, Herold found that although Chinese people may be frustrated 
about the lack of free speech in China, they can be truly angry and defensive when 
Westerners claim that the “Chinese are brainwashed” (Herold 2009: 1).  I have found a 
similar effect in my own research. 
 
Nationalism and Chinese Nationalism 
Aside from the internet, nationalism is the other main theme of this thesis. In this section 
theories of nationalism will be examined as well as theories and studies of Chinese 
nationalism in particular.  
Nationalism is the belief that one’s nation is of primary importance. It is “a 
political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” 
(Gellner 1997:23), and is a product of modernity and industrialization. The creation of 
national culture was compelled for fulfilling the requirements of industrialization 
(Gellner 1997).  
Anderson tells us that “a nation is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1983:6). 
Anderson draws his argument from the development of mass media and claims that the 
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rise of nationalism is closely related to the rise of print capitalism. After stepping into 
the information era, Anderson’s theory on how nationalism is spreading and enforced 
through print media may be dated. However, even if print media is not the most popular 
medium any longer, the construction of “imagined communities” has never stopped. In 
this thesis, I argue that the internet indeed accelerates the sense of belonging to the same 
“imagined community” among my informants.   
Eriksen also argues that nationalism is a modern concept although nations tend 
to imagine themselves as old (2002: 96-119). In Ethnicity and Nationalism (2002), he 
analyzes the relationship between minority groups and the state as well as how the 
idea of nationalism is imposed upon different groups of people that geographically 
belong to the same nation. Minority cultures are commonly sacrificed during the 
establishment of a united national culture (Eriksen 2002: 123). Hence, national 
identity became the primary identification for all people living in the same country 
regardless of their self-ascriptions. 
If we only discuss nationalism in a general sense, it may seem unnecessary to 
bring up the issue of ethnicity. However, my research was done in the Chinese context in 
which ethnic conflicts always trigger intensive nationalistic backlash. During interviews, 
my informants became touchy when asked about issues relating to Tibet. Even those 
who didn’t spend much time searching news related to Tibet claimed that Western media 
should stop meddling in this matter. None of them seemed concerned for the Tibetan 
people’s self-ascriptions. To them, Tibetans are first and foremost Chinese. One feature 
that ethnicity and the nation-state share is that they both have something to do with the 
“classification of people and group relationship” (Eriksen 2002: 4). Both of them to 
some degree force us to consider the concepts of “selves” and “others” in terms of 
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cultural distinction. The nationalism I found among my informants certainly came with a 
clear definition of “Chinese us” versus “Western others”.     
Unlike Gellner and Anderson, Anthony D. Smith does not only focus on a 
modernistic view to interpret nationalism, the view that nationalistic ideologies are the 
expression of modern, industrial society. He discusses nationalism from the view of 
different camps, namely those of nationalists, perennialists, modernists and post-
modernists. Smith argues that the central question in our understanding of nationalism is 
“the role of the past in the creation of the present” (Smith 2001: 18).  Both nationalists 
and perennialists believe nations are immemorial. Different from nationalists who argue 
that the nation is a part of the natural order, perennialists claim that although the nation 
is not a part of natural existence and particular nations may eventually dissolve, the 
“identity of a nation” can remain unchanged. Therefore, the task of nationalism is to 
recover and to rebuild the submerged past. As for the modernists, the past is largely 
irrelevant because to them “nationalism, in short, is a product of modernity, nothing 
less” (Smith 2001: 50-51).  The post-modernists think the past is problematic and that 
“the present creates the past in its own image” (Smith 2001: 19). Therefore, in their 
definition, “nationalist intellectuals may freely select, invent and mix traditions in their 
quest for the imagined political community” (Smith 2001: 19).  
An alternative understanding on nationalism is to see it as an “existential 
mystification”. “Existential mystification is mystification based on our human 
condition and its fears” (Mathews 2009: lecture notes). Since the basic law of human 
life is the urge to gain self-esteem (Becker 1971: 66), people tend to earn self-esteem 
from the symbolic world, which makes life meaningful, on which a number of 
cultural fantasies are constructed (Becker 1971: 128). Nationalism is one of them, this 
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position maintains. It is a hero-system, in which a net of codified meanings and 
perceptions are in large part arbitrary and fictional. Nationalism provides individuals a 
meaning for their life on an even higher level than what money or family can bring. 
Being a patriot can make people feel that they are morally noble, or at least “morally 
correct” as my informants’ said. 
Furthermore, nationalism can also be seen as a prime example of “the mutual 
bluff”, a lie the government tells its citizens that citizens want to believe because it 
benefits both parties (Baumeister 1991: 360-361). Nowadays, the internet expands the 
effects of the mutual bluff by providing another stage for people to enact their social 
performances.   
The mutual bluff deals in this case with the dialogic interactions between the 
government and its subjects. But it doesn’t indicate to what extent people can freely 
choose to accept the lie that the society/nation-state tells them. It seems true that 
people voluntarily seek their self-worth through the mystification of nationalism. 
However, the question is how much can they be aware of that? During my fieldwork, 
my informants always claimed that their nationalistic enthusiasm is neither a result of 
state propaganda nor an irrational emotion. Their words provide me a lens to see how 
individual agency and the state’s ideology interact with each other.  
From the perspective of practice theory, nationalism can be seen as doxa 
(Bourdieu 1977), which is a common taken-for granted belief shared by most Chinese 
people. Based on my observation, what people do in cyberspace is not only an 
emotional abreaction. They also use their common faith to form social networks, in 
other words, to establish their social capital.  
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Although the idea of “loving your country” has been internalized by most 
Chinese people, individuals still can use their agency to turn the practice of patriotic 
social actions into something that is advantageous to their own personal life. Today’s 
Chinese nationalism is no longer tied to socialism. It is often used as a legitimized 
reason for social movement and resistance. Many forms of internet resistance are 
carried out in the name of nationalism. The protestors claim that they rebel because 
the current government isn’t governing the country in the right way. “Love your 
country” is utilized by them to confront the central government’s political actions. 
However, the truth is that these protests are concerned less with the nation-state’s 
development than with seeking social justices or individual well-being. That is why 
only cases like the “milk powder scandal” can easily draw attention from netizens, 
because it is closely related to netizens’ well-being and daily life.   
In sum, nationalism as an ideology is taken for granted by the majority of 
Chinese people. It also is strategically utilized by them. Although there is only limited 
room for individuals to use their agency, Chinese people are not being entirely passive 
in this “social game”.  
In China’s cyberspace it is rare to see anti-China discourses. My informants 
also claimed that they won’t publish anti-China comments online. It is not simply a 
result of central government’s surveillance. Although netizens would discuss social 
issues online, if they found any one crossing the line and “betraying” their country, 
they would persecute him/her through the use of the infamous “Human Flesh Search 
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Engines”11. This “Human Flesh Search” mechanism resembles “witchcraft” (Evans-
Pritchard 1976). Since no one wants to be searched by “Human Flesh Search 
Engines”, individuals start to watch what they say and engage in “appropriate” 
discourses when they are joining an online political discussion.  
 
Chinese Nationalism  
In this section, I discuss in what ways Chinese nationalism is different from 
nationalism in a general sense. To most observers, Chinese nationalism is different 
from that in other countries because China “is indeed among the extremely rare 
examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or 
entirely homogeneous” (Hobsbawm 1990: 66). Jared Diamond further states that 
“China has been Chinese, almost from the beginnings of its recorded history” 
(Diamond 1998: 323; emphasis in original). Prasenjit Duara also argues that the idea 
of nation as a uniquely modern institution shouldn’t be applied to China, which has 
“four millennia of documented history and two millennia of centralized rule” (Gries 
quoted Duara 2004: 7). He uses William Skinner’s work on regional systems, “which 
demonstrated the extensive commercial and social networks that linked villages in 
imperial China” (Duara quoted in Gries 2004: 152) as well as James Watson’s essays 
on popular gods during the Qing dynasty (Gries 2004: 152) to support his argument. 
Through examining pre-modern Chinese economic, religious and kinship institutions, 
Duara argues that the peasants in rural places were not isolated. They were linked to 
people in Beijing by sharing the same cosmology with them (Duara 1995: 21). Since 
                                                 
11
 The “Human Flesh Search” is a Chinese internet phenomenon where netizens use the internet to do 
massive researching about individual people that are involved in a hot social phenomena, and publicize it 
along with contact information to harass and humiliate the person.      
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Chinese people have already shared a common culture in the pre-modern era, “they 
were the ‘first nation’” (Duara 1995: 21).  
Many Chinese scholars share a similar confidence in this united nature of the 
Chinese people (Leibold 2007:1). Among them, the most famous is Fei Xiaotong. He 
argues that the Zhonghua minzu [Chinese nation] has a history of more than five 
thousand years of racial and cultural melding [minzu ronghe] (Fei 1989: 1-2).  
It is common that a nation state depicts itself as a bounded and ancient unity. It 
is a practice that is used by state elites to naturalize their political power. James 
Leibold argues that the idioms of time and space are usually employed in this process 
of naturalization by helping construct a myth of national belonging. The globe can be 
divided into discrete geographic entities and distinct “time zones” of progress 
(Leibold 2007: 3-4). Then, “space (geography) and time (history) serve as the two 
primordial axials that order human variation in the modern nation-state---powerful 
technologies for marking the boundary between national Self and Other” (Leibold 
2007: 4).  
This distinction between “national self” and “others” is usually stressed during 
war. It has become axiomatic within the studies of Chinese modern history that the 
struggle against foreign imperialism helped define the Chinese identity that we are 
seeing today. The Chinese identity was formed and strengthened through an unequal 
dialogic process which started in the late Qing dynasty, called “reversed colonial 
racism” by John Fitzgerald (1996: 136). Jing Tsu uses the language of “failure” to 
feature modern Chinese national identity, arguing that the Chinese national identity is 
built on failure. Chinese modern history, as the anxiety, humiliation, and injury of 
colonial victimization initiated the imagination of Chinese national identity among 
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Chinese people; it also holds out the alluring promise of future self-regeneration (Jing 
2005).  
Gries also agrees that Chinese nationalists unearth their national pride out of 
the history of national humiliation (2004). The 19
th
 century was a traumatic but also 
heroic historical period for Chinese people. Some Chinese people view China as a 
victor who overcame foreign interventions and finally woke up and developed into a 
world power in the late 20
th
 century. For others, China was a victim. Although these 
two views seem different, they in fact share the common denominator which is 
“pride” (Gries 2004: 43-53). Accordingly, these two interpretations of that period of 
humiliated history together fashioned the dynamic of the nationalistic discourses in 
present-day China.  
Among all the interactions with other nations, China’s relationship with the 
United State and Japan are crucial in understanding Chinese nationalism in recent 
decades (Gries 2004: 40). Gries argues that Chinese people’s widespread angry 
reaction toward the United States after the 1999 US bombing of Belgrade was not 
merely a consequence of the bombing. Instead, Chinese have held the perception of 
“Western aggression against China” for a long time (Gries 2004: 20), which may be 
shaped by the historical legacies of Western imperialism. However, Chinese people’s 
feelings towards the United States are more complicated than just general animosity. 
During the Maoist era, Chinese people used to see the United States as the arch-
enemy of their country. After the isolation of the cold war, China and the U.S. 
renewed their student-teacher dynamic, in which the U.S. was playing the role of 
teacher. Today’s Chinese youth rebel against this notion and seek a higher position for 
China in the hierarchy of the world’s nations (Gries 2004: 34-35). Some Chinese 
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nationalists even portray the United States as an upstart child who should be 
disciplined by the father, China (Gries 2004: 35). Meanwhile, they also use racism to 
define Chinese ethnic superiority. For example, in A Beijinger in New York (1993), a  
mainland Chinese television series, the main character, Mr. Wang, depicted 
Americans like hairy monkeys who are not as evolved as Chinese (Gries 2004:42).  
Unlike Americans whose national identities are defined by their citizenship, 
ethnic identity is an extremely important element for Chinese people to recognize 
themselves as Chinese. Hence, by claiming they were a group of people who had 
climbed higher than others in the evolutionary tree, Chinese people use their physical 
ethnic characteristics to strengthen their patriotic sense. This idea is still popular today. 
For example, Chinese people quite enjoy enumerating the physical differences 
between the Chinese and Japanese or Korean, which in fact barely exist. Similar 
statements were used by my informants to claim the superiority of the Chinese
12
 
ethnic group.   
Generally speaking there are two ways for people to strive for national identity: 
people can ground their national identity through resorting shared traditions that can 
be either real or invented, or, they can do it by establishing enemies, which will cause 
the increase of centripetal force within a group. “The quest for national identity 
blocked in one dimension, compensates in another” (Kim and Dittmer 1993: 288). 
Hence, when seeking traditions becomes difficult, given the fact that after Cultural 
Revolution many Chinese traditions were forgotten, some Chinese people reinforced 
their national identity by establishing enemies.  
                                                 
12
 In this thesis, if it is not specifically mentioned, Chinese refers to Han Chinese.  
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As for the Sino-Japanese relationship, it is even more perplexing given the 
intricate long history as well as the cultural similarities between the two societies. On 
the one hand, the “greater similarity allows the Sino-Japanese relationship to be 
captured by the older brother-younger brother metaphor” (Gries 2004: 35). On the 
other hand, Chinese nationalists are very sensitive about the power relations between 
the two nations. They would consider the Japanese to be morally inferior to them. 
They also consider that China and Japan are in an asymmetric relationship in which 
the Japanese are indebted to China and culturally inferior (Gries 2004: 37-40).  
James Watson argues that “it is ordinary people (not just state authorities) who 
played a central role in the promotion and perpetuation of a shared sense of cultural 
identity” (Watson 1993: 81). He argues that in some contexts, the sense of belonging 
can be activated among a group of people by nurturing a system of shared beliefs. 
Under other circumstances, practices or rites help maintain cultural unity (Watson 
1993: 83). In China’s case, “practice rather than belief was what made one Chinese” 
(Watson 1993: 87). For example, people of all social statuses performed funerals and 
weddings according to the same basic form in China over its history; and that makes 
them united and self-identified as Chinese (Watson 1993: 102). This is the conclusion 
Watson comes to in regard to pre-1950 China. However, this situation changed over 
the following two decades. Instead of considering the Cultural Revolution as a 
process of brainwashing, which might result in assimilation and integration, Watson 
argues that it is the Cultural Revolution that destroyed the “four olds” and forbade 
people to fall back on their ancestral standardized rituals which devastated the 
unification of the Chinese people (Watson 1993: 102-103).  
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“The original meaning of the English word nation—from the Latin verb nasci 
[to be born]—was simply a ‘group of people born in the same place’” (Kim and 
Dittmer 1993: 241). However, the concept of “nation” is quite vague in the Chinese 
language. The term minzu was imported from Japan during the 1980s for helping 
Chinese intellectuals to search for their national identity in a modern sense (Kim and 
Dittmer 1993: 251). As a multinational state, China has 56 minzu
13
 [民族; 
nation/ethnicity]. The term Zhonghua minzu [中华民族; Chinese nation] is used to 
refer to all Chinese. So, the question for those non-Han people, like Tibetans, is that 
of how can they be a member of the Zhonghua minzu but also a member of their own 
minzu? And how could these two minzu [nation vs. Chinese nation] identities avoid a 
clash? For solving these problems, the central government propagates “China’s 
identity as a socialist state” (Kim and Kittmer 1993: 268), in which all minzu can 
enjoy equality. Thus, a socialistic ideology was utilized for constructing the new 
Chinese identity. 
Yet, a new paradox was presented. Being a socialist state, the state’s primary 
ruling political ideology should be Marxism. “Can a Communist, who is an 
internationalist, at the same time, be a patriot?” (Kim and Dittmer 1993: 253) Mao 
Zedong responded to this question by disputing the theory of Marxism as “not a 
dogma but a guide to action” (Dittmer and Kim quoted Mao 1993: 196). He wrote, 
“the [dogmatists] must be replaced by the fresh, lively Chinese style and spirit which 
the common people of China love…”(Dittmer and Kim quoting Mao 1993: 254). 
Therefore, Marxism was not merely used as an ideology by Mao but also as a tool for 
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the Chinese proletariat to initiate revolutions. It was also essential for the re-
establishment of Chinese national identity. As ironic as it may sound, Mao as a 
Marxist did an amazing job at promoting a nationalistic ideology in the PRC. Even 
nowadays, talking about Maoism with people like my informants generated their 
nationalistic feelings. The idea of a “Chinese style” has been embedded among them. 
The argument that “China is special” and should not follow Western countries’ 
developmental path was frequently brought out by my informants.  
Barth (1969) paints an entirely different picture of social identity, one that 
goes against the standard Chinese view today. He denies the preceding theories which 
considered ethnic groups as discontinuous cultural isolates or naturally existing 
categories. According to Barth, cultural variation may be an effect rather than a cause 
of group boundaries (Barth 1969: 9-38). Ethnic groups should be considered as 
“categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves” (Barth 1969: 10).  
Although ethnic identity is different from national identity, these two concepts 
are often interlinked. Zhonghua minzu refers to all people who live inside China’s 
territory; it is an integrity that includes 56 ethnic groups (Fei 1999). When Sun Yat-
Sen established the Republic of China in 1912, he emphasized that the Chinese belong 
to the yellow race because they come from the blood stock of the yellow race. The 
blood of their ancestors is transmitted by heredity down through the race, making 
blood kinship a powerful force (Sun 1981). Thus, by promoting a racialized identity, 
Sun for the first time united the modern Chinese people and recreated/redefined 
boundaries. The national boundary had been accentuated while the sub-ethnical 
boundaries had been dimmed. Hence, the new Chinese national identity can be seen 
as a politically mobilized Chinese ethnic identity.  
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This Chinese identity is not natural but artificially constructed, as is the so-
called Chinese race. Subsequently, “Chinese culture” and “Chinese traditions” have 
been invented for the purpose of justifying Chinese identity. Cultural differences are 
constructed for satisfying people’s sense of ascription. They also help maintain 
cultural boundaries. For it is “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the 
cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1969: 15). 
The internet has been considered as a challenge to this boundary. In the early 
1990s, the internet was widely believed to lead to the overthrow of authoritarian 
regimes as well as the end of national identity since it opened a door for individuals 
and provided them with opportunities to experience other cultures, which suggested 
the fragmentation of the old common value system shared by a particular social group. 
Also, cultural imperialism from powerful countries has been considered by scholars. 
Many worry that a “McWorld” could be created. Nonetheless, this is not entirely true 
according to what we are witnessing today. Rather than losing one’s national identity, 
the internet activated interactions among social groups and made people become more 
aware about their identities.  
Chinese identity is one of self-presentation (Barth 1969), which makes more 
sense when the presenter has an audience. Therefore, when the interactions between 
different social groups increased, the presenter must be more conscious about one’s 
performances. Then, identity would be enhanced. “Ethnic group is defined through its 
relationships to others” (Barth 1969: 11). In this case, the internet highlighted those 
relationships by providing an interactive communication platform.  
In conclusion, although Chinese identity in general is a national identity, the 
creation of a zhuanghua minzu mingles a national identity with an ethnic identity. 
 52 
 
After the Chinese national/ethnic boundary had been clarified, a set of cultures and 
traditions were invented for the purpose of retaining that boundary, which 
consequently aroused patriotic feelings among Chinese citizens. Because of the 
activated interactions with “others” that the internet provides, Chinese people’s 





















Chapter 3. The Google-China Affair  
The wrangling between Google and China was intense during the first two weeks in 
2010. Long before this, Google had been facing a public relations crisis in the United 
State for compromising with censorship policies of China. Google had been operating in 
China with a Chinese version of its search engine since 2000. However, its full entry 
into the Chinese market by launching a “Google.cn” version of its search engine that 
filtered politically sensitive results as well as other “unsavory” material, took place in 
2006. Over the next few years, Google was criticized for not abiding by its own mantra 
of “do no evil”. In early 2010, after experiencing a series of cyberattacks on its servers, 
David Drummond, the Chief Counsel of Google wrote a famous blog in which he said 
that Google was considering leaving China (Drummond 2010). From then on, Google 
officially started to challenge censorship in China. It redirected all search queries to 
Google.cn to its Hong-Kong-based search engine, Google.com.hk, where uncensored 
search results are provided. The Chinese government responded swiftly with a statement 
proclaiming that if any company wishes to do business in China, it needs to follow 
Chinese laws. “The Google-China affair has many far-reaching implications” (York 
2010). Indeed, the affair went beyond a dispute between Google and China to become a 
transnational debate over internet freedom.  
The internet is more open, more interactive and more efficient than any earlier 
form of media. The trade-off for these advantages is that the internet is also the most 
chaotic medium. The facticity of online news is often questioned. “What kind of 
restrictions are suitable for this new medium?” is an important contemporary question. 
For a nation with more than four hundred million netizens, the Chinese government runs 
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the most sophisticated internet censorship in the world. The government stresses that its 
actions of limiting information access and blocking certain “inappropriate” content in 
cyberspace are for its citizens’ own protection. China as a nation-state is disciplining its 
people through its censorship of cyberspace.  
There are two reasons why the practice of censorship in cyberspace is more 
complicated than it is in physical reality. The first, as mentioned previously, lies in the 
chaotic nature of this new media. The second is linked to the world’s changing economic 
structure in the past few decades, along with the development of a global market. When 
multinational corporations settled in China, they didn’t only bring capital but also 
foreign cultural contexts as well, which directly or indirectly affected Chinese society.  
“Do no evil” is the mantra of Google, which believes that “freedom of 
information and expression” are basic human rights which should be enjoyed by 
everyone. This can be seen as a representation of the spirit of liberalism. At the moment 
that Google brought this idea into China, the contradiction surfaced between Google’s 
belief in individual-based freedom and Chinese traditional doctrine that collective 
interests take precedence over the interests of individuals.  In a sense, both parties have 
their own particular versions of “do no evil”. Google claimed their “quitting the China 
market” was a noble action that intended to alert Chinese netizens as to how they were 
suffering from internet censorship. The Chinese government, on the other hand, asserted 
that having the “the Great Firewall” in operation is necessary since it can protect 
Chinese citizens from “inappropriate” information. Is there cynicism behind Google’s 
apparently noble gesture or is the Chinese government the one that deserves criticism?   
There are interesting conspiracy theories and back alley news about Google as 
well as about the Chinese government, but there are also more meanings hidden in this 
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affair. It is chosen as a major theme for this thesis because it represents various subjects 
that relate to internet censorship. Each aspect of this affair is linked to the issue of 
censorship and also linked to the underlying conflicts between so-called liberalism and 
so-called conservatism in contemporary China. In this chapter, besides retelling the 
episodes that happened between Google and China, I also bring in my informants and 
their views. By organizing the ethnographic data that aid in understanding my 
informants’ perceptions of the Google-China affair, we will see patterns that can help us 
further explore the controversial issues of censorship in China’s cyberspace. This 
chapter thus builds a framework for the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
The most obvious issues the Google-China affair illuminated are the lack of 
access to free information and the lack of free expression in China’s cyberspace. 
Present-day discussions on these issues emphasize the impact that communication 
technology has on the delicate balance between economic modernization and political 
control in post-Mao China. Under Mao Zedong’s command economy, the media in 
China were used to serve the state through imposing ideological hegemony (Kalathil and 
Boas 2003: 18). Mao’s regime could be characterized as a top-down media supervisory 
structure in which people were passive receivers overwhelmingly accepting the official 
information they were given. Communication among the masses was discouraged. In the 
post Mao period, with the emergence of the market economy and the development of 
ICTs, the role of the media began to change. It was no longer defined as an instruments 
of class struggle but was promoted as a tool for economic and cultural development, 
emphasizing business information and entertainment (Kalathil and Boas 2003:18). Since 
then, the media’s responsibilities have shifted. It has had to response to not only 
domestic but also international pressures.  
 56 
 
In After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in 
Reformed China (1999), Daniel C. Lynch notes that commercialization, globalization 
and polarization have all combined to break down states’ ability to shape the ideological 
environment that favors the ruling government. A number of international observers are 
convinced that the internet can make the authoritarian government of China eventually 
collapse. Many see the Google-China affair as evidence of this statement. I agree that 
the practices of the market economy and the underlying context of globalization have 
been primary factors behind the changes in the media landscape in China. Yet I think 
these hardly have posed a potent threat to China’s political system. This doesn’t mean 
that I agree that the Chinese government has successfully turned the internet into a tool 
for strengthening their regime. The situation is more complicated than that. China’s 
cyberspace is neither a tool for the CCP nor an implement for democracy-seeking. I 
argue that China’s cyberspace is a self-organizing system in which a dynamic group of 
mutually dependent and interacting constituents are functioning together as a totality.  
Cyberspace and physical society are interrelated. Although inconspicuous, the 
boundaries between different societies in the cyber world do not vanish because of their 
lack of physical presences. A virtual society resembles its counterpart in physical reality 
more than it does other societies in virtual reality. China’s cyberspace mirrors today’s 
Chinese society. Thus, freedom in cyberspace is like freedom in physical space, which is 
determined by the invisible force that comes from the core value of a certain society.  
In this chapter, by analyzing how Chinese returnees reacted to the Google-China 
affair, I focus on finding out my informants’ understandings of the scale of freedom in 
China’s cyberspace. Freedom is a subjective matter without objective standards. The 
concept does not belong to any particular cultural camp. For example, wearing a hijab 
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has been considered as oppression to women by Western feminists, whereas from an 
emic perspective, many Muslim women don’t see it as a limitation to their freedom. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how the “natives” feel about the degree of 
freedom in China’s cyberspace without imposing a set of Western liberal ideals on them. 
In this chapter, I also talk about the impact on China’s cyberspace management by 
transnational corporations like Google. Censorship is certainly a kind of discipline 
taking freedom away from Chinese netizens; however, commercialization of information 
is just another way of discipline that may not be any better than the state’s operation of 
censorship.  
Although one may say that market is the lesser of the two evils since the state’s 
control is usually practiced by forcing its citizens to obey rather than by persuading them, 
still, neither can lead people to total freedom in cyberspace. Dwelling in either the 
market paradigm or the political paradigm cannot give the answer as to what freedom in 
cyberspace means to Chinese people. Freedom in cyberspace should be understood from 
an emic perspective. I think it is a cultural matter rather than a political or a commercial 
one. As N. D. Batra has noted, “submission and martyrdom may be the ultimate freedom 
for a fundamentalist Muslim…while for a person like Hugh Hefner of the Playboy 
empire, the ultimate freedom means sexual freedom as measured in the marketplace” 
(Batra 2008: 3). The concept of freedom is a variable instead of a constant. It changes 
along with time and cultural contexts.  
The dynamics inside China have not only originated in China. Today’s China has 
been greatly influenced by the outside world. To study Chinese society, we must look at 
other societies and cultures as well. Those who have been chosen as informants for this 
research represent how individuals perceive and react to certain situations after being 
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cross-culturally cultivated. The ideological disagreements and struggles between 
traditional Chinese culture and newly imported Western ideas in today’s globalizing 
China are more obvious and more easily be understood by studying Chinese returnees 
like my informants. By studying people like my informants and their understandings of 
controversies like the Google-China affair, we can ascertain how the notion of free 
information affects Chinese people’s attitudes toward censorship in cyberspace. Before 
going into the ethnographic data and the analysis that comes with it, I will backtrack and 
provide more background information on this affair.  
 
The Saga of Google and China  
Google provides the most powerful and popular search engine in the world with over 
one million servers and one billion search requests per day (Pandia Search Engine News 
2007).  Since 1997 when Larry Page and Sergey Brin developed the so-called “Page 
Rank”, a complicated mathematical algorithm that profoundly transformed access to 
information, Google has been expanding its business at an amazing pace. Now, Google 
Search is available in 40 different languages and in nearly 200 countries.  
Google first launched its business in China on April 12, 2006 after the central 
government allowed Google to create a local Chinese version, known as “Google.cn”. It 
started its operation in China under two conditions: “1. Google.cn would follow the 
information filtering rules that applied to all foreign internet companies operating in 
China, and 2. Google.com would remain blocked” (Wang 2010: 2). From then on, the 
battle between Google and the Chinese government began. The discontent began to 
surface in 2009. Many sites hosted by Google were no longer accessible to Chinese 
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netizens. Later on, the legal department of China sued Google for diffusing “unhealthy” 
information in China’s cyberspace. By accusing Google of promoting pornographic 
businesses that contaminated China’s cyberspace, the government further restricted its 
search engine, limited the use of g-mail as well as other services provided by Google in 
mainland China.  
The controversial legal issue here is that although the Chinese central 
government maintained that the search results provided by Google included immoral and 
illegal information, based on legal principles, internet companies only have to comply 
with local law where their servers are located. In this case, Google claimed that 
California state law is the only law it must obey. In early 2010, Google alleged that they 
had been targeted in a series of sophisticated cyber-attacks which resulted in the thefts of 
intellectual property and attempted access to the g-mail accounts of Chinese human 
rights activists. The company claimed that those attacks originated from mainland China. 
This made Google start to become concerned over the issue of information security in 
China’s cyberspace. Subsequently, Google made an announcement on its official blog 
site on January 12, 2010, declaring that it would review its business opportunities in 
China and consider the possibility of leaving the China market. Its blog said:  
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered--combined with the 
attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web--have led us to 
conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in 
China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our 
results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with 
the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search 
engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to 






From then on, Google officially started to challenge the practice of censorship in 
China. Google began to redirect all search queries from Google.cn to Google.hk. 
According to David Drummond, the senior vice president of Google, Chinese 
government officials found the redirection unacceptable. They warned that if Google 
kept doing so, their Internet Content Provider license will not be renewed (Drummond 
2010). Drummond wrote on Google’s official blog that, “without an ICP license... 
Google would effectively go dark in China” (Drummond 2010). Eventually, both sides 
swerved considering the potential losses that could have been caused by the collision. In 
early July, the Chinese central government and Google reached an agreement. Google 
would get its license renewed and they promised that they will not break any more local 
laws. Hence, the affair seemed to come to an end in the middle of 2011.  
Different parties have different responses and interpretations of the Google-
China affair. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement saying that the 
Chinese central government disturbed the free flow of information in cyberspace. She 
compared the Great Firewall in China’s cyberspace with the physical Berlin Wall. The 
Washington Post simply used the expression “GOOD for Google” as the lead of their 
article published on January 14, 2010, right after Google announced their decision to 
pull out of the China market. In that article, they wrote, “China aims not just at 
eliminating the free speech and virtual free assembly inherent to the Internet but at 
turning it into a weapon that can be used against democrats and democratic societies” 
(Editorial Washington Post 2010). It stated that Google had taken the admirable step of 
resisting censorship publically.  
Meanwhile, the editorial section in The Global Times said, “Whenever the U.S. 
government demands it, Google can easily become a convenient tool…for promoting the 
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U.S. Government’s political will and values abroad” (The Global Times quoted in Hille 
2010). The Wall Street Journal said that it is would not be surprised if Google swerved 
eventually, because “it can't afford to miss out on the world's biggest Internet market” 
(Efrati and Chao 2012) Although currently Google’s search business in China only 
accounts for a tiny slice of its $24 billion in annual revenue, with analyst putting its 
annual China revenue at $300-$400 million (Lee 2010), its long-term growth is key. The 
internet penetration rate of China is 28.7% in 2009 (IWS 2009), which means “China’s 
online sector is still in its infancy” (Lee 2010). Even with only 28.7% penetration, the 
population of Chinese netizens has already reached 400 million. Thus, China market 
holds huge potential for Google, not only for its search business, but also for other 
internet services it can provide, including social-networking, e-commerce and online 
gaming (Lee 2010). 
In addition to those reports and editorials from mass media, ethnographic 
research concerning this case had been conducted by Tricia Wong  a Ph.D student in 
Sociology at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) who focuses on studying 
how people use digital tools in their day-to-day lives She is convinced that conflicts and 
arguments between these two powerful institutions (Google as the giant internet search 
engine versus the communist government of the world’s second largest economy) lay in 
the fundamental differences of their understandings of “moral orders”. She claims that 
both of these two parties were intending to control information flows but for different 
purposes. She argues that there is no reason to say that the Google as a corporation is 
nobler than CCP as a nation-state’s government. Any statement accusing either of these 
two parties as evil oversimplified the issue.  
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During her presentation, “Googlist Realism: the Google-China saga and the free-
information regimes as a new site of cultural imperialism and moral tensions”, given at 
the eighth international conference on New Directions in the Humanities at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Wong argued that the “Google-China saga 
is an example of a contemporary clash in moral orders centered on information politics” 
(Wong 2010:7). Google’s credo “do no evil” exemplified the “hacker ethic” rooted in 
the Enlightenment ideal of individual achievement, whereas, the Chinese government’s 
moral order reflects Confucian cultural norms of social harmony that emerged during the 
early Han dynasty (Wong 2010:8).  
Another argument Wong made concerning the Google-China affair is that 
“Google.cn wasn’t useful to Chinese netizens” (Wong 2010). The mainstream opinion in 
the West on the withdrawal of Google from China business was that if Google.cn hadn’t 
been censored, Chinese people would have used it. Wong disagrees. Based on her 
ethnographic research conducted in China in summer 2009, she found that Google 
misunderstood Chinese non-elite internet users’ needs and it had no chance to succeed 
over its biggest Chinese competitor, Baidu, which uses nationalism as one of its 
publicity strategies. Also, although the digital elite in China prefer Google to Baidu, 
normally they use Google.com instead of Google.cn since they are willing and capable 
of paying for third party service to get around the Great Firewall. Her talk indicated that 
“quitting the China market” was basically a public relation strategy for covering up 
Google’s poor business record in China. After all, gaining profit should be the first 
priority for a commercial company, she argued. 
Before Google announced its exodus from the China market, many believed that 
this action would be catastrophic for Chinese netizens. However, this overstated the 
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situation. There were many Google regular users who placed flowers in front of 
Google’s headquarter in Beijing to show their sympathy for the company. But attention 
didn’t remain for long. The Google-China affair started off with a bang but ended up 
with a whimper, and it had hardly any concrete impact on China’s censorship policy. 
However, the metaphorical and symbolic meanings this affair carried may nonetheless 
be inspiring not only to scholars but also to Chinese common netizens. This affair had 
been expanded into a political debate. Atlantic writer James Fallows has noted that after 
the Google-China affair, “there are reasons to think that a difficult and unpleasant stage 
of China-U.S. and China-world relations lies ahead” (Fallows 2010). 
 
Reviewing the Saga through the Eyes of Chinese Returnees 
During my first period of fieldwork in Beijing, I discussed the Google-China affair with 
my informants. Their opinions are diverse and more complicated than Wong’s 
illustration. The distinction between those who are in favor of the central government 
and those who support Google’s doctrine was not absolute. It seems clear that the moral 
orders of Google and China are different, and I am not entirely convinced by Wong. She 
argues that the major concern of practicing censorship by the Chinese government is 
their Confucian agenda (Wong 2010). Wong studied censorship by focusing more on the 
state’s agenda, while largely ignoring internet users’ perspectives. As mentioned in the 
last chapter, my targeted informants are Chinese returnees who in Wong’s definition are 
digital elites among Chinese netizens. I thereby can use their personal experiences as an 
advantage, through which the interactions between the Western “hacker ethic” and 
traditional Chinese cultural values can be seen at an individual level.  
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Most of my informants admitted that they use Google more often than Baidu
14
. If 
Google were banned in China it would cause  much trouble for them [although fanqiang, 
techniques used against internet censorship as mentioned in chapter one are always an 
alternative option, “the Great Firewall” does bring trouble to users, which made the lazy 
ones stop visiting the blocked sites].  
Lynn, one of my informants who has been living in the U.S. for 12 years since 
she was nine but has been flying back to China on a regular basis, found Google’s credo 
very convincing. She considered it an honorable and brave action that Google tried to 
confront the Chinese central government by quitting a tempting market like China. She 
said that she is a loyal user of Google products, from Google search engine to Gmail to 
Google Reader, more than 50% of her online activities rely on Google. Lynn asserted 
that Google is not only a pioneer in the internet industry because they have the strongest 
R&D team, but more importantly, their faith in “don’t be evil” made them special and 
competitive. “Don’t be evil” is the informal corporate motto of Google. It is the 
abbreviation of “you can make money without doing evil” (Google 2011).  Google’s 
ideal of providing free information to anybody is one of the reasons why their products 
are attractive to her. Also, she believes that pulling out of the China market prevented 
Google from becoming a de facto accomplice to repression. Lynn said, “It is kind of 
admirable if its confrontation with the Chinese central government was truly driven by 
the desire of guarding its fundamental belief in providing free information”.  
Besides showing full support for Google’s business, Lynn was convinced that 
Google’s ideal vision of free information for everyone is not suitable for today’s China. 
                                                 
14
 This is particularly found among Chinese returnees, while other Chinese internet users prefer Baidu 
more. That is why statistically speaking Baidu is dominating the search engine market in China. 
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Then, I further questioned her: “If Google’s ideal is so good, how come Chinese people 
don’t deserve it?” She responded by using the well-known saying “中国网络不成熟” 
[“China’s internet is immature”]. She also defended the Chinese government’s practice 
of censorship. She thinks that Chinese netizens’ educational levels are relatively low, 
which also made “free information” unsuitable for today’s China since people may have 
irrational responses toward certain sensitive news.   
Lynn was not alone in defending the Chinese government. Many of my 
informants gave reasons like “China has a large population which is very difficult to 
manage”, “Chinese people are not rational enough to face all that controversial 
information”, and “Chinese netizens are always ganqing yongshi [感情用事: acting 
impetuously]”, etc. to support their similar arguments to Lynn’s.   
When Western scholars promote free information and sometimes even express 
pity towards Chinese people because of the strong censorship that the CCP places on 
China’s cyberspace; a good number of my informants believed that censorship is 
somehow necessary and has positive meanings for today’s Chinese society.  
A research report entitled “The Tangled Web: Does the Internet Offer Promise or 
Peril for the Chinese Communist Party?” published in the Journal of Contemporary 
China (Shie 2004) showed that many Chinese netizens don’t think censorship is a 
problem. Among 2457 Chinese internet users interviewed by Shie, nearly half agreed 
that websites should be disciplined by the government and the control over information 
on the internet should be enhanced. Another interesting case is described in Li 
Yonggang’s book Our Great Firewall: Expression and Governance in the Era of the 
Internet (2009:110).  In Shanxi province in September 2006, the secretary of the Party 
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committee of a county proscribed the operation of internet cafés. There is a good number 
of people in China relying on internet cafés to have access to the internet because 
personal computers are not widely available in suburban areas in China. Many people in 
that county lost their access to the internet because of the proscription. From a moral 
perspective, this secretary abused his power and violated local people’s basic human 
rights: individuals should enjoy free information. However, the survey done by sina.com 
showed that the majority of local people supported this proscription. Many locals 
worried that the internet had a negative impact on the younger generation.  
From my research, I found that although censorship is not a respectable way of 
information management in a general sense, most of my informants perceive it 
differently. They felt that censorship of sensitive information to a certain degree is a 
good thing. Even those who have been assimilated to Western culture somehow share 
the same understanding about information management with those who have never been 
abroad. When people like Lynn claimed that they love Google and Google’s ideal, they 
were doing nothing but representing slacktivism, a term coined by Evgeny Morozov. 
Slaktivism is a combination of slacker and activism, and to a certain degree it captures 
most of my informants’ attitude toward censorship. The Urban Dictionary defines it as 
“the act of participating in obviously pointless activities as an expedient alternative to 
actually expending effort to fix a problem” (Urban Dictionary 2008). From my 
fieldwork, it is not hard to discover that although people like Lynn suggested that they 
are promoters of democracy and freedom, their opinions and their reactions to certain 
issues told another story. 
Some of my other informants believe that we should stop arguing about the 
suitability of free information in China’s cyberspace since the statement that “Chinese 
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people are not ready for a more open net” is merely an assumption. They propose that 
we should leave the problem to the market. If Google really can’t make money, as the 
rumor held, there is no reason for it to stick to its business in China. Some of them 
pointed out that leaving China is a proper and rational decision for Google. Yun, an 
architecture graduate student who had left China when he was seven and had spent most 
of his time in Canada, had recently returned to Beijing for a summer internship. During 
our conversation, Yun showed tremendous trust in the market and consciously avoided 
talking about ideological or cultural issues. He told me that he’d rather understand the 
Google-China affair from a pure business perspective. He said to me:  
There is no reason for us to make it [the Google-China affair] sound complicated. 
We shouldn’t make it looks like an incident that resulted from clashes between 
two different cultures. Neither should we see it as a political conspiracy. After all, 
Google is a commercial corporation. It has to make a profit to survive. And I 
think it totally has the right to choose which market to get into or to get out of. 
Chinese companies can do the same when they are operating in the U.S. market. 
I think Google has no obligation nor did they intend to promote any ideal to the 
world or to China despite their allegation of “trying to help the country open up”. 
It is naïve for one to believe that Google is trying to help Chinese people obtain 
freedom of information. “Do no evil” is a business campaign slogan. If Google 
really functioned well in the China market, it wouldn’t consider leaving. It is 
business, as simple as that.  
 
 
Wong’s research supported Yun’s argument. In Wong’s article, she writes that 
Google failed to execute on three main factors when they put their business into the 
China market: “achievement of brand recognition, creation of a successful marketing 
campaign, and understanding the local use contexts of non-elite internet users” (Wong 
2010). Many of my informants are like Yun. They believe that the China market has a 
distinctive environment because of the practice of guanxi and the ambiguities of all 
those “policies” and “regulations” set up by particular local governments. They pointed 
out that while Google has succeeded in most regional markets around the world, China 
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may be an exception. Some of them believe that Google has failed because it did a poor 
job of localization in mainland China. As the dominant search engine in the world, it lost 
its battle with Baidu—Google’s arch-rival in mainland China. Online statistic data 
provided by “China Based Internet and Web Marketing Consultant” shows that my 
informants were not wrong in their supposition. Market shares for Baidu and Google in 
2010 were 58.4% and 35.6% respectively (China Based Internet and Web Marketing 
Consultant 2010). Yan, another informant of mine who is studying economy in the U.S., 
said that “not being in first place makes it easier for [Google] to retreat or retrench”.  
This market-oriented way of thinking was commonly found among my 
informants, and some of them even tried to understand the whole issue of censorship by 
using this approach. They’d rather define censorship as a market issue than as a political 
or an ideological issue. As Yan said to me, “I think the market alone is already enough 
for keeping a society functioning well in the long term. Thus, state interfere is 
unnecessary”.  
Apparently, the idea of market liberalism has been well adopted by people like 
Yun and Yan. From their ideas, we can see how the idea of marketization is being 
extended into the field of information management. To those who are like Yun and Yan, 
everything can be simplified as a business matter. They interpreted the Google-China 
affair as a result of a lack of consumer demands for free information. This reminded me 
of a story told by Vaclav Havel in his book Power of the Powerless (1985):  “The 
manager of a fruit-and-vegetable shop places in his window, among the onions and 
carrots, the slogan: ‘Workers of the world unite!’ Why does he do it? What is he trying 
to communicate to the world? Is he genuinely enthusiastic about the idea of unity among 
the workers of the world? Is his enthusiasm so great that he feels an irrepressible 
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impulse to acquaint the public with his ideals? Has he really given more than a 
moment’s thought to how such unification might occur and what it would mean?” 
(Havel 1978: 4)  
Yun and Yan’s understanding of “market” is nothing different than that fruit-
and-vegetable manager’s way of understanding that slogan. Both have separated the 
meaning from the words they were using. They created a distance from the fact and 
trying to be apathetic about what is happening. They cynically believed what happened 
is just the way it supposed to be. Slavoj Zizek made a felicitous interpretation of Havel’s 
story. He said those with power indeed appreciate their people to be cynical about 
ideology. The worst they could image is their people take their ideologies seriously and 
act on them (Liang 2009). Similarly, from my interview with those two informants 
above, we can have a rough idea of how marketization may affect some of today’s 
Chinese young people. The full adoption of the idea of the market is not making Chinese 
people like some of my informants care more about their rights as citizen, or how the 
government has been working on ideologies they promoted, or whether the free market 
is really being practiced well in China. A popular saying in China’s cyberspace is “shei 
renzhenle, shei jiu shule” [谁认真了, 谁就输了: if you are serious, you lose]”.  
Marketization is becoming an excuse used by people to justify and to accept 
censorship “rationally”. That’s why in the beginning of this thesis I’ve argued that the 
internet that was an embodied hope for democracy in developing countries is not a threat 
to the authoritarian regime in China for now, because commoners don’t much care about 
it. In the past, if the transparency of information is low people would blame the 
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government. At present, when Google announced their intention of leaving, my 
informants tried to accept it since it is a result of the market. But is that true?  
Apparently, not all of my informants concur that “market” can be used as a 
sufficient explanation for the Google-China affair. Some of them were convinced that 
the confrontation between Google and the Chinese government is political. “Of course it 
is not as simple as it appeared to be. And, I’m glad that our government took a steady 
stand on this issue,” said Tin, a 24-year-old informant who is working on his MBA 
degree in Australia and has returned to mainland China during summer vacations for the 
past five and half years.  
Tin told me that Eric Schmidt, who served as the CEO of Google, was invited to 
the White House to have dinner with Hilary Clinton a day before Google announced its 
intention to leave China. He thus assumed that Google’s action was not based on a pure 
commercial concern but a political one. “The U.S. government is protecting Google’s 
back”, he said. He insinuated that Google was just trying to make the issue look bigger 
than it actually was. He said, “They intentionally exaggerated the [censorship] problem 
to defame the Chinese government in order to make Google and the U.S. look better”. 
He stressed that as an independent country that has different cultural, political and social 
environments with the U.S., it is understandable and reasonable for the Chinese 
government to reject Google’s proposal of stopping internet censorship. Tin thought that 
it is possible that Google is a tool of the White House.  
Interestingly, although it seems he is in favor of the Chinese government, 
nonetheless, Tin identified himself as an advocate for “free information”. He said it 
would be a tragedy if Google really was going to leave China, and he is indeed a loyal 
user of Google products. Tin’s comments seemed inconsistent. He explained that he 
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likes “Google.com” as a commodity because it is supported by Google’s advanced 
technologies and because it can provide abundant information sources to its users. He 
also likes Google as an institution that is trying its best to keep the information flow free 
to everybody. However, if he had to choose a side in the dispute, he would choose the 
Chinese government over Google, he said. Tin’s opinion on this affair is similar to 
Lynn’s. Both of them argued that China’s cyberspace is too “juvenile” to be set free. 
They both believed that Google’s proposal for stopping censorship in China’s 
cyberspace may cause chaos and social disorder. Tin further queried that if China is in a 
condition of anomie, what is the point of having freedom of information? It will only 
make the situation worse. He said,   
I think Google and the Chinese government don’t share the same ideal.. In fact, I 
believe both of them intend to create a better society, a better world, but by using 
different means. What works in America may not be proper for China. What is 
“ideal” is situational. If censoring the internet can bring harmony and prevent 
anomie, it is acceptable. The ends justified the means.  
 
 
Unlike Tin, some of my informants believe Google has a simple motive, one 
which is just as pure as they claimed. One of them, Liu, an engineer student who is 
working on his master’s degree in the U.S., admires the legendarily entrepreneurial 
stories of Google. He told me that based on his knowledge, one of Google’s founders 
[Sergey Mikhaylovich Brin] fled to the U.S. from the former Soviet Union in his early 
life. Liu believed that this background helped this entrepreneur resist the authoritarian 
management model. He said to me:   
If I were in Beijing by the time they announced their retreat, I would have placed 
flowers in front of Google’s headquarters too. It is a good thing for them to point 
out that there is something wrong with our cyber system. I am well aware there 
was a common idea that Google’s way of running business is not suitable for 
China and that if we follow what Google is promoting, it may cause social 
problems in this country. But I don’t agree with it. Many people see the internet 
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as a catalyst for the development of democracy as well as a drive for new social 
reform in China. It brings abundant opportunities to this nation and its netizens. 
Of course, opportunities don’t come alone. They come with risks. Maybe those 
people were partly right. Making cyberspace more open immediately would 
engender chaos. However, we must not be afraid of making mistakes. The 
potential temporary setbacks shouldn’t make us refuse opportunities for change. 
It is silly for us to stop eating for fear of choking.  
 
 
Although his agenda sounds discordant with the Chinese governments’, during 
our conversation, Liu wanted to impress upon me more than once that he is a very 
nationalistic person and I shouldn’t confuse him with those cynical youths in China who 
cannot offer a single opinion without criticizing the government. He said he understands 
that to manage a vast country with a huge population is not an easy task. He also 
believes both the government and people like him want China to be better despite their 
different views on certain issues. Contradicting what Tin said, Liu doesn’t believe that 
“the ends justify the means”. He said, “It is just an excuse for making their [the Chinese 
government’s] job easier”.  
Like Liu, the majority of my informants are either from middle class or upper 
middle class. They are people who can and are willing to afford the third party servers 
when they use the internet inside mainland China. Fanqiang is commonly practiced 
among my informants. Mike, another informant who is a social science professor in his 
forties, said, that Chinese culture respects collective benefits more than individual rights. 
Mike thinks that the idea of sacrificing the interests of the minority to achieve major 
satisfaction is commonly accepted by many Chinese people. Liu disagreed with Mike. 
He insisted that no one should be sacrificed during the process of development. He 
argued that as citizens of a modern society, Chinese netizens should have rights to enjoy 
free information. Their rights should not be limited by their social class or cultural 
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background. He said, “We should feel empathy for those who can’t get around the Great 
Firewall. Those who claimed certain people’s rights are supposed to be sacrificed for the 
sake of keeping the society harmonious only say so because they are not the ones being 
sacrificed”. 
When television became popular, it created problems for authoritarian 
governments. As Marx wrote in Relation of Wage-Labor to Capital, “a house may be 
large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social 
requirement for a residence” (Marx 1847). However, television allows people to know 
more about the well-being other people’s lives. Thus, the popularization of television 
resulted in an increase in relative deprivation. This problem has become more intense 
with the popularization of the internet. Without comparing their own lives to others’, it 
is easier for individuals to accept unfairness in their lives. Relative deprivation is a 
common experience shared by most people. It is the experience of feeling deprived of 
something to which one believes oneself to be entitled to have. Relative deprivation 
refers to “the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and 
realize that they have less than them” (Bayertz 1999: 144). Armed with more 
information people tend to compare their own life to others’ more often than before. 
These comparisons force people to question their current life and the possibilities of 
having an alternative. Further, they would start to question the authority of their 
governments as well. However, what an authoritarian government used to do in the past 
was to “fool the people” and prevent them from expressing their ideas on politics, while 
citizens might internalize the idea of “ignorance is bliss”. Although the critical ones 
keep querying the government every now and then, the presence of the unconditional 
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love and trusts toward the “big brother”15 are still found among subjects like my 
informants.  
The idea that “I have to support the Chinese government on this case because 
it is my country” was repeatedly mentioned by my informants during our interviews. 
Initially, I thought that those who saw the Google-China affair from a political 
perspective might feel offended by censorship. However, when I asked them to 
choose a side to support, they almost always chose the Chinese government over 
Google. Tin is rather an old-style nationalist, while Liu showed an alternative way of 
being a patriot in today’s China. If we see Tin as a conservative, then Liu is like a 
reformist. Although disagreeing with the current political agenda, Liu keeps his faith 
in the current regime. He thinks that social reform is necessary but it should not 
endanger the current social structure. He loves his country and resents the government, 
but still showed a willingness to bear with the government.  
Their way of thinking represents the reformation of Chinese nationalism from 
an ideological instrument for the ruling class to a force that is out of the government’s 
control: Nationalism was imported to China for the use of stabilizing the authoritarian 
regime. Years later, it started to grow on its own and finally has evolved into many 
different versions. The saga between Google and China is a good lens to look at these 
new versions of Chinese nationalism since it conveys discourses concerning the Sino-
American relationship, a relationship that is essential for framing today’s Chinese 
nationalism as Gries has noted (2004). Correspondingly, nationalistic discourses also 
can help us with better grasping and understanding Chinese returnees’ perceptions on 
                                                 
15
 “Big Brother” is originally a fictional character in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four. Here 
this usage refers to the authoritarian government.   
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censorship. A more comprehensive discussion on how nationalism related to the 
resistance and accommodation to internet censorship in China’s cyberspace will be 
given in the last chapter of this thesis. 
Besides their views of the affair itself, I also have gotten an interesting comment 
from one of my informants who saw this affair as a lesson for her own life. Molly, a 
returnee who has lived in Hong Kong for seven years, told me that the Google-China 
affair strengthened her determination to stay in Hong Kong permanently. She said that 
there is a big gap between the intensive developing economy and the stale ideology in 
mainland China. “I personally don’t like the way the Chinese government governs 
cyberspace but it doesn’t mean I think their strategies are totally inappropriate for 
today’s China”. What makes her different from my other informants is that she in 
particular seemed to represent the Chinese version of “the American dream”.   
In Vanessa Fong’s article “Filial nationalism among Chinese teenagers with 
global identities” (2004), she researched teenagers in rural China and argued that they 
have a Chinese version of “the American dream”. Teenagers interviewed by Fong lived 
in Northern China, and dreamed about immigrating to a more developed place through 
studying hard. From Molly’s case we can tell that this notion doesn’t only belong to 
rural teenagers. Molly told me that many of her friends inside mainland China 
considered her an outstanding achiever among peers since she has a nice job and can 
fulfill her own life in Hong Kong. But, she thinks it is actually much easier to live in 
Hong Kong than in mainland China. “Mainland China is a super complex society. Skills 
alone can’t ensure your survival. You also need guanxi. Here (Hong Kong), everything 
is simpler. Guanxi is easier to be handled. The institution and laws are more advanced. 
Job opportunities are abundant. As long as you are willing to try, you can make a decent 
 76 
 
life”, said Molly. She told me that she believes in individual agency. She stressed that 
one may not be able to change the culture or the society he/she was born into, but he/she 
can always works on his/her own life. Molly, who is now an editor for a contemporary 
art magazine said to me: 
We have the power to choose and to change our life. If I found the society I was 
living in is not the one I like, I will do everything I can to make a change. But the 
change should be on my own life inside of on the society. Indeed, I agree with 
the governance strategies that are used in mainland China’s cyberspace. I believe 
the government has a better vision on what is going on. They can see the bigger 
picture and they know what is good for this country as a whole. As individuals, 
we can’t. So, if you have a problem with their governance, you change your own 
life by moving to another place. You don’t change the local culture or rebel 
against the government. Like Google, either fit in or leave. There is no way for 
them to fight the local culture or local authority. As the proverb says, “qianglong 
yabuguo ditoushe [强龙压不过地头蛇; one with great power cannot defeat a 
local villain.] 
 
In this context, this proverb was trying to express that: “…although Google is a 
powerful international company, it is impossible for it to operate by its own rules in 
China, which would require resistance to the local power.” 
The Google-China affair has been transformed from a single event to become a 
part of Molly’s personal memory. Indeed, for many internet users, the Google-China 
affair and follow-up events have become common memories to them. These new social 
memories not only contribute to creating common interests among people and increasing 
social solidarity, but also affect the core values in Chinese society which in turn will 







On September 7, 2011, Google had its internet permit in China renewed successfully.  
This means that after the serious strife Google had with the Chinese government, it 
eventually chose to make a comeback in China (Chao 2011). The Google-China affair 
was brought to a temporary close. I called some of my informants after I learned this and 
asked for their opinions. The great majority of them didn’t even know the news. Those 
who paid close attention to this follow-up event believed that Google tried to keep a low 
profile about its return. One of them, Gregory, said, “Compared to their dramatic 
reaction to those cyber-attacks and censorship last year, their comeback seemed much 
more modest and quiet”. In general, my informants were happy about Google’s return. 
They think that if Google left, Baidu would have monopolized the Chinese internet 
market, which they thought would be a bad thing. Meanwhile, they also showed 
discontent to Google’s statement which said it would provide “localized internet 
service” for China. Tin said, “We don’t need localized stuff. What does localization 
mean? It means that they would cooperate with the national security bureau and keep 
censoring information”.  
 
Conclusion  
In his essay “Max Weber and Modern Social Science”, Ralf Dahrendorf noted that 
Weber believes “the statements of fact are one thing, statement of value another, and any 
confusing of the two is impermissible” (Dahrendorf 1987: 577). This statement 
acknowledged clarification between pronouncement of fact and of value. I think my 
informants sometimes failed to make this distinction when they talked about the Google-
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China affair. Their attitudes toward Google and the Chinese central government were 
preset. Although these returnees identified themselves as highly educated rational 
individuals who read news from different sources, their original opinions toward certain 
issues seem hardly altered, judging from my interviews. Instead of changing minds, 
different information provided new chances and new sources for them to rationalize 
their initial opinions, as I discussed earlier in terms of the “information cocoon” effect.  
I have used the Google-China affair as a window through which many issues in 
China’s cyber-management can be considered: freedom of information, freedom of 
speech, and also, the nationalistic emotions that I’ve discovered in some of my 
















Chapter 4. Freedom of Information  
Access to information is increasingly recognized as one of the most important 
prerequisites for a transparent and accountable government. It facilitates individuals’ 
ability in making informed choices, and it also allows citizens to monitor their 
government. The Google-China affair provoked the Chinese government by 
emphasizing the lack of freedom of information in China’s cyberspace. The practice of 
censorship is one of the essential reasons why Google decided to quit the China market, 
at least so they claimed in their open letter. In this chapter, I focus on how my 
informants view this issue. I look into different ways of understanding the subject of 
internet censorship to inquire into how this particular group of cross-culturally cultivated 
Chinese came to choose their views with regard to their Chinese identity and Western 
educational background, as well as what kind of values and thinking sustain their 
choices. This chapter takes up the concepts of cultural relativism, individual agency, 
economic liberalism and moral discipline to discuss the issue of “freedom of 
information”.  
 
Universal Human Rights vs. Cultural Relativism 
Is freedom of speech a universal human right or is it a matter of culture? The former 
view was held by those I interviewed who objected to internet censorship, while the 
latter view was held by those I interviewed who used a pro-government discourse to 
defend the practice of censorship.  
I asked the question “Why do you think the Chinese government is using 
censorship? Do you think censorship is reasonable?” A common response I received to 
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this query was this: “The government might be wrong if you see their action alone, out 
of context.  But the practice of censorship makes sense in Chinese society.” More than 
half of my informants felt that “the Chinese government is right to apply censorship 
online”. People in this group were generally satisfied with the situation in China’s 
cyberspace and believed that Western media demonized China’s governance. 
Nonetheless, very few of them were in all respects pro-government in their views. Most 
of them showed an understanding of both the Western critique of censorship and the 
Chinese government’s rationale for practicing online censorship. A male informant, Bob, 
who spent three years in Switzerland for studying computer science, said: 
Freedom of information is a matter of culture instead of a universal principle.  
They [Americans] believe the individual freedom is more important than 
anything, which probably caused the American Revolution. Yet, it is not a taken-
for-granted idea for us. China has never been really opened until the late 1970’s. 
Before the 1970’s, we lived in a quite different way than the Americans did. 
Even now, we have a different government agenda from them. I don’t want to 
make a judgment on which agenda is the better one. But the fact is that what 
Google and the Americans as a whole have been criticizing seems to work well 
in our country.  
 
Another female informant, Lily, who studied business and has lived in Hong 
Kong for six year said: 
 
Due to the low education level and the large population, maybe it is better if 
China didn’t choose to be too open to the world. You can say that I am 
stereotyping China or underestimating the capability of our citizens. But it’s true 
that people from different societies have different qualities and different patterns 
of behavior. People in this country don’t like to think on their own but like to 
follow others. That’s why they are very easily agitated. Our society lacks 
independent thinkers.  
 
Indeed, those I interviewed who defended the government definitely didn’t like 
censorship as a general principle. Almost every one of them is able to get around the 
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“Great Fire Wall” of the Chinese government censorship by using special software or 
paying for a third party service (VPN) when they are inside China. Although they are 
well aware of the inconvenience and feel more or less frustrated about censorship, they 
are still not much interested in criticizing it. “Cultural relativism” was one of the reasons 
they gave for explaining their sympathy toward censorship in China. They said their 
experiences of living abroad made them think more about Chinese culture and Chinese 
society. They claimed that the core value of Chinese society is mutual harmony and 
stability rather than the results-oriented individualism that Westerners admire. Chinese 
society is regulated not by laws in a Western sense but by rules in a Chinese sense, they 
claimed. These rules do not refer to different kinds of regulations and limitations on 
individuals’ behaviors but are rather rules of relationships. An informant in his mid-
twenties who had lived in Australia for five years and studied environmental science 
there said: 
The essence of Chinese culture has been epitomized in the Chinese character 
yuan 圆 (circle). You can that see this character consists of a person “员” 
standing inside a circle “口”. “从心所欲而不逾矩” [Originally from the 
Analects of Confucius, translated as “I would follow what my heart desired, 
without transgressing what was right.”] is what we are seeking. Instead of 
changing the rules that may get in our way, we are cultivated to adapt to them 
and play with them.   
 
In this discourse, the Confucian agenda is easy to see. Many of my informants 
who don’t find censorship a great problem share this type of thinking. They shifted the 
focus from “censorship as a means of discipline” to the idea that “individuals should 
cultivate themselves to adapt to the situation and feel free even under discipline”. More 
than that, some of them also used the idea that Chinese culture is to Western culture as 
collectivism is to individualism. Thus, as Chinese, it is reasonable to give up certain 
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individual rights for the sake of collective interests. Of course, not everyone agreed with 
this. Hai, a computer science student who objected to censorship said to me:  
 
Freedom of information/speech is a basic human right that should be enjoyed by 
everyone. On this issue, cultural relativism should not be applied. It is just wrong 
for one to say freedom of information and speech could only be enjoyed by 
Americans and it is not suitable for Chinese people. Indeed, the information 
control is not that horrible in China’s cyberspace. However, the idea that some 
people in our society could be sacrificed is more terrifying. No one should be 
superior to others. No one should be sacrificed to make others’ lives easier.  
 
Hai complained to me that lots of Chinese people held to a false dichotomy of 
individualism versus collectivism. He told me that some of his peers labeled him as an 
individualist and criticized his view on censorship because he is only concerned with 
individual rights but doesn’t keep the nation’s well-being in mind. “Some of them even 
told me that I have been brainwashed by capitalism,” he said. This kind of accusation 
has been repeated by different informants during my fieldwork interviews. Many of 
them poured out their discontent at being accused in a similar way. Hai maintained that, 
to him, censorship is a horrible thing for the Chinese government to do but what is even 
worse is that Chinese netizens consider it as acceptable. And that is the real reason why 
China cannot have a relatively free cyberspace even today, he said.  
Although Hai felt frustrated by censorship in cyberspace and people who found it 
to be normal, he decided to come back to China and find a job in Beijing after finishing 
his MA degree at the University of Pennsylvania. He told me that with a master’s degree 
in engineering, it wouldn’t have been difficult for him to find a stable job in the U.S. 
However, he felt that there wouldn’t be a challenge if he did that–he maintained that he 
did not want to lead a predictable life, and the situation in China is more complex and 
interesting. Thus, he seeks to work for one of the most popular local websites in 
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Beijing—working inside the system that he is not satisfied with rather than avoiding it, 
since he believes that this is the only way to create change in China. At the end of our 
interview, he said to me, “I remember this line from a movie: ‘We like people because 
of their qualities, but we love them because of their defects’. This saying can also be 
used to explain my feelings toward my motherland. Although the status quo in China has 
let me down in many ways, I still love this country and hope that it will improve with 
my contributions”. By the time I interviewed him, he was taking a leave from his PhD 
program and was working as a full-time employee in the R&D department of the 
website company.    
Another informant, Zheng, who was working on his master’s degree in 
anthropology in Hong Kong, held a more radical attitude. He said that he resents 
censorship and found censorship unbearable. He credits those who work to overcome 
censorship actively. He thinks that it is not so difficult to spread news or “truths” by 
using informal channels, especially with help from those active netizens. He said: 
I object to censorship and believe it is entirely unnecessary. News is unstoppable 
in this information age. No matter how hard the government tries, it cannot wrap 
fire in paper. Truth will come to light sooner or later. The real problem is that 
after knowing the news, our hands are still tied because we can’t express our 
opinions freely. Thus, I think the real problem is lacking freedom of speech. As 
to the issue of free information, I believe that knowing is important. Only when 
the news transparency is high can people monitor their government and ensure it 
does its job correctly. Even if censorship caused much trouble to netizens, there 
are always solutions. Of course, the lazy ones may stop bothering to discover the 
truth because of censorship. But there are people like me who will never give up 
seeking truth.  
 
Both Hai and Zheng agreed that making the news more transparent is crucial for 
today’s China. They also showed appreciation of caomei [草媒; grassroots reporters; 
citizens who report news through informal channels voluntarily]. “Caomei are very 
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active and helpful. They release news and provide refreshing views on social issues,” 
said Hai.  The second generation of the internet focuses on creating more interactions 
among internet users. This has encouraged netizens to share news. With a smart phone, a 
Wi-Fi hotspot and a Weibo/Twitter  account, anyone can be a caomei. The transparency 
of social news has increased because of the use of new media. News now spreads out 
through informal channels. People have alternative sources other than the authorized 
news channels like CCTV (China Central Television).   
When discussing the effectiveness of caomeis’ work against censorship, Zheng 
said to me:  
The internet injected a flow of fresh blood into Chinese media. Since the 
government has already controlled military power and media in physical reality, 
they should just cut a deal with netizens in cyberspace. I think caomei are 
awesome. In fact, I think we can all call ourselves caomei in some respects. I 
don’t know how effective they are in making a social change, but at least they 
break news and make news travel faster. Ever since this informal channel of 
reporting became popular, I felt that we netizens are connected to each other. I 
felt that we have been empowered and we finally get to know our government 
beyond its own representations on its official news.  
 
Even with the practice of censorship, many of my informants felt that caomei 
and their constant reporting have altered the old media landscape in mainland China. My 
informants said caomei help ensure their “right of knowing”.  
In the next section, I discuss how ordinary netizens like my informants are using 
their individual agency to resist or accommodate to censorship, and how effective their 








Individual Agency vs. State Control 
Some of my informants argued that although censorship creates many obstacles in China, 
with only a limited amount of effort one can get almost any information one needs in 
cyberspace. They argued that the fundamental problem of lacking freedom in 
information lies in the laziness of Chinese netizens more than the state’s control alone. 
According to those informants, resistance toward censorship can be effective, since 
crossing the Great Firewall at an individual level doesn’t require many IT skills.  It’s not 
technologically challenging for many people. However, most netizens are not properly 
motivated to do it. During my fieldwork, I found that almost all of my informants know 
how to fanqiang [use different techniques to avoid censorship and get around the “Great 
Firewall”]. I even managed to let some of them show me how to do it during our 
interviews.
16
 However, a significant proportion admitted that they don’t practice it 
frequently. My informant Wei said, “Censorship is not unique to China. It happens in 
other places. Obstacles always exist in the way of seeking truth and knowledge. If one 
isn’t eager to find things out, an open net couldn’t help in making one know more. 
Americans are good examples. Their cyberspace is more open compared to China’s. 
However, their netizens are often ignorant as well.”   
Some of my informants suggested that not only are people too lazy to resist 
censorship, but also utilize it for their own convenience. Censorship has been commonly 
used as an excuse by Chinese students and even some domestic scholars to account for 
                                                 
16
 The most popular method used by my informants to cross over “the Great Firewall” is using VPN. Most 
of them were still students while I did the interviews, so, they could just install the VPN account provided 
by their overseas school into their PC. Instead of access to the internet through local connections, they use 
VPN. In that way, they can pass censorship. Another website they suggested me to use is this: 
http://vpncup.com/. It is also a VPN, but with an extra bonus of being available for mobile device 
installation. By using this, or products similar to this one, my informants can use Twitter, Facebook, New 
York Times (apps), etc, on their smart phones.   
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their own mediocre academic work. Chen, an informant who is a graduate student 
studying political science in the U.S. told me that before he went abroad, he was 
convinced that the lack of free information is the primary obstacle for the lack of 
development of Chinese academics. However, his experiences of studying abroad made 
him start doubting this. He said: 
Now, I think censorship is used as a pretext for bad-quality work done by some 
college students. Our cyberspace may not as open as some other countries’. But I 
think we’ve never really had a lack of information. Most popular academic 
works are available online.  Websites like Jstor, Lexis-Nexis or Interconnect 
have never been blocked. But I doubt people would actually use them either 
inside or outside the “wall”, because they simply don’t care. In China’s academia, 
those who care about academics sincerely are the minority.  Every time I talk 
about censorship with my peers, they say “we can’t log into Facebook or 
Youtube inside mainland China”. Does freedom of information just equal 
Facebook plus Youtube?  
 
Some of my other informants are like Chen. They believe the situation is not too 
bad in China’s cyberspace. They claimed that as long as one doesn’t support Falun Gong 
or try to overthrow the current regime, there is plenty of information for conducting 
various kinds of research. “How many people have to build their academic careers based 
on working with Falun Gong?” said Chen; “Almost no one!” he stressed that much 
information blocked in China’s cyberspace is not necessary for ordinary people and their 
daily lives. He said that disagreements in opinions are commonly found everywhere, and 
it is not a unique thing in China that the ones with power would try to impose their 
ideology on the powerless. Chen argued that when many social science students in 
China are complaining that they can’t do research because of censorship, many foreign 
scholars have done a great job of studying contemporary Chinese society with limited 
first hand data. It is not censorship that has blinded Chinese people. Rather, a lack of 
devotion in research has blocked them from understanding the real situation. He said, 
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“rather than criticizing the Chinese government, Chinese netizens should make a self-
criticism first”. 
Informants like Chen used the absence of individual involvement to justify 
censorship. The responsibility of freeing information, then, falls on the shoulders of 
netizens. They argued that many Chinese netizens exaggerate the damages caused by 
censorship just as foreigners exaggerate those damages. They think Chinese netizens 
should stop being paranoid, and should stop using censorship as an excuse for their own 
incompetence. Instead, they should accommodate to the situation.  
There are also those who defended the government’s practice of censorship in 
cyberspace. Wei, one of my informants who studied philosophy, said: 
Living in a nation-state is like you’ve signed a tacit-consent even before you 
realize you’ve signed it. You give up certain rights in exchange for other rights. 
Every regime has its own mechanisms. Boundaries and restrictions are 
everywhere. They are not going to disappear and they don’t have to be evil in 
nature. Globalization and neoliberalism make people became fuzzy and 
unrealistic.  
 
Between “discipline” and “freedom”, people like this informant are in favor of 
discipline. They believe that a country like China with a large population will be better 
off with a strong government. The education level of China was brought up many times 
during my interviews.  
Shirley, who had lived in the U.S. for nine years, said to me, “Americans can 
never understand that with the large population and the low education level among our 
citizens, if our government is not strong enough, Chinese society will be in chaos”. Wei 
said that cyberspace is an extension of physical space. If the authoritarian regime works 
well in physical China, it should be applied to cyber China as well. He argued that 
regulations and controls are necessary for any modern nation-state. Wei diverted our 
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discussion of censorship into a discussion of economic liberalism. He thinks that a total 
free market is an ideal model that can never work in reality, and argued that if people 
hold that idea too tightly, they may find themselves disconnected from the real world.  
He also pointed out the fallacy of an assumed causal relationship between “low 
education” and “acting irrationally”. He said, “I think people are overly concerned about 
our netizens’ educational level. It is always used as a legitimation for keeping China’s 
cyberspace from being more open”. He argued that its large population is the essential 
key that makes China different from other countries, and can indeed be used to justify 
the practice of censorship in both physical and cyber reality. “Even if Chinese people’s 
educational level and their suzhi [素质; quality] had been elevated, with such a large 
population, problems and potential damages caused by a more open cyberspace would 
still exist. The key is the quantity but not the quality” said Wei.  
He emphasized that with billions of others to compete with in order to get at a 
limited amount of resources and opportunities, it is normal for people to feel desperate 
about their lives. With the sky-high prices of real estate, deteriorating employment 
conditions, and health care problems combined with other social issues, desperation is 
what most Chinese ordinary people are experiencing at this moment. He argued that it is 
impossible for one to keep faith in the bright side of human nature to make the society 
stay in harmony, which is what today’s China needs the most, he claimed, since it 
ensures continuing economic development. Thus, Wei and many of my informants who 
shared the same idea with him, stressed that having a strong government is not an option 
but a necessity for today’s China. Therefore, to some degree censorship is legitimate.  
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He also discussed economic development. He, like over half of my informants 
(32 out of 58), considered it as the most important task for today’s China. Lee, an 
informant who had studied financial engineering in Germany for four years, criticized 
my research. He said that as a “humanities student”, I am “barking up the wrong tree” 
when talking about censorship. He said: 
You “humanities students” talk about censorship with a tone that makes it sound 
like something so terrible and everybody should be against it. But you are 
wrong. Do you have any idea of how many people are suffering from starvation 
or how many can’t have a stable income that can support their family in our 
country? If a large number of our people cannot be fed, there can be no 
development and no freedom to speak of. The government is trying their best to 
develop the economy and to reduce the population suffering from poverty. 
People should stop complaining about those inessential issues like censorship. 
At this point, social harmony is the most important thing. Other things can wait.  
 
He also suggested that we should apply a “demand and supply diagram” to the 
issue of censorship:  
Why is internet censorship practiced in China? That is because the demand for 
freedom in cyberspace is not higher than its supply. The government is only one 
of the active parties in this story. There is a chance that Chinese netizens don’t 
really feel oppressed in their daily internet use. After all, fenqing [愤青; “angry 
youths”] are a minority in our society. Of course, people would like more 
freedom in cyberspace. But compared to other essential social problems, the free 
flow of information is a luxury rather than a necessity for Chinese people.  
 
Lee said, “Information is out there. It is not so hard nor does it take a lot of time 
to search for what you want”. Lee and Wei, as well as some other informants, argued 
that the government should only be responsible for “bigger things” such as keeping the 
economy growing, maintaining diplomatic relations and improving the social welfare 
system. They were convinced that the government blocked certain information because 
not all Chinese netizens can digest them. They maintained that Chinese intellectuals who 
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think they can handle all kinds of information should use their individual agency to take 
the liberty to search for whatever they want rather than just being a passive receiver and 
being fed by the so-called “official news”.    
 
Market Domination vs. State Control  
Many of my informants think information should be marketable like other commodities. 
They argued that individuals are entitled to know whatever they want to know, and, 
marketization of information is a great solution for ensuring the individual’s “right of 
knowing”. Besides, they also believe free flow of information will help improve equality, 
at least in cyberspace. They think that with an open network, people will have equal 
access to information despite their different social backgrounds. During our 
conversations, the notion of “free will” was brought up by my informants. They asked 
whether, even without censorship, individuals can really choose what they want 
voluntarily. One informant, Feng who majored in economics in college and currently 
works for a bank, said: 
The “cultural supermarket” sounds ideal. However, it doesn’t mean every culture 
or information has an equal chance to be seen or to be chosen by people. Some of 
them are more popular than others. Cultural imperialism is happening in 
cyberspace too. In recent years, Chinese people have worshiped foreign things 
and fawned on foreign powers. It is so annoying to hear that my peers think 
Western cultures are superior and more developed. If this bias became a common 
consensus, how can people make a “rational” decision when they are shopping in 
the cyber cultural supermarket? In this sense, I think censorship to a degree 
protects local cultures. I know that localism is not right, but sometimes it is the 
only way local culture can survive.  
 
Sophia, another informant who is a journalism graduate and had been living in 
Hong Kong for six years, disagreed: 
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Censorship is not the solution for protecting cultures. I don’t think cultures with 
weaker economies will be disadvantaged only because people have freedom to 
choose which culture they like. More than that, even if a culture has to face the 
risk of being obsolete, I don’t see it as a problem. Back in the 10th century when 
China was strong, people from other countries worshiped this oriental empire 
and they learned from us. Maybe, it is the time for us to learn from the rest of the 
world now. I don’t see it as a bad thing but a filter of cultures. The best ones are 
left, while the uncompetitive ones are buried.  
 
 “Market orientation” is the attitude adopted by Sophia, and many of my 
informants are like her. They think information and culture should be treated as 
commodities and we should leave them to the free market. Most of them showed 
tremendous trust in an open market and individuals’ ability of making the right choices 
for themselves. One of my informants, Lynn, said: 
There is no need to worry about the future of Chinese culture. Americanization 
can’t last long. People will choose Western products, life styles, and even 
ideologies because they think those are fresh. But the sense of freshness will 
wear off soon.  The market will find a balance and reach equilibrium where 
different cultures can co-exist. Then, Chinese people will pay more attention to 
their own culture. The revival of Confucianism is a sign of that. 
 
 
Economic liberalism has been internalized by this group of informants who 
object to censorship. Lynn further argued that instead of using censorship to help 
eliminate “harmful” information, the government should make more efforts on 
improving the public education system. “Education can make people know better. Then, 
they can choose information or practice culture wisely. The nation-state should treat its 







The Concept of Rationality 
Aside from the dichotomy in understanding “universal human right vs. cultural 
relativism”, some of my informants also pointed out that making news more transparent 
is crucial for contemporary Chinese society and is a prerequisite for increasing 
“rationality” among Chinese citizens. However, my more cynical informants held a 
suspicious attitude toward this view. Many scholars who have done research on 
cyberspace or the development of ICTs [Information and Communication Technologies] 
have argued that the internet is bringing us the privilege that individuals have never had 
in the past because it allows access to an enormous amount of information. This will 
help alter the old relationship between the nation-state and its citizens, they claim. 
Further, it will affect the development of democracy in different societies (Schudson, 
Schell, Ninan, Davidson and MacKay in Everette and Snyder ed. 1995).  Even though 
those scholars had second thoughts on the dynamic relationship between the internet and 
democracy, in general they still insist that free information could make people more 
rational and create more democracy.  
In contrast, American scholar Cass Sunstein (2006) argues that the overload of 
information is not a help for building a better and more democratic society, but a burden. 
He uses historical facts and legal cases to argue that cyberspace is not an “anarchic 
zone” that is created by individuals, but a “republic.com” constructed by governments. 
In his book Infotopia (2006), Sunstein disagrees with the idea that more information 
would make individuals see a bigger picture and be more rational. He argues that the 
overload of information may not eliminate but rather reinforce the bias held by 
individuals. He uses the term “information cocoon” to describe the situation that despite 
the enormous amount of information, individuals tend to only care and pay attention to 
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that which they like and only talk with those who share the same interests. Individuals, 
whether the masses or the leaders, are prejudiced by preconceived ideas. Therefore, 
cyberspace and the information in it are not providing us an opportunity to be more 
objective but offering more supporting data for the biases we already have.  
My more cynical informants share Sunstein’s idea. They doubt that “freedom of 
information and speech can make people more rational.” On the one hand, they believe 
that Westerners as well as some fenqing [愤青; “angry youths”] inside China are 
exaggerating the dark side of censorship since they overlook the creative net culture in 
China’s cyberspace that represents an informal resistance, such as the creation of 
caonima.
17
 They argued that monopoly corporations like Google have constructed the 
myth of “more information is better”; however, there are certain circumstances where it 
is better if the masses know less, and there is no correlation between information and 
rationality. Thus, if information is not as powerful and useful as assumed, censorship 
can’t be of that much harm.  
On this issue, one of my informants, Qing who studied sociology in college, said 
that Google is using that myth to get into the China market and to obtain money from it, 
just like what the British did to China with opium two hundred years ago.  
Another informant, Jamie, who majored in communications, gave an example to 
argue why knowing more may not be a good idea in some circumstances. A terrorist 
from Xinjiang bombed a bus in Shanghai a few years ago. After the event, local 
authorities decided not to make it public. The news was known by a limited number of 
                                                 
17
 Caonima (草泥马; Grass Mud Horse) is a Chinese internet meme widely used as symbolic defiance of 
the internet censorship in China. It played on homophone in Chinese language. Grass Mud Horse is 
supposedly a specie of alpaca. The pronunciation “cào nǐ mā” also means “fuck your mother” in Mandarin. 




people in Shanghai but never became national news. My informant mentioned that 
without authorized news, most people tended not to be concerned about the “rumors”. 
That is why they didn’t panic. The lack of significantly strong reactions among the 
masses discouraged terrorists and made them lose interest. Thus, no similar act of 
terrorism has happened in Shanghai ever since. On the other hand, the American mass 
media used a different way to handle news of terrorist attacks. They ensured 
transparency based on their principle of “citizens have the right to know the truth”. 
However, the results by many accounts have not been good. Somehow, the Western 
media became the accomplice of those terrorists in creating public fears. In “How the 
Media Enable Terrorism” on American Thinkers, an online journal, Rachel Neuwirth 
(2006) wrote,  
A major segment of the global media is behaving in a manner that makes 
terrorism and mass killings more likely rather than less likely. They enable and 
encourage terrorist slaughter of innocents by supplying providing a propaganda 
bonanza for the terrorist cause. Without the gain, there would be less incentive 
for the horrific behavior (Neuwirth 2006).  
 
 
Other communication study publications like “Transnational Terrorism, Security 
& the Rule of Law” (TTSRL 2008), also discuss the negative relation between “mass 
media” and “terrorism”. Similar to these arguments, my informant Jamie argued that 
there are certain circumstances in which it is better if citizens know less. “Of course I’m 
not saying that every block our government made in cyberspace is justifiable. It would 
be stupid to say so, since we all know their political tricks. I am just saying that 
Westerners have no idea what is going on in China. They generalize and simplify the 
situation. One principle [freedom of information] cannot fit all [situations]. Sometimes 
information can’t bring rational thinking but irrational reactions,” she said.   
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When I laid aside the abstract questions and focused on my informants’ internet-
using experiences, I found that although they may try to defend the government’s 
actions on censoring news, they still considered the Chinese government to be untruthful. 
Most of them spend about an hour reading news in cyberspace on a daily basis. When 
they do so, they do not just check news on Chinese websites. Although they go through 
news in what mainlanders called sidamenhu [四大门户; The Four Portals]18, they don’t 
trust them, especially when talking about affairs like Tibetan claims to independence, 
and Taiwan issues. The most popular websites for getting news mentioned by my 
informants were BBC.com and Washington Post.com.  
The reason that they prefer to read news from Western websites was not entirely 
because they trust Western media more than Chinese media. Actually, most of them trust 
none of these media and see the media as tools for different parties. They found that 
reading news from Western perspectives was quite useful and was a habit they 
developed during their years overseas. Many of them found that people outside China 
have no idea of what is going on in this country, especially those who are in the Western 
world. They either label China as a communist country and see people in it as still 
struggling with horrific totalitarian authority, or consider China as a nouveau riche 
society that can take the top position in the world economic hierarchy and should be 
treated as a major threat to developed countries. Returnees I’ve interviewed sometimes 
felt that they should be responsible for correcting such flawed thinking and felt 
responsible to represent China as it really is. Most of them share a strong sense of 
responsibility toward their motherland. They want to introduce it to the rest of the world. 
                                                 
18
 The Four Portals are, sina.com; sohu.com; 163.com; Xinhua.com. They are recognized as places for the 
Chinese government posting official discourses directly and indirectly.  
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This is where learning Western ways of thinking becomes handy, they felt. One male 
informant, Wang, who had been studying applied physics in the U.S. for three years, told 
me: 
Americans are very ethnocentric. When we discuss social issues concerning 
China, we can’t reach an agreement and it is almost impossible for them to really 
listen to me because they are convinced we Chinese are brainwashed and 
incapable of making any argument without carrying a communist ideology. I got 
upset and argued back. It was not a pleasure having these conversations and I 
tried to avoid talking about my country for a while. Now, I read their news, 
editorials and I learn their way of thinking. It is not because I believe their 
culture is superior but I want to be able to communicate with them. In some 
sense, they are also brainwashed. It is interesting to see how they could be so 
stubborn even though they have full access to all kinds of information.  
 
People like this informant questioned the correlation between “free information” 
and “rationality”. In addition, a conspiracy theory about the Google-China affair has 
been frequently mentioned by this group of informants, in which the Sino-American 
relationship had been put under the spotlight. One informant told me that he believes 
that Google’s action was definitely not based on a pure commercial concern. “The U.S. 
government was behind Google. They [Americans] are trying to use an ideology that is 
not suitable for Chinese society to infiltrate the mind of our youths. And they are trying 
to make China disordered,” he said. They saw the affair as an international political 
issue, and they claimed that “any rational Chinese should see through their trick”.  
All in all, the majority of my informants believed that China needs stability more 
than freedom of information and speech. They argued that if censorship can bring social 





Responses to Moral Discipline  
Among many “legitimate reasons” that the Chinese government used for blocking 
information, “immorality” is the handiest one. Both morality and politics provide 
answers to the question of “how ought we to live?”, but at different levels--the former is 
at an individual level, whereas the latter is at a social level. Confucianism as an essential 
part of Chinese culture during the past thousands of years emphasizes morality to a great 
degree. Chinese people’s social actions are not only constricted by laws but also by 
morality in a Confucian sense. For example, erotic culture like pornography is 
considered vulgar. The Chinese government has constructed a concept in 2010, called 
sansu (三俗: it refers to “vulgar”, “philistine” and “low” culture) to include everything 
they defined as morally intolerable. Following a conservative Confucian tradition, 
anything labeled as “sansu” is meant to be banned or blocked. However, some of my 
informants questioned the legitimacy and the legality of this concept. There were people 
I interviewed who found that censorship to a considerable degree violated their personal 
interests and privacy. One informant, Ba, a medical school graduate who identified 
herself as shunmin (an obedient citizen) found censorship to be a negative intrusion: 
I like reading about tanbi [refers to male homosexuality or boy love stories]. 
However, our government thinks it is a degraded taste. They label people like me 
as perverts. Reading tanbi novels is my hobby. Sometimes I even write them. 
There are certain websites and online communities I would go to regularly. 
However, they had been shut down many times during the past few years. Novels 
posted there have been deleted. Our posts were censored by the internet police. It 
was frustrating. It’s none of the government’s business. I was just reading and 




She told me that she knows how to “fanqiang”. But in her case this skill is not 
very useful. She said that she is neither curious about what happens “outside the wall,” 
nor is she interested in reading tanbi novels written by foreigners. She emphasized, “I 
want to read novels written in the Chinese language and talking about Chinese queers. 
Those are not available “outside the walls””. Therefore, Ba disagreed with many of my 
informants who believed that fanqiang is a fine solution to censorship. “Of course we 
always can come up with some solutions to cope with the situation. But those are not 
real solutions, since they are not focusing on solving the real problem. The real problem 
is that the Chinese government is too conservative and out of date. It is acting like a 
conservative parent who wants to control everything,” said Ba. She continued: 
I always identify myself as a shunmin [顺民; obedient citizen]. I have always 
been a good student from elementary school to college. I study hard and help 
others. I was a favorite kid in my class and won lots of prizes in different 
competitions. I got myself into the best college. The only “flaw” I have is this 
hobby. It doesn’t fit the social expectation for “a good girl”. You can say I’m 
vulgar. As an adult, I think I have my right to be vulgar. There is nothing wrong 
of choosing to be “vulgar”. What I am doing in my personal life has nothing to 
do with anyone else or the government.  
 
 
Ba found that censorship interferes with her personal life. She considered it as a 
violation of privacy. Many informants who share the same view with Ba also object to 
the idea that the nation-state has the right to determine what is vulgar. There was a 
popular match-making TV program that was banned in mainland China because officers 
in the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (广电总局; SARFT) found 
the program was vulgar. Discussions of this event were heated online afterward. Brett, 
one of my informants who majored in mechanical engineering said to me: 
Before the SARFT made a big buzz about this program, I actually thought the 
program was unattractive and sort of vulgar. But now, I found the SARFT is 
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more vulgar. As audience we are not passive receivers. However, the SARFT 
denies our capability of digesting information appropriately. They have 
outsmarted themselves.  
 
Ba used a popular sarcastic saying to criticize censorship of a marginalized 
subculture like tanbi: “it is not enough for you [the government] to rape me but you also 
have to criticize me for not being a virgin”. In her words, we can see that one reason that 
my informants think that pornography or other internet content shouldn’t be blocked or 
officially criticized is that they believe culture is something that should be marketed and 
treated as a commodity. Individuals could and also should have the right to choose any 
type of culture they like. The standardized good/bad value system that has guided 
people’s cultural tastes is out of date, they maintain. Although they may not know the 
concept of the “global cultural supermarket” (Mathews 2000), they certainly are using it 
to explain their perspectives on how cultures should be treated or managed. Meanwhile, 
although this female informant felt uncomfortable about the situation, she said that she 
wouldn’t or couldn’t do anything about it because people like her are minorities in China. 
She showed her accommodation toward this problem. “If you realize that you are 
powerless and can’t change anything, why bother anymore?” she said.  
The majority of my informants suspect that morality has been used by the 
Chinese government as an excuse to conceal politically sensitive information. Brett said, 
“China is still a country ruled by people but not by laws. The only difference between 
today’s China and the China of earlier eras is that China is now pretends to be 
administrated by laws. Thus, lots of information is hidden from ordinary people for 
political reasons. Whenever there are disagreements between different interest parties, 
certain information will be classified as “sensitive” and blocked from netizens. However, 
 100 
 
they need to make the operation of censorship sounds reasonable to ordinary people. 
And that is why they use moral discourses”.  
Morality is a central concern of many societies. However, after the 
Enlightenment, Europeans shifted their focus from morality to rationality (Conradie and 
Abrahams 2006: 60). The advocacy of reasoning led to individualism, because only 
individual can reason. In addition, the spirit of capitalism, which is the desire to profit, 
engendered consumerism which made the society more market oriented and less 
controlled by the state. In China, although both of these trends happened to a degree, the 
semi-authoritarian state is still very strong and the Confucian moral discourses are 
taken-for-granted by ordinary people. Accordingly, this provides a ground for 
censorship since it can always use “morality” as its justification.  
Nonetheless, through interviews, it is clear that economic liberalism is taking 
over from old-fashioned moral discourses. Many of my informants insisted that 
watching pornography is a personal choice which shouldn’t be meddled in by the 
government. My informant Chensaid to me: 
We are living in a fragmentizing world. The society is filled with specialists but 
not generalists. Individuals are only familiar with some parts of the total 
knowledge but not other parts. Even the highly educated ones don’t know 
everything. Therefore, a deep conversation can hardly be carried on between 
people who specialize in different things. Of course, to show off my intelligence 
I can talk about quantum physics to you. But only people in that academic circle 
can understand me or are interested in my talking. However, those are labeled as 
sansu by the Chinese government are common for everybody. You don’t need a 
PhD to understand them. Life is already miserable. Why shall we talk about those 
serious political things when we don’t have to? Sansu might be vulgar, but you 
can see it as an ironic way of interperating social issues, which is also an outlet 
for depressed emotions caused by the pressure of life. Letting people dramatize 






In this chapter, I have looked into how my informants view the issue of information 
freedom in China’s cyberspace. Binary ways of thinking were obviously displayed in 
their answers [“universal human rights vs. cultural relativism”, “individual agency vs. 
state control”, and “market domination vs. state control”]. Besides the well-worn 
argument that freedom of information is a basic human right, the commonest reason for 
disapproving censorship was rooted in the idea of marketization and the faith in 
individual rationality, holding that the nation-state should stay away from the free flow 
of information. Those who defended censorship believe that although freedom of 
information in a general sense is a good principle, it doesn’t suit Chinese society due to 
the large population and unstable social conditions China has. Few of my informants 
were certain about their attitudes toward censorship, with most changing their positions 
during interviews. On the one hand, they felt the inconvenience caused by censorship. 
On the other hand, they compromised whenever alternative options were available.  
The practice of fanqiang was commonly found among my informants. Different 
kinds of technologies are utilized for getting around “the Great Firewall”. Censorship, in 
a strange way, encouraged some of my informants. They became more enthusiastic in 
searching for information. According to them, the most popular news and posts in 
China’s cyberspace usually are labeled with words like “check this, will be censored 
soon”. At the same time, when the government was trying to conceal sensitive topics 
like the Tiananmen Square Protest in1989, their efforts can be counterproductive since it 
only evoked more curiosity. During my fieldwork, I realized that my informants 
sometimes confused consumers’ rights with civil rights. That explained why they didn’t 
feel extremely annoyed by censorship. When they talked about using individual agency 
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to resist censorship, they were displaying how they used the power of being modern 
consumers. They identify themselves as consumers more than citizens during both the 
information accessing and information selecting process. This point will be further 






















Chapter 5.  Freedom of Speech 
This chapter explores how my informants understand the issue of freedom of speech and 
how they view the situation of free speech in China’s cyberspace. It starts with a general 
discussion of freedom in relation to speech and then examines several well-known cases: 
the case of Liu Xiaobo, the case of Ai Weiwei, and the Chinese Jasmine Movement. 
Compared to the positive responses I got by discussing the issue of freedom of 
information in China’s cyberspace with my informants, in terms of these issues, 
pessimistic views were expressed. Discussions of “freedom of expression” revealed my 
informants’ concerns and worries about the negative effects censorship caused.  
Freedom of speech is a highly contentious issue. On the one hand, it is 
recognized as a basic human right. On the other hand, most discussions of freedom of 
speech conclude that in some contexts it must be limited, since such speech always takes 
place within a context of competing values. Absolute freedom in speech doesn’t exist. 
As Stanley Fish points out, instead of seeing the phrase “free speech” as a suggestion 
that “speech should never be interfered with”, we should instead realize that is a useful 
term to focus our attention on a particular form of human interaction: “Free speech, in 
short, is not an independent value but a political prize” (Fish 1994: 102). The degree of 
free speech in a society can be seen as a result of struggles that take place between the 
competing demands of liberty and authority. As John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty, 
we cannot have the former without the latter (Mill 1869: 5). In egalitarian liberal 
accounts, free speech should be provided to individuals as a constitutional right aimed at 
protecting them from interference by the state. “Liberalism has developed the notion of 
the state’s role as a neutral facilitator of a ‘marketplace of ideas’, within which citizens 
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may freely debate competing notions of the good life, with the state favoring no one 
view over another” (Levin 2010:1). However, it seems clear that this “marketplace of 
ideas” will not solve the problem of inequality in contemporary society, which is not 
operating as liberal theorists had envisioned. Neither the state nor the marketplace alone 
is sufficient in making Chinese society a place in which diverse views considered openly 
and in a spirit of genuine inquiry can coexist. Culture is another variable that should be 
taken into consideration as well, since it has influence in shaping both the state and the 
marketplace.  If the state only works as a neutral institution and mainly relies on the 
marketplace to guide the public will, its function in facilitating each individual’s 
conception of the good will be ineffective. The sense of freedom is also a subjective 
matter under many conditions, and will be affected by the cultural environment 
individuals live in.  
The task of research on free speech, therefore, should not focus on arguing for an 
unlimited domain of free speech nor should it use any ideal ideological perspective to 
review the situation in China or any other particular society.. First we need to be 
cautious about assuming that information in the West is open and in China is censored.  
After all, there are limits to free speech in the West as well.  It is true that there are 
greater limits in China, but an important part of this thesis is moving past a 
documentation of those limits to an analysis of how people accommodate to these limits.  
Thus, this chapter focuses on explaining the meaning my informants place on 
free speech in relation to the values they place on other ideals. Moreover, I look at how 
people like my informants make alternative realities coexist. For example, how could 
they be Westernized and supporting liberal values on one hand while being pro-CCP and 
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adopting conservative values on the other? This chapter also examines how returnees, as 
a group of Chinese intellectuals, evaluate the current context of free speech in mainland 
China as well as how they respond to censorship and tyranny in cyberspace whenever 
they feel their right of free speech is violated. 
 
Freedom in Relation to Speech 
Most of my informants were optimistic when talking about the issue of “freedom of 
information” to me. However, the majority felt pessimistic when talking about freedom 
in relation to speech. They argued that with all the informal channels available, it is not 
so difficult for them to get enough information. However, my informants said that they 
felt that there were more obstacles when trying to post original thoughts that may go 
against the interests of certain people or certain parties on the internet. Liang, one of my 
informants, said: 
I feel that the openness of free speech in China has regressed in recent years. 
Five years ago, China’s cyberspace was quite open. We barely felt constrained. 
We could find anything and express almost everything online. But recently, 
especially after the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the situation had become worse. I 
think this is a trend. I’m not so happy with the current situation. I don’t believe 
there is hope for the future either. As I recall, three years ago, “wei wen” [维稳; 
stability maintenance] became the focus of the central government’s work. Ever 
since then, the situation has become worse. I pay close attention to social affairs. 
And I can see that more and more public intellectuals are being accused and 
arrested. The real reason behind those accusations was that they had written and 
published “inappropriate” things. I don’t think they were trying to release 
breaking news that we don’t know. We already knew the facts. They were just 
commenting. And I think sometimes public intellectuals are set up to commit 
crimes without a legitimate reason. And they would be taken away and just 




It is obvious that Liang was dissatisfied with and confused about the current 
situation. She said, “Isn’t the situation supposed to get better and better? How come I 
feel our society is running in the opposite direction in regards to free speech?”  
Alex, another informant, who has been identified as a “fenqing” [愤青 angry 
youth] by his peers, expressed an even stronger sense of dissatisfaction when talking 
about the lack of free speech in China. He was quite emotional during our interview. He 
told me that he was glad there is somebody like me that he can talk to about this problem. 
Alex hoped that my research would be provocative towards the Chinese government or 
at least could create a link between citizens like him who resent censorship and the 
authorities practicing censorship. He told me that he envied me for having an 
opportunity to write about censorship. I, on the other hand, felt guilty that I may 
disappoint him, since I don’t directly expect to create social change through my research. 
There is very little I can do to change the situation in China’s cyberspace as an activist. 
During my fieldwork, I was more of an observer. Alex said: 
I am trying my best. I am living overseas now. I search for all kinds of 
information and spread them out by using online social networks. Although my 
posts get deleted every now and then, I won’t give up. I think our society needs 
someone to do this: to provoke the authorities! If we all give in to censorship and 
assume there is nothing we can do about it, if we stop being angry about it and 
just keep our mouths shut, the situation will only get worse. I am not comparing 
myself to people like Liu Xiaobo who is definitely an activist. Yet, I think I am 
better than those who are doing nothing but being cynical.  
 
Freedom of speech differs from some other forms of freedom of action in a 
fundamental way. The state can control most freedom of action by limiting the sources 
of that action. For example, if the state doesn’t want its citizen to use automobiles, it just 
needs to limit the production of automobiles or limit the opportunities for citizens to buy 
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them, as the Beijing local government is doing at present
19
. However, in the case of 
speech, the government’s hands are tied. All they can do is to punish people after they 
have made their “inappropriate” expressions. This means that to some degree Chinese 
people are free to say or to publish things, at least in cyberspace. There is a time gap 
between expression and censorship by the internet police. Alex is using this gap to resist 
censorship. He also emphasized that the consequences of resisting censorship should be 
taken into consideration too. That’s why Alex also said to me: 
People shouldn’t feel scared when they are trying to express themselves. It is not 
right that we have to think about the consequences of what we say. They [the 
government] arrested those influential people as an example to us. They tend to 
deter us and try to tell us that the opportunity cost is too high when we fail to 
watch our mouths. Yes, you [the government] are powerful and you are 
manipulating public opinion to sound harmonious. But what you are showing to 
the world on television and newspapers is not an honest reflection of today’s 
China. Those are lies.  
 
Another informant, Qing, who also felt frustrated about the lack of free speech in 
China’s cyberspace, disagreed with Alex when I told him the latter’s opinions, and said 
that his understanding on this issue was too simple and naïve. Qing said: 
He is making the mistake that many outsiders and netizens are making. As an 
educated Chinese, he should know better. Instead of seeing the central 
government as a single unit, we should see today’s Chinese government as an 
assemblage of many different interest groups. Any policy or decision that is 
made by the central government is the result of the struggles among those 
interest groups. If you simply interpret the practice of censorship as a result of 
communistic leadership, you are wrong. It is a structural problem. And, that’s 
why I think that even if the country is about to change the Chairman and 
reshuffle the leadership, the problem won’t be solved.   
 
                                                 
19
 The Beijing local government announced new regulations in car purchases in order to ease traffic 
pressure. Only Beijing permanent residents with valid driver’s licenses are allowed to apply to purchase 
cars in Beijing. Among all those applications, lotteries are run by the government on a monthly basis to 
decide who can buy a car (Streeter 2010).  
 108 
 
Qing was even more critical and pessimistic about the current and future 
situation of China’s cyberspace than Alex. She pointed out that what the “harmonious 
society” project has “accomplished” during the past few years is irreversible. She 
continued,  
Millions of people are working in positions that are related to this project. If we 
stop the operation of censorship, internet policemen, programmers in charge of 
building “the Great Firewall”, engineers who invent software that supports 
fanqiang, etc, they all will be unemployed. Also, after the central government 
made the budget for the censorship project, local governments would do 
anything for a piece of that pie. Of course they would rather be more 
conservative and catch more ‘radical netizens’ and ‘activists’ despite the 
accuracy of reports on those ‘activists’. That’s how they convince officers from 
the upper levels of the bureaucratic system to allocate funds to the area which 
they are supervising. I think censorship is a structural and economic problem but 
not an ideological one. Officials in the CCP are not as stupid as you might think. 
They are not saying “obscurantism is the best solution for our country”. They 
just have to do this [censorship] because each one of them has been corrupted by 
the system. And the whole system has already sunk into a vicious circle. No one 
can stop what they are doing now, because the opportunity cost of stopping it 
would be tremendous both economically and socially.  
 
When Max Weber inquired into the strengths and weaknesses of three types of 
authority (Weber 1958), he pointed out a similar cost to the legal-rational authority 
which refers to modern bureaucratic systems. As Weber claims, no authoritarian 
structure in reality can be exclusively bureaucratic because some position would be held 
by a variety of charismatic leaders or traditional leaders who can climb up the 
bureaucratic system by using their connections. Yet, in a larger sense it is still a 
legitimate argument to say that present-day China is built upon an extensive bureaucratic 
system. Weber expressed his pessimistic view by saying that bureaucratic systems may 
lead us to an “iron cage” in which people become cogs of the machine of capitalism. In 
an “iron cage”, individuals are isolated and can only focus on specific tasks. No one, not 
even leaders, can see the bigger picture. This reflects the current situation in China on 
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the issue of free speech. In the coming parts of this chapter, I will further elaborate on 
this statement by using different cases.  
 
Twitter and Sina Weibo 
Both Twitter and Sina Weibo are micro-blogging platforms that provide new 
communication channels. They enable a user to send and read posts composed of up to 
140 characters [140 for twitter/136 for Sina Weibo], which are displayed on a user’s 
profile page. A user can also subscribe to other users’ posts. All posts are publicly 
visible. Users of these micro-blogs can “tweet” [post news] via the official website or 
through compatible external applications that are installed on smartphones. The services 
of both Twitter and Weibo are free. Sina Weibo is considered to be the Chinese version 
of Twitter. Technologically, this new communication platform provides social 
advantages that are lacking in traditional forms of media.  
First, it makes communication easier and ensures the timeliness of the 
dissemination of news. Second, it is supported by a massive number of users. Twitter 
has 100 million active users (Taylor 2011) while Sina Weibo has 300 million registered 
users
20
 around the world (Russel 2012). Some scholars and commentators predict that 
with these two characteristics, micro-blogs will empower ordinary internet users and 
accelerate the process of democratization, especially in developing countries. The way 
Twitter was used by ordinary people to increase news transparency during Iran’s 
election in 2009 is used as evidence to support this argument. “As Iran’s government 
cracks down on traditional media after the country’s disputed presidential election, tech-
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 “An average day sees more than 100 million messages sent across the platform. While that number is 
vague, Sina has declined to offer up an indication of just how many users are active” (Russel 2012). 
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savvy Iranians have turned to the micro-blogging site Twitter. Its use to organize and 
send pictures and messages to the outside world— in real time as events unfolded— was 
a powerful example of how such tools can overcome government attempts at 
censorship” (CBS NEWS 2009). Also, it is a useful tool for organizing protests in the 
physical world. For example, utilizing Twitter and Sina Weibo, Chinese artists 
organized and broadcast a protest at Chang’an Street against the forced demolition and 
violent eviction of the Art District in Beijing (NTDTV 2010), even though the result of 
this protest was not fully successful. However, both Twitter and Sina Weibo can only act 
in a very limited way in the Chinese context.  Twitter has been blocked by “the Great 
Firewall” since June 2, 2009 along with other Web 2.0 platforms such as Flickr, 
Facebook, and Youtube. Only those who practice fanqiang can keep their Twitter 
accounts activated. After Twitter had been blocked for two months, China’s biggest 
Web portal, Sina group, launched its own micro-blog in China’s cyberspace. Soon, it 
became a substitute for Twitter and captured the Chinese market. Those who don’t 
practice fanqiang regularly choose to use Sina Weibo instead of Twitter. My informants 
claimed that there is an interesting distinction among Chinese netizens: the “liberalists” 
use Twitter, while the “new left” would use Sina Weibo. This impression has been 
deeply rooted in my informants and was repeatedly mentioned by them. 
However, I am highly suspect of the validity of these labels. First, the dichotomy 
of “liberalism vs. new left” oversimplifies the situation. Typically, a “liberalist” is a 
person who supports more radical market reforms, further capitalization, 
democratization and more freedom in different areas, whereas, those labeled as the “new 
left” advocate authoritarian rules and stress public ownership of resources and a better 
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social welfare system. In What Does China Think?, Mark Leonard (2008) examines the 
work and activism of Wang Hui
21
 to argue that the stereotype of the “new left” is not 
applicable anymore. Wang Hui, as a public figure and a representative of today’s “new 
left”, calls for the establishment of democracy in present-day China. He believes that we 
need democracy to enable the government and to strengthen its regime. As mentioned by 
my informant Qing, the Chinese bureaucratic system is made up of different interest 
groups. Wang Hui states that only democracy will enable the government to handle 
those special interest groups so that the government can obtain financial and social 
support from them. In the 1990s, there was a binary division between the concepts of 
“free market” and “authoritarian government”. In general, people accepted the idea that 
“we should develop the economy and reform the market first” and the “reformation of 
the government” can gradually be taken care of afterwards. According to Leonard 
(2008), Wang Hui now argues that this view is shortsighted and unrealistic since there 
are many problematic by-products that have been created by the economic reforms. 
Political reformation is necessary to help solve such problems (Leonard 2008).  
Leonard uses this case to argue that today’s “new left” in China has already 
become more like the “liberalists”. On the other hand, the representative of the 
“liberalists”, Pan Wei22 from Peking University, has criticized the on-going democratic 
elections that Yu Keping
23
 and his colleges have experimented with in Ping Chang 
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 Wang Hui (汪晖) is a public intellectual in China, and a professor in the Department of Chinese 
Language and Literature at Tsinghua University. He has been named as one of the top 100 public 
intellectuals by Foreign Policy magazine (U.S.) in 2008. He also has been commonly labeled as a 
representative of the “new left” in today’s China.  
22
 Pan Wei (潘维) is an associate professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University.  
23
 Yu Keping (俞可平) is the Deputy Director of the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central 





. Pan argues that a U.S.-European interpretation of democracy shouldn’t and 
couldn’t be directly applied to China because of the nation’s different social and cultural 
environment (Leonard 2008). He is convinced that elected officials won’t focus on 
serving local people but rather on pleasing local magnates. At first glance, Pan’s 
argument makes him sound like a “left-leaning” person who supports authoritarian 
governing. However, he explains that he argues so only because that he thinks perfecting 
the legal system is more important than developing democracy in China. According to 
Pan, democracy places too much faith on people and assumes that good leadership can 
be chosen by ordinary men, while he believes that strengthening the legal system should 
receive priority because the government shouldn’t trust civilians or the “potentates”. 
From these two cases, Leonard explains that the line between the “liberalists” and the 
“new left” is unclear in today’s China. Similar inconsistencies were also found among 
my informants, which I discovered through an examination of their micro-blogs found 
that most of my informants used both Twitter and Sina Weibo.  Xiao, a male informant 
in his mid-twenties who is now working for a web-site designing company, said to me: 
It is not one’s political view that matters the most. I use both of them [Twitter 
and Sina Weibo] because some of my friends who live inside ‘the Great 
Firewall’ are too lazy to fanqiang. And also I think Sina Weibo has more 
interesting news about China. To Chinese people, such news is more entertaining 
than that found on Twitter. Many celebrities are using it. Twitter, on the other 
hand, usually is used for following people like Ran Yunfei
25
 or organizations like 
Southern Weekend
26
 to get political news or controversial comments on social 
issues. I think those are things I need to know. They make me know more about 
my country. That’s why I always try to keep my Twitter account activated. But it 
is also fun to just read gossip about celebrities and trivial details about my 




 Ran Yunfei (冉云飞) is a famous Chinese writer and a high-profile democracy activist and blogger. He 
was arrested in late March 2011, shortly after the start of the 2011 Chinese Jasmine protests. 
26
 Southern Weekend (南方周末) is one of China’s most popular newspapers, and is owned by the 
Southern Daily Group (南方报业集团). The New York Times has described Southern Weekend as 
“China’s most influential liberal newspaper” (Rosenthal 2002).  
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friends’ lives on Sina Weibo. When I post news, which platform is my primary 
choice?  Hmm, you know there is an online application which can help you 
combine all your social networks, such as Facebook, Renren, Twitter, Weibo, 
Douban, together. When you write a new comment or a new tweet by using that 
application, your post will automatically appear on all those social networks. 
Many of my friends are using that. I don’t think politics is the essential reason 
for choosing certain online applications or social network sites. Well, I can’t 
deny that using things like Twitter results in a kind of labeling. It means that I am 
a zhishifenzi [知识分子: intellectuals]. But the most popular news on both 
Twitter and Sina Weibo is entertainment news after all. 
 
Apparently, he is right. According to the “The Twitaholic.com Top 100 
Twitterholics Based on Followers” (Twitaholics 2011) and the similar ranking record for 
Sina Weibo (Sina 2011), except for Barack Obama [politician] on Twitter and Kai-Fu 
Lee [information technology executive] on Sina Weibo, the rest of the most popular 
Micro-blog users were all celebrities. As my informant Xiao continued: 
Yes, if censored news has been released on Twitter or Weibo, we will follow it. 
But it has to be something concrete and detailed. For example, the case of Liu 
Xiaobo, the case of the poisoned milk powder or the story of “My father is Li 
Gang”27…we paid close attention to the details of those cases. No one would 
write something only for the sake of an ideology today. We are not like those 
hippies back in the 1980s. When you think about the Tian’anmen Square protests 
of 1989, those angry youths were protesting mostly for the sake of an ideal. We 
don’t do such a thing anymore. It doesn’t mean we don’t have ideals. Today’s 
world is different. People are not so passionate about politics. Thus, although 
both Sina Weibo and Twitter are supported by massive numbers of users and 
both of them are useful for uniting people, I don’t think a real effective 
revolution can take place in present day China. After all, it is not technology that 
makes revolution possible but people. Today’s Chinese youths, even those like 
us who have studied overseas, have lost the spirit of 1989.  
 
                                                 
27
 Li Gang (李刚) is a deputy director of the Baoding Public security Bureau. His name became familiar to 
the public because of the “Li Gang Incident” which occurred on October 16, 2010, inside Hebei 
University in Baoding.  A black Volkswagen Magotan traveling down a narrow lane hit two university 
students who were roller-skating. The drunk driver who caused this accident was Li Gang’s 22-year-old 
son, Li Qiming. When arrested by security guards, Li Qiming was convinced that his father’s position 
would give him immunity, and shouted out, “Go ahead! Sue me if you dare! My father is Li Gang!” The 
phrase “My father is Li Gang” [“我爸是李刚”] soon became popular and was used by Chinese netizens in 




Another informant, David who works as an accountant, added,  
 
Most of the time, people would reply to sensitive news online. But they only use 
emoticons or curse words instead of posting informative comments or 
constructive criticisms. Yes, news travels faster than before. But that is all. When 
people complain that there is no free speech in Chinese cyberspace, I think they 
should take a look at themselves first. What would they say if they could fully 
enjoy the freedom of expression? On the one hand, you can say that we are a 
country that lacks free speech. Real democracy activists are caught up and beaten 
up by policemen every now and then. On the other hand, ordinary people are 
cursing the government on Sina Weibo or Twitter on a daily basis. Cursing the 
government seems like a ritual that you must do every time when you read some 
tragedy that has happened in China.  
 
Both Xiao and David argued that even though platforms like Twitter and Sina 
Weibo could be helpful to connect netizens and initiate social movements, nonetheless, 
in a broader sense physical reality can barely be changed because of what is happening 
in cyberspace. My informants think that generally speaking, ordinary netizens still don’t 
have enough momentum to fight for greater change.  Shuo, an informant who have been 
living in UK for more than ten years after leaving Japan where she had lived for six 
years, confessed to me: 
I am criticizing my peers. But honestly I don’t think I can do better. With all our 
education and cultivation, we can think and we can reason. But most of the time, 
when we are online, we just want to do something silly and fun. That’s why 
when you discussed freedom of information and speech with me, what 
immediately jumped into my mind is “Facebook” and “YouTube”. Frankly 
speaking, with all the resources of free TV shows and free movies, I am fairly 
happy with what I can enjoy online. If someday, the government blocked those 
programs, I think I will be really angry and spend more effort to get those free 
entertainments back, because that is not something abstract or an unobtainable 
ideal but a very important part of my daily life.  
   
One important thing that is worth noticing from what my informants said is that 
only specific events can capture their attention and convince them to take action. This is 
probably the reason why my informants complained more when talking about free 
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speech than when they talked about the issue of freedom of information. The way free 
speech has been limited makes people feel constrained in a more concrete way. Shuo 
also told me a story to support her critique of the ridiculousness of censorship: Once, Li 
Yinhe
28
, the most famous sexologist in China, was trying to organize a symposium on 
sexuality. When she sent invitations to the symposium via email, because “sex” was 
marked as a “sensitive word” and was automatically replaced by the symbol “□”, her 
email didn’t make any sense to her recipients. Although this is an extreme case and I 
can’t testify to the accuracy of my informant’s story, similar things do happen frequently 
to ordinary internet users. My informants showed dissatisfaction toward this problem. 
Jing, who was studying international communication in the U.S. said:  
What kinds of words are qualified to be sensitive words? How come there are so 
many sensitive words? I find their [internet policemen] definition of ‘sensitive 
words’ to be peculiar. Sometimes, I think the things I’ve written were perfectly 
correct in a political sense, but words in my post would be deleted anyway. I 
can’t identify our government’s G spot. They are unbelievable!  
 
Not only is there a lack of definition for “sensitive words” but also the concept of 
“chaos”. When Evan Osnos, the staff writer of The New Yorker, gave a speech at The 
14
th
 Harvard East Asia Society Graduate Student Conference, he questioned the idea of 
“stability”. Considering the current situation of censorship in China’s cyberspace, his 
query was fair and sensible. What kind of situation is qualified to be labeled as chaos or 
instability? How do we define “chaos”? For what reasons are public figures caught and 
accused of endangering “national security”? Bearing these questions in mind, I went to 
the U.S. and did a second period of fieldwork in Richmond, Virginia after Liu Xiaobo 
won the Nobel Prize and the Chinese Jasmine Movement first began. During this 
                                                 
28
 Li Yinhe (李银河) is a sociologist, sexologist, and an activist for LGBT rights in  China.   
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fieldwork, I focused on investigating how my informants interpreted the case of Liu 
Xiaobo and the Chinese Jasmine Movement in relation to the issue of free speech.  
 
Liu Xiaobo  
Liu Xiaobo is a Chinese literary critic and one of the most influential human rights 
activists in China. He called for political reforms and initiated Charter 08, resembling 
Charter 77 issued by dissidents in Czechoslovakia in 1977. Charter 08 was published on 
10 December 2008 and signed by over 350 Chinese intellectuals and human rights 
activists. Since its release, more than 10,000 people inside and outside of China have 
signed the charter (Havel, Nemcova and Maly 2010). This manifesto called for basic 
human rights for the Chinese people, among which the demands for free press and free 
speech have been emphasized. Liu Xiaobo, as the winner of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize 
missed his opportunity of receiving the prize in person since he was arrested in China in 
2008 and sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2009. He then became the world’s only 
imprisoned Nobel Peace Laureate, which brought his case international attention. All of 
those I interviewed knew about Charter 08 and the stories of Liu Xiaobo. Some of them 
told me that they had read Charter 08 online. A few of them even signed it.  
Generally speaking, before Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize, many of my 
informants admired him and Charter 08. Yet, when I did my follow-up interviews after 
Liu won the price, this same group of people claimed that those who cheered for Liu 
were radicals who weren’t thinking rationally.  “Those who celebrated the Nobel Peace 
Prize certainly haven’t thought the whole thing through. Although Liu did make an 
effort to change the current situation of freedom of speech in China, his Charter 08 was 
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merely a text without down-to-earth effects. His winning is too political. He has been 
used by Western politicians,” argued Emily, a business graduate who actually resented 
censorship.  
Ting, a civil engineering graduate, disagreed with Emily and thought she 
devalued Liu Xiaobo and his work. He said:  
I think the government was cruel and foolish. Society needs people like Liu who 
dare to say something to provoke and challenge the authorities. I don’t think he is 
just any writer who only wants to draw attention to himself by being radical. He 
is not a hypocrite but someone who is willing to show his true colors. Some 
public intellectuals in today’s China like to pretend that they are noble and don’t 
care about fame or money, but they do. That’s why they only publish the 
“proper” articles. Liu, on the other hand, although he admitted directly during an 
interview in 1988 that two of the reasons which encouraged him to continue to 
teach are the ability to “make money” and “nourish my ego”,  he still kept taking 
risks and kept writing “inappropriate” articles that enraged the government and 
influential officials. I think Charter 08 is effective. I admire people like Liu and 
hope there can be more like him that fight for us and for our country’s future.  
 
Although he showed enormous respect and admiration for Liu, he told me that he 
did not dare to take the risk and be a civil rights activist himself. Ting continued: 
I pay close attention to stuff like this case. But I won’t confront the government 
and its policies. First, although I don’t like censorship, I can’t say that censorship 
is useless in China. After all, I don’t have any idea what the “bigger picture” 
looks like. Maybe it is true that the society would dissolve into chaos if the Web 
becomes entirely open in China. Who knows? Who am I to say which policy is 
better for the majority of people? I’m not like Liu or other activists that know 
better about our society. Second, I have to think about my family and my own 
life. Look at Liu’s wife. Now, she is so miserable with her life under full 
surveillance. She is practically living in prison. I am just an ordinary man. I 
won’t do radical things that endanger my family or myself. But I can do small 
things. I like to spread “censored” news to my friends who don’t have easy 
access to it. Maybe some of them will be inspired by what I’ve shared. I don’t 
believe that “ignorance is bliss”. Even if I can’t change the situation after 
knowing more, knowing is still better than being blind. And, I think if there is a 




Instead of focusing on Liu and his deeds, Ning, who is also working on her 
master’s degree in Richmond, considered the case of Liu Xiaobo as a sign that reflects 
the general trend in China on the issue of free speech. She said:  
I am terrified by this case. Do you know how much the Chinese people and 
Chinese government value “face” [面子 mianzi: “self-presentation”]? If you 
don’t, think about the Beijing 2008 Olympics or any other international event 
that has taken place in China. Our government always presents its best “face” to 
the world. Considering the international pressure, I thought that even if they put 
Liu in jail, at least they would allow him to go to the ceremony in order to 
pretend that China has human rights. But they didn’t! They made him the only 
Nobel Peace Prize winner that was forbidden by his own government from 
receiving the prize. I think the government was trying to send a message to its 
citizens as well as to the international community, which says ‘we don’t care 
how you judge our way of governing’. I feel so frightened about this. 
 
She also told me that there was a very popular but vulgar cyber-figure who drew 
more attention from Chinese netizens then even Liu’s case during that period. Ning 
complained to me, “Everybody is talking about Xiao Yueyue29 [小月月]. Her stories are 
stupid and she is just a stupid fictional figure. How could people find that Xiao Yueyue 
deserves more attention than Liu Xiaobo? I already know what is wrong with our 
government. But who can tell me what is wrong with our people?”  
I’ve noticed this phenomenon too. Before the result of the Nobel Peace Prize was 
announced, there were netizens that tried to make the event a gamble, a game, or their 
own opportunity of being the new “web celebrity” in China’s cyberspace. I remember 
that there was a girl who posted a letter on her own webpage, in which she said that if 
Liu won the prize, she would post nude photos of herself to celebrate it. Some of my 
                                                 
29
Xiao Yueyue is the main character of a fictional story that was posted by a Chinese netizen on the 
Tianya online community.  The stories about how Xiao Yueyue seducing her potential boyfriend, calling 
attentions in public by using outrageous and annoying means, etc received a large amount of attention in 




informants consider this girl as an object of contempt and her behavior as offensive. 
Others view her practice as an expression of behavioral art that could make the case of 
Liu Xiaobo more visible to the public. Although my informants passed different 
judgments on this case, it is apparent that because of the internet, politically sensitive 
news spreads further and faster than before, but the internet is also used by netizens to 
de-politicize certain events. It seems that we are entering a “political entertainment” era 
with the help from the internet.  
When talking about behavioral art, there is another figure that must be mentioned, 
artist Ai Weiwei, who was arrested right before I started the second period of my 
fieldwork.   
 
Ai Weiwei  
Ai Weiwei is a contemporary artist who has also been recognized as one of China’s 
boldest political activists. “His cultural and political footprint is unique in a country 
where people generally face a choice between thriving within the confines of the system 
or shouting from the shadows outside it” (Osnos 2010). Lots of his art work is related to 
social and political issues such as government corruption or cover-ups; one of his art 
pieces is dedicated to exposing an alleged corruption scandal in the construction of 
Sichuan primary schools that collapsed during the catastrophic earthquake in 2008. As 
Chen Danqing, another influential Chinese artist, put it: “He is doing something more 
interesting, more ambiguous…. He wants to see how far an individual’s power can go” 
(Osnos 2010). According to the South China Morning Post, Ai was intercepted from 
boarding his flight to Hong Kong by border police at Beijing Capital International 
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Airport (Choi 2011). According to unofficial news spread online, he was under 
investigation for tax evasion, bigamy and distributing pornography on cyberspace. His 
whereabouts remained unknown throughout my fieldwork period.  
This news was extremely shocking to my informants because Ai Weiwei was 
commonly considered as one of the “untouchable” figures in today’s China, although he 
acted radically from time to time. Besides being an important figure in the contemporary 
art community, he also has a special family background. He is the son of Ai Qing, who 
was an authoritative official in the history of the CCP and was an influential literati. 
Many of my informants believed that it is the legacy left by Ai Qing which protected his 
son from being threatened by authorities, even though many of Ai Weiwei’s art works 
were outrageous. My informant Melissa, an East Asian Studies graduate, expressed her 
views to me:  
I was totally shocked! I’ve never thought that Ai Weiwei could be arrested. I 
remembered that my friends and I used to joke about Ai Weiwei’s untouchability. 
We used to say that China still has people like Ai Weiwei who can make a living 
by criticizing the Chinese government. I didn’t really admire him because to 
some extent I felt that his accomplishments should be credited to his famous 
father. I thought that if he was not Ai Qing’s son, lots of his works couldn’t be 
done and he might have been caught a long time ago. I used to believe that Ai 
Weiwei does not have to fear being arrested because he has a famous father. 
What just happened feels like it’s from a dream. Shocking! After I calmed down 
and read those articles about this arrest, I feel scared. If even Ai Weiwei couldn’t 
be safe, who else could? I felt like we needed to watch our mouths more 
carefully when expressing ourselves online.  
 
Compared to Liu Xiaobo’s case, Ai Weiwei’s was more stunning to my 
informants. Nicholas Bequelin from Human Rights Watch raised the same concern as 
my informants. He said that this arrest was designed to send a message that no one was 
immune. “No matter how prominent you are, the police can arrest you at any time they 
choose” (Bequelin quoted in Clem and Choi 2011).  
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When talking about this case with my informants, I could feel their anger as well 
as their senses of hopelessness and helplessness. Many of them described the police who 
participated in the censorship operation as “shameless hooligans”.  
Because Ai Weiwei is too famous to be ignored, his arrest drew much public 
attention. However, he has not been the only one arrested for fighting for human rights, 
especially freedom of speech. His case drowned out the arrests of other public 
intellectuals. Many other commentators and critics went missing around the same period. 
On the one hand, I think we can see it as a trend of aggravating the lack of free speech in 
China. On the other hand, we can also see it as a starting point of the process of 
“normalization”.  When a weighty figure like Ai Weiwei loses his immunity to the 
government’s power, it is an important step in making the Chinese people accept the fact 
that they are being censored and “watched” by the police. Contrary to Melissa, instead 
of thinking that China would be swept by a wave of panic, I think from now on people 
will see being arrested for saying the “wrong” thing as a normal consequence. It is hard 
to make a judgment on whether this “normalization” is good or bad for Chinese society. 
One potential consequence is that people may stop fighting for free speech and stop 
viewing censorship as evil, but rather see it as normal. Another potential consequence is 
that people may stop fearing the authorities and the possibility of being arrested, since it 
is normal and just a part of the protocol. Signs of both potentials were observed 
throughout my interviews with my informants on the issue of freedom of speech. People 
like Melissa felt scared, while, people like Zheng told me that he would be honored if 
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one day he could draw attention from the authorities and was asked to “have a cup of 
tea
30”  with guobao31.   
 
The Chinese Jasmine Movement 
The Chinese Jasmine Movement refers to the weekly pro-democracy street 
demonstration in more than a dozen cities in mainland China in early 2011. It started on 
February 20
th
, 2011. It was inspired by and named after the Jasmine Revolution in 
Tunisia. My informants’ views on this movement were divided into two groups: those 
who considered the Chinese Jasmine Movement as a positive undertaking for developing 
democracy in China, and those who viewed it as a useless action. This section aims at 
investigating how my informants thought about the movement and how they justified 
their perspectives,  
Tim, a humanities student, told me: 
It [the Chinese Jasmine Movement] will not amount to anything. The 
environment of Chinese society is so different from that of North Africa. First, 
Chinese people’s lives are less miserable. Yes, there are all kinds of social 
problems. But those problems are not so serious as to arouse a revolution. 
Second, because of extensive internet censorship, unlike in Egypt, there are very 
few Chinese people who are using Twitter and Facebook regularly. Other 
platforms like Sina Weibo or Tencent Weibo are closely monitored by the 
government. Thus, although you see thousands of people involved in the Chinese 
Jasmine movement, considering the large population base, they still are 
minorities. And I think the police have taken everything under control during 
those demonstrations. They are kind of fearful.  
   
                                                 
30
 “Having a cup of tea” (请喝茶) is a well known procedure of the National Security Bureau. The 
government usually sends officers to have “a cup of tea” with those who are suspected as social activists 
and tend to resist censorship 
31
Guobao (国宝) can be directly translated as “National Treasure”. It is used by netizens to refer  to the 
National Security Bureau officials in charge of censoring information and arresting activists. 
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Zoe, another of my informant who studied philosophy, heard this comment and 
disagreed. She argued that although the effect of the movement was not yet significant, 
the movement still had a positive meaning for Chinese society. This was not only 
because it had called for social justice, but it had also established a prototype for how 
Chinese netizens could use new media to facilitate a social movement. In addition, 
although violent suppression still appeared, the situation was better than before. She 
argued: 
Both the suppressers and the protestors were rational and knew where the bottom 
line was. Compared to social movements back in the 1980s, through today’s 
Jasmine movement we can see better negotiations between the authorities and 
protestors. I think this definitely is an improvement. Also, the power of the 
internet had been demonstrated in this case. Not everyone is tech-savvy. 
Compared to the large population base, only a limited number of internet users 
can post politically subversive content online. However, exactly because of the 
massive population base, the internet can be extremely useful and powerful in the 
Chinese context. Let’s do the math: Even if only 5% of Chinese netizens can 
access the news, the actual number of that 5% of netizens may already more than 
the entire population of Hong Kong. Therefore, from this movement, I see more 
hope than nonsense. 
 
These two informants in their different views can fairly represent two dominant 
interpretations. Some of my informants showed an ambiguous attitude toward this 
movement. They also made interesting arguments to support their ambiguity. Jamie said, 
“Our society is a society without trust. This is a great problem. This is why even though 
the internet is really helpful in terms of creating social networks and spreading news, it 
is rare that those who receive that information would want to be a part of the movement. 
People don’t trust the society nor do they trust each other. That’s why people would 
rather be onlookers”. Later, she added, “I think even onlookers are useful. I believe that 
the increasing number of onlookers can definitely increase the attention received 
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towards the central government. They can put pressure on the government and force 
them to make a change”.  
It is difficult to say what has caused this lack of trust in present-day China. This 
is a complicated issue. However, based on my observations and discussions with my 
informants, it is apparent that new media like the internet have contributed to this lack of 
trust. When anyone could be a reporter or an editor, to post or edit information online, 
the credibility of the available information will decrease. In short, with all the 
advantages the internet has, it is still handicapped in building credibility. Censorship, at 
the same time, contributes to this lack of trust by obscuring the truth. On the one hand, 
citizens have an intense longing for official news to confirm whether what they’ve 
learned from cyberspace is true or not. On the other hand, people don’t trust the 
authorized news. They get used to assuming that any news from CCTV can’t be entirely 
true. Facts must be censored out during the reporting. Therefore, considering the 
confusion that censorship generates, along with the defects of new media, it is 
understandable why most of my informants are unwilling to participate in the movement 
but would rather be onlookers.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined my informants’ understandings of the issue of free 
speech as well as several on-going political events. One significant finding is that they 
feel more pessimistic about the situation of free speech in China compared to freedom of 
information. I believe that the sense of freedom they expressed when we talked about 
freedom of information came from their misunderstanding of human and civil rights. 
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From those interviews, it is not difficult to see that my informants confused consumer 
rights with human and civil rights. Whenever they can buy information or alternative 
access to the internet like a VPN account, they felt that they were not constrained by the 
government’s discipline. Yet, human and civil rights should be ensured by the 
government without requiring the intervention of the market. As modern consumers, my 
informants have been deluded by the freedom of their power as consumers which allows 
them to purchase a VPN that can help them to get around “the Great Firewall”. Thus, if 
we merely look at the issue of freedom of information, the answers given by my 
informants are more optimistic since information is available in the market, while, the 
freedom of expression normally cannot be purchased.  
 In this chapter I also emphasized the changing tension between netizens and the 
authorities concerning new media on the internet. It is undeniable that new media have 
brought fresh elements to today’s social movements. Netizens are using online platforms 
like Twitter and Sina Weibo to spread news as well as to organize protests both online 
and offline. After Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiwei were arrested, netizens used the internet to 
call for help domestically and internationally. The Chinese Jasmine Movement is 
another example showing how the internet can be used for initiating social movements 
and confronting the government. Although the effects achieved through the Chinese 
Jasmine Movement were limited, I still consider it a sign of social change and as 
evidence of how the internet is being utilizing by netizens to strive for free speech.  
Yet, talking with my informants made me realize that cyberspace is not and 
cannot fully be a political field. Public opinion cannot be transformed directly into a 
political force. As Qing put it,  
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We curse our government and those officials all the time. It makes us feel 
powerful. It makes us believe that we have a voice in social issues. However, our 
cursing is not making any concrete change. We curse and release our anger. We 
feel better about ourselves. Then, we go to bed. The next day, we still witness the 
unfair things that happen in our society. We feel angry again. Then, we go online 
to curse our government. All these things have been repeated again and again. It 
has become a part of our daily routine.  
 
Why would most of my informants rather be observers but not activists when 
they are already tired of being censored and feel frustrated about their lack of free 
speech? As I discussed in the last section of this chapter, China is a society within which 
trust is rare. I have argued that censorship is partially responsible for this crisis of trust. 
Lack of news transparency has forced people to relay unofficial news that they can 
obtain from cyberspace. However, even in cyberspace, information is filtered and a great 
number of people are hired as wumadang
32
. My informants expressed a sense of 
confusion. They felt to some degree that they were becoming lost in an excess of 
information. Lack of trust is also one of the consequences of that confusion. However, 
trust among fellow women and men is the foundation of initiating any successful social 
movement.  
In this chapter I also emphasized that we can’t see the government and the 
society as two separate polarized entities. Those who are working for the censorship 
project are also members of our society. While my informants hate censorship, they 
expressed understanding toward those who carry out censorship. Moreover, we cannot 
simply see the government as an independent single unit. It should be seen as the 
integration of multiple interest groups. Most of my informants acknowledged this and 
understand the complexity of the situation. That’s why they also expressed feelings of 
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“helplessness” and “hopelessness”. It is another reason why they dislike the critics from 
the “outside”. My informant Alex said, “Yes, there is lack of freedom of speech in 
China’s cyberspace. Westerners point that out while criticizing it in the wrong way. 
They always simplify the situation. They see the world as a place with only black and 
white. But there are grey zones!” Another informant, Xiao, added, “Even in Hong Kong 
people misunderstand the situation quite often. Every time when they are trying to make 
a critique, they say something like ‘the communist party blah blah…’ If the problem is 
that simple, we wouldn’t be so frustrated, would we?” 
Last but not least, in this chapter, I have argued that censorship has now become 
normalized in Chinese society. Censorship is a part of the Chinese internet users’ life. It 
is annoying yet also playful in some sense. In addition, when shocking cases like the 
arrest of Ai Weiwei happen, netizens like my informants reflexively re-examine the 
situation. Some of them start to think that if even people like Ai cannot be immune, it 
means being arrested is “normal”. Also, demonstrations, like the Chinese Jasmine 
Movement, showed negotiations between the government and the netizens. It became 
common that people come out and use different means to vent their dissatisfaction 
toward censorship either online or offline. These are all parts of the Chinese people’s 
“normal” life. After Ai Weiwei’s arrest, most of my informants admitted that they 
wouldn’t be surprised if similar incidents happen in the future. Suppression is expected 
ahead of organized demonstrations. All these are parts of the pathological normalcy in 
present-day China.  I think to most of my informants, resisting censorship is also a way 
of accommodating it.  Moreover, these censorship-related incidents have helped create 
new collective memories among my informants, which have reinforced their sense of 
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belonging to the “imagined community /family” of China, a theme which I’ll return to in 
























Chapter 6. Conclusion:  Censorship and Chinese Nationalism  
In each of the previous three chapters, I have looked at how Chinese returnees view the 
Google-China affair and other issues that are directly linked to internet censorship. In 
this chapter, as a conclusion, I point out some patterns that appear throughout previous 
chapters. One point is quite clear. Although my informants held diverse views on the 
issue of censorship, at the end of each interview, regardless of their different attitudes, 
virtually all my informants stressed that they were patriotic. For those who found 
censorship justifiable, it is easier for us to understand why they claimed to be patriotic. 
They pointed out that although Western observers might be right that censorship is an 
obstacle to developing democracy, with its current situation and history, it is better for 
China to control the spread of information than to be a state which has lost its 
centralization of power.  Even those who objected to censorship stressed that no matter 
how much they have been influenced by democratic or capitalistic ideals, they are first 
and foremost Chinese patriots. They simply sought to use Western liberal ideas as a 
means to make China a better place. While they criticized the central government for its 
practice of censorship, they also, contradictorily, defended it.  
To more fully analyze the patterns apparent in the preceding chapters, I return to 
some of the theories mentioned in the “theoretical framework” section in chapter two. In 
this chapter, I first analyze the specific nature of Chinese nationalism. Then I use 
Foucault’s argument concerning repression, Erving Goffman’s theory of performance 
and Max Gluckman’s concept of “rituals of rebellion” to answer the question of how 
and why my informants resisted or coped with internet censorship. The last part of 
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this chapter focuses on how censorship helps construct new collective memories in 
this information age, which in effect reinforces Chinese nationalism.  
 
The Conundrum of Self-Flagellating National Pride 
The paradoxical nationalism repeatedly expressed by my informants made me curious. 
Where does this strong sense of nationalism come from? What generates it? What is the 
mechanism behind it?  
As has been discussed in chapter two, nationalism is widely considered to be a 
product of modernity. The Chinese approach to nationalism is thought to be different 
from other nationalisms because it is closely associated with internationalism. The 
polarized boundary between nationalism and internationalism is transcended in the case 
of China, where they are like two sides of the same coin. In other words, “Chinese 
nationalism was a curious and simultaneous mixture of political nationalism, cultural 
anti-traditionalism, and a strong desire to be accepted as an equal member in family of 
nations and for active engagement in world affairs” (Xu 1999: 101). Xu Guoqi (1999) 
argues that the very concept of nationalism was not adopted by Chinese people until the 
first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).  Joseph Levenson also notes that “In large part the 
intellectual history of modern China has been the process of making kuo-chia [国家; 
nation-state] of tien-hsia [tianx; 天下; “all under heaven,” referring to Chinese 
civilization] (Levenson 1969: 103). He also points out that “Chinese nationalism began 
as a paradox, a doctrine with increasingly obvious internal tensions. The nationalist 
protested tradition so that he might be a nationalist and be able to attack it” (Levenson 
1969: 108).  
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It also has become axiomatic within the academic literature that the construction 
of Chinese identity was closely associated with the humiliating history of struggling 
against foreign imperialism. Jing Tsu uses the language of “failure” to interpret the 
source and core characteristics of Chinese nationalism. She suggests that China’s nation-
building project compels us to think differently about the familiar Western discourse of 
nationalism, and points out that when talking about Chinese nationalism, we should go 
“against our intuitions and desires to deplore abjection and to privilege empowerment” 
(Jing 2005: 17). She argues that the humiliating history during the late Qing dynasty is 
crucial for the making of modern Chinese identity and the radical nationalism that we 
observe today. “Failure, in another way, inspired rather than devastated [Chinese 
nationalism]” (Jing 2005: 12).This view is quite distinct from other cultural theories on 
nationalism, since we rarely think of cultural humiliation and failure as strengths. Jing, 
in her book, places failure in a cultural context that gave rise to nationalism, arguing that 
the passion and meaning of Chinese nationalism can be found in the unobtainable desire 
to right past wrongs both personally as well as collectively. As she writes, “Failure 
achieves that distinct prerequisite of nationalism that perhaps no other positivistic 
definition can compel, the recognition of a singular destiny that is the foundation of 
sovereign thinking” (Jing 2005:222). 
Her theory of Chinese nationalism can explain the “paradoxical nationalism” that 
I’ve observed throughout my fieldwork. Rather than mark it as “paradoxical”, we can 
see the “shame” and the “love” expressed by my informants as interrelated. Self-hatred, 
dissatisfaction and frustration accompanying a kind of tormented self-preoccupation 
remains central to modern Chinese identity, which is found in my interviews with 
Chinese returnees. It is the conundrum of self-flagellating national pride that generates 
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the strong sense of nationalism among my informants. Their radical Chinese identity in a 
large sense is still bound up within a history of failure.  





 century in China. But among my informants, it is not the corrupt Qing 
government and failures in warfare in the 19
th
 century that contributed to their sense of 
shame and failure. It is rather the current socio-cultural condition and government in 
China that makes them dissatisfied and “ashamed”. As discussed in chapter four, the 
rapid growth in the economy and the development of ICTs changed China’s media 
environment. From a bottom-up perspective, citizens are empowered by new media like 
the internet. From a top-down perspective, the government is trying to be as liberal as it 
can with economic policy in order to ensure continual GDP growth, but also seeks to 
continue with the reigning Maoist philosophy of authoritarianism.  
Historically speaking, the last mania of Chinese nationalism that burst out in the 
late 20
th
 century was closely associated with World War II, especially the war between 
China and Japan. The Sino-Japanese relationship is crucial to the construction of 
Chinese identity. Since the late Qing government was Manchurian, the definition of 
“Chinese” was unclear. Are only han people Chinese or can Manchurians also be 
Chinese? The notion of “nation” was weak in that era. The war between China and 
Japan should be seen as a process of “othering” for Chinese people. It helped define 
Chinese identity in relation to others, such as the Japanese. In today’s China, 
modernization has been characterized by Westernization. For the sake of economic 
growth, China has opened its doors to increasing interactions with the outside world, 
which has resulted in a resurgence of nationalism. These interactions with the outside 
world have fostered an imagination (Anderson 1983) of what the Chinese nation is in 
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contrast to the rest of the world. The Chinese leadership welcomed this because a new 
ideology was necessary as faith in Marxism or Maoism declined (Zheng 1999: 2). If 
handled properly, nationalism can help justify the political legitimacy of the CCP in 
today’s China, Zheng Yongnian argues: “nationalism can become the ideological basis 
of a transitional regime that turns away from totalitarianism but is not yet democratized” 
(Zheng 1999: 2). 
However, this resurgence of nationalism is not sufficient to conceal the problems 
created by an imbalanced situation between the open market economy and the confined 
ideological sphere. My informants, who mostly come from the Chinese middle- or 
upper-middle class, benefited from this economic and ideological relationship, which 
caused them, perhaps unconsciously, to speak positively about the current system. On 
the other hand, they also felt ashamed of the disgraceful and awkward policies and 
decisions made by the Chinese government. These kinds of contradictory feelings were 
enlarged in the context of controversial issues like internet censorship. A few of my 
informants who are currently working on their PhD degrees in the U.S. told me that they 
had gotten into verbal battles with local American students on this topic. As Tommy, an 
informant who is studying radiology in the U.S., exclaimed, “They don’t understand!” 
However, later on, he told me that even though he defended the Chinese government’s 
practice of censorship, he only did so because the critics were Americans. Tommy said: 
Of course I will say different things to you. You are a Chinese and you would 
understand, right? I’m not stupid and I’m not brainwashed. It just pissed me off 
when those “ghosts” [foreigners] criticize our country without knowing what is 
actually happening there. You know, once, there was an exhibition to show the 
diversity of culture on campus. They picked up different symbols to make 
posters to represent different countries. I saw the Kangaroo for Australia, the 
Queen for England, etc. And among all those pictures, a rural undeveloped 
village view which looks like a village in China in the late Qing dynasty, was 
used to represent China. I mean, what is that about? If you want to stereotype us, 
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at least, you should do it right. Had the people who designed those posters ever 
been to China after the 1980s? How come we are always seen as uncivilized? So, 
of course when it comes to the issue of censorship, Chinese are the ones who 
don’t have human rights at all….You can’t blame me for getting angry with 
those ignorant ethnocentric Americans.  
 
 
This attitude definitely has something to do with the fact that he is now living in 
a foreign country. Following Barth (1969), we can see that intensive interactions with 
people belonging to another cultural group made my informants’ identity as Chinese 
more distinct. They were more aware of their identity as Chinese than ever before. One 
may argue that this held a strong influence over their responses toward the issue of 
censorship. This leads to the question of why I chose returnees as my informants. Indeed, 
I deliberately chose this special group of people as my informants because I believe that 
the dynamics inside China today have not originated only in China. We must go beyond 
China to understand today’s Chinese society, as mentioned in chapter one. By focusing 
on this group of people, a clearer picture of how pride in Chinese identity is being 
affected by the criticisms from other societies and other cultures can be captured.  
The passion of Chinese nationalism that I observed during my fieldwork was 
more like a cultural pattern or a psychological process than a political abstraction. By 
defending the Chinese government that they did not necessarily support and by 
justifying a policy that they did not consistently view as fair, these returnees showed a 
passion for righting past wrongs both at an individual and collective level. As citizens of 
a developing superpower, my informants were proud of the remarkable achievements 
that China has made economically.  They were easily offended when foreigners brought 
up China’s “disgraceful” past as well as their dissatisfaction with contemporary Chinese 
policies. However, some of them portrayed their “dear motherland” as a “vulgarian” 
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who had gotten rich financially yet had not shaken off her old habitus. During their 
interactions with “others”, China’s economic success was glorified by my informants, 
while authoritarian policies like censorship dishonored them, they felt.  Under these 
conditions, how an individual chooses to react to critiques of China from “others” 
somehow became a moral issue to my informants.  
Vanessa Fong (2004) uses the phrase “filial nationalism” to indicate the 
distinctive moral aspect of Chinese nationalism. Fong finds that her informants in Dalian, 
rural Chinese people who were born during 1980s, liked to make an analogy between 
their feelings toward their country and their unconditional loyalty to their parents. 
Unlike Western societies, where one’s sense of nationalism comes from “imagined 
communities”, the passion of nationalism among these Chinese teenagers is generated 
from an “imagined family”. Fong argues that “despite their admiration for wealthier 
societies, they maintained a strong sense of filial nationalism, which they saw as 
analogous to their unconditional loyalty to their parents. Such nationalism could not be 
nullified by their disgust with China’s low status in the capitalist world system” (Fong 
2004: 631). The educational level of these teenagers’ parents was relatively low. This 
makes the analogy of China and their parents apt. The position for these parents in 
China’s society is like China’s position in the world community. Both are not at a high 
place in the hierarchy and both are powerless in certain ways.  Her informants preferred 
to identify themselves as educated and modernized youths unfortunately born in China, a 
developing country.  
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Fong in her article mentioned that her informants are from lower-class families. 
On the contrary, the majority of my informants belong to middle class families
33
. 
However, the same analogy was brought up frequently during my interviews. My 
informants’ nationalistic discourses sounded like a self-comforting mechanism more 
than any radical patriotic declarations. They demonstrated how an individual can 
rationalize the fact that he/she must live in a sociopolitical environment that he/she may 
not care for and yet has no power to change. On this matter, they are quite similar to the 
youths in Fong’s research. From this perspective, the passion of nationalism found 
among my informants should be seen as a social negotiation rather than a result of 
political brainwashing. This phenomenon resembles what Jing Tsu writes in her book: 
“Nationalistic subjects often endorse the sentiment of nationalism without agreeing on a 
coherent vision of the nation” (Jing 2005: 23). Thus, the passion of Chinese nationalism 
I found during my fieldwork should not be seen simply as a kind of false consciousness 
of fictive identity as described by previous scholars (Gellner 1997).  Instead it should be 
viewed as a longing for renewal at a personal level and redemption at a collective level 
as Jing illustrated in her theory of Chinese nationalism (Jing 2005). 
 
Repressive Hypothesis 
After discussing the Chinese nationalism that I found among my informants, I will now 
talk about another topic which at first seems irrelevant but is actually crucial to my main 
argument.  
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 The concept of “middle class” is problematic in today’s China. In my research, when I use this term, I 
mainly focus on the economic status of my informants’ families. 
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Michel Foucault provided a powerful critique of the repressive hypothesis 
concerning sexual practices during the Victorian period. Before the Victorian period, 
sexual practices had little need of secrecy. On the surface, the arrival of the Victorian 
period repressed sexual practices and expressions of sexuality, which coincided with the 
development of capitalism, and this became an integral part of the Victorian bourgeois 
order (Foucault 1978:5). However, Foucault argues that the hypothesis that “modern 
industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual repression” should be 
abandoned (Foucault 1978:5). In his words, “we have not only witnessed a visible 
explosion of unorthodox sexualities; but—and this is the important point—a deployment 
quite different from the law, even if it is through a network of interconnecting 
mechanisms, the proliferation of specific pleasures and the multiplication of disparate 
sexualities…never more sites where the intensity of pleasures and the persistency of 
power catch hold, only to spread elsewhere” (Foucault 1978:49).  
I borrow Foucault’s analysis and apply it to the issue of internet censorship. I 
argue that censorship is not ushering Chinese society into an age of increased 
information repression. Indeed, we are witnessing an explosion of unorthodox 
information. Evidence for this can be found in three aspects.  
First, from a technological perspective, my informants told me that they started 
paying more attention to the use of the internet and all relevant ICTs exactly because of 
the practice of censorship. My informants thought that resisting censorship has already 
become a basic IT technique, one that even those who used to be technologically 
challenged now know how to do. As Angel a biochemistry graduate recalled:  
I was always the one who was technologically challenged. I didn’t see the 
point of paying more effort to learning them [communication 
technologies]. However, this whole censorship thing makes me interested 
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in learning about fanqiang [how to get around ‘the Great Firewall’]. I 
asked around and learned how to do it from my friends. Also, I would 
like to pass the skills around. Sometime it is not about what is on the 
other side of ‘the Great Firewall’. I’m not seeking to be a civil rights 
activist. But by doing it [fanqiang], I feel like I am capable of keeping my 
other options open even under the state’s control. This feeling of taking 
back control of this is great. I think psychologically we are all rebellious 
to some degree. The more the government tries to forbid us to do one 
thing, the more we become interested in doing it. I am just an ordinary 
girl. Usually I do nothing but watch YouTube or play on Facebook after I 
get to the other side of “the Great Firewall”. But it is still cool to do it and 
social networks like Facebook and Twitter are quite important for getting 
alternative information. Sharing news and information that come from 
‘the other side’ also makes me popular among my friends.  
 
 
The data I’ve collected indeed clearly showed one interesting consequence of the 
practice of censorship: censorship to some extent stimulated my informants’ desire to 
get more information from cyberspace. Some of them admitted that they became more 
motivated than before, since resisting censorship is not just a simple action but also can 
represent their conscious concerns for Chinese society. Qian, a psychology graduate 
student, said: 
As educated youths, of course we need to know what is happening outside China. 
I fully support the idea of “free information”. Whether the purpose of censoring 
the Web is for the government’s own protection or it truly is a kind of concern 
the government has for its citizens doesn’t really matter. What we are seeing is 
that there are barriers. I think it will be more practical to focus on how to 
overcome those obstacles than asking the reason why information is being 
censored. So far, we are doing fine. With all those tools and networking websites, 
news travels faster than ever before. That’s why although I am bothered by 
censorship; I don’t think it is really working effectively. Conversely, it just whets 
our appetite for seeking the ‘truth’.  
 
 
Second, censorship not only motivates people to search for information online, it 
also inspires netizens to create innovative internet cultures. Some of my informants 
claimed that today’s internet culture in China’s cyberspace represents an informal 
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resistance, such as the creation of “caonima [草泥马]” and “Little Rabbit” kuangkuang 
[小兔框框] (Sogoops 2011). Euphemisms have been well played by Chinese netizens, 
and these varied and creative internet cultures impact offline China in many ways. It has 
started becoming an alternative channel for the internet generation to learn about 
Chinese society. It has also become an unofficial means for cracking down on corruption 
and the abuse of official power. The “50 cent throwing” incident34 is a good example of 
this.       
Third, online communities are formed by netizens in cyberspace. Many have 
found that a side effect of capitalist development is a loss of a sense of community, yet 
the internet provides an alternative community for people to connect with each other. 
Online communities are formed in both formal and informal ways. Formal communities 
are quite common and their existence is easily observed online (Yang 2011). Informal 
online communities, although generally neglected in the literature, are quite important 
too. I call them informal communities because those communities don’t have any 
specific IP based websites. They are formed through personal contacts among netizens. 
People use social networks like Facebook, RenRen, or Weibo to find those who they 
have never met but share the same interests. Then they start to use e-mail and other ICTs 
to keep in touch with each other, to share news and to discuss social issues. Based on 
what I’ve observed during the past few years, it seems that in the recent past, the internet 
was mainly used by netizens to search for information; recently, however, the internet in 
                                                 
34 “
50 cent army” (五毛党), as mentioned in page124, refers to those who are hired to post information or 
opinions on-line that benefits the authorities. Initially, there was an allegation that for each pro-
government online post, the poster can get 50 cents. Ever since, “50 cent army” has become a euphemism 
used to satirize those who work for the CCP and post “politically correct” notes on the internet. The “50 
cent throwing incident” happened in Beijing in April 2010. Wu Hao, the minister of the department of 
propaganda of Yunnan was giving a speech to university student in the People’s University of China in 
Beijing and  three human rights activists threw 50 cent bills and coins at him.    
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China and arguably all over the world has shifted its primary function from being a 
search engine to becoming a social networking platform. The founder of Facebook, 
Mark Zuckerberg, was called “the Google crasher” by some, indicating this shift. Even 
Google, as the biggest search engine in the world, has started its project “Google+”, 
another online social networking base. The great majority of my informants admitted 
that the first thing they do after turning on their computer every morning is to check 
their Facebook or RenRen accounts. Social networks, or “informal online communities”, 
are the most popular websites and news sources for my informants. As one of my 
informants, Zheng, said in our interview: 
I read news on foreign websites which are blocked in mainland China. Then, I 
copy and paste them to my profile page of a social network website 
[RenRen.com] that I use. Many who are living inside “the Great Firewall” and 
have trouble getting enough information about social issues that they are 
interested in, have read and commented on articles I’ve shared on my page. Then, 
we started to contact each other online. We share news and talk to each other 
although we’ve never met. It usually takes three hours to a day for an internet 
policeman to censor or delete my posts. Those who follow me online still have a 
chance to see my posts before they are deleted. They also voluntarily pass 
news/posts around. Although we don’t have a group or a fixed online address, 
what we’ve formed is essentially a small community in which I feel comfortable. 
My parents don’t want me to pay too much attention to political stuff because 
they think it is useless and may get me into trouble. Many of my peers don’t 
understand why I am interested in doing this. They said that I’m not being 
realistic or practical. However, the internet and online social networks help me 
find people who share the same ideal with me, those who want to do something 
to contribute to the construction of civil society in China.  
 
Another interesting thing Zheng mentioned was that he and his online friends 
were utilizing censorship to get other people’s attention in cyberspace. He told me that 
whenever he types, “this will be censored, please read it before the internet police do” as 
a part of the title of his posts, the number of views would explode. In other words, the 
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acknowledgement of censorship somehow motivated people’s eagerness for finding out 
“the truth”, and fostered the spread of certain kinds of information in cyberspace.   
Some of my informants even argued that there is an emergence of a parallel civil 
society as a result of technological development such as the internet. From a certain 
point of view, it is true that Chinese internet users are able to use Twitter as well as other 
carriers as platforms to develop communities that resemble real-life civil society 
organizations in terms of leadership, voluntary membership, and achievement of 
outcomes. This argument is certainly true in some sense. However, how significant are 
these achievements? What is the nature of those “civil” movements in China’s 
cyberspace? Have Chinese netizens, such as my informants, really become more 
awakened on the issue of civil rights? Does the unorthodox information boom that I 
describe above mean that there will be a revolution taking place in China’s cyberspace? 
Is the flourishing and vigorous prospect that I portrayed above leading us to a more 
democratic cyber-China? Are those who are actively searching and sharing news online, 
like some of my informants, really rebellious towards censorship or the Chinese 
government? My answer to all these questions is negative rather than affirmative. Let 
me explain this by applying the concepts of “the presentation of self” and “rituals of 
rebellion” to my research.   
 
Presentation of Self and Rituals of Rebellion  
I argue that my informants’ resistance and objections to censorship seemed more like 
“rituals of rebellion” rather than actual rebellions.  
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Some of my informants were called “hipsters” [文艺青年] by their peers because 
of their interests in sharing anti-government news and information that was not 
recognized by mainstream media. Although they showed interest in politics and they had 
been actively resisting censorship at different levels, I don’t consider them to be activists. 
My informants told me that most of those who master the skills of fanqiang and actively 
share news that is not available inside “the Great Firewall” in cyberspace were doing 
what they do for the sake of a “cool” identity among peers instead of attempting to 
initiate real social movements. Personal blogs and profile pages of online social 
networks have become another stage for individual “impression management” (Goffman 
1959).  As Goffman explains, “While in the presence of others, the individual typically 
infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory 
facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure” (1959:30). Thus, the activated 
and increasing attention to social issues that can be observe online may to a certain 
degree be the result of educated individuals’ “presentation of self”.  
Goffman writes, “As Sartre suggested: ‘The attentive pupil who wishes to be 
attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears open wide, so exhausts himself in 
playing the attentive role that he ends up no longer hearing anything. And so individuals 
often find themselves with the dilemma of expression versus action” (Goffman 1959: 
33). The same situation may be found from an analysis of my informants’ online 
behavior. I certainly am not denying their concern for social issues; nor do I doubt their 
enthusiasm of some in promoting the idea of civil society and civil rights. However, 
their claims and their behaviors were not necessarily consistent. For most of them, the 
biggest contribution they have made in resisting censorship has been to share posts 
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online. This sharing seems done partially because of “peer expectation”. As Angel, one 
of my informants, put it, “Everybody is doing it. My friends are sharing news on their 
profile pages. Of course, I would share that and post it on my page too. It is also a way 
to show your care about the country and that you are not out of date.”  Some of my 
informants think that sharing information is one thing that conscious people are 
supposed to do in this context.   
Many editorials that I’ve read in popular magazines, for example Southern 
Weekly (Xiao Shu 2010), suggest that sharing posts is powerful and useful for changing 
the environment in China’s censored cyberspace.  A popular saying going around in 
China’s cyberspace is that, “Observing can change China. Sharing is power. [围观改变
中国，转发就是力量] ” This saying emphasizes the potential of cyberspace to change 
Chinese society, which the internet gave to the masses by enabling information to pass 
more quickly than before. It was mentioned by several of my informants during our 
interviews. Those who didn’t say it directly also were well aware of this view and 
agreed with it when I brought it up.  
Forty-five out of fifty-eight of my informants were users of Twitter or Sina 
Weibo. Many of my informants told me that they used both, but for different reason. 
Twitter was used by many of my informants to follow specific public figures, mostly 
promoters of democracy. It also was used to obtain news that was not available inside 
mainland China. Sina Weibo was mainly used by my informants to communicate with 
their friends or to follow news about domestic celebrities. Sometimes, they would copy 
and paste news from Twitter to Sina Weibo. Twitter, therefore, instead of being a new 
arena for a developing civil society among ordinary internet users, was more likely 
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working as an information source to people like my informants. Some of my informants 
claimed that they would post news from twitter to their Sina Weibo account. It seems 
that the act of sharing is likely to be more important than the fact of knowing to most of 
my informants. Therefore, I think that my informants over-estimated the power and the 
effect of sharing information. The rebellion in China’s cyberspace was more a game for 
most of my informants than a real confrontation with the Chinese government and its 
censorship. Websites like Twitter and Sina Weibo seem to have created an illusion for 
those who are using them, an illusion that exaggerated the power of the internet and the 
power of communication tools like Twitter and Sina Weibo in propelling the 
development of democracy in today’s China. Tommy said to me: 
Think about Twitter and Weibo! Millions of people are using them. It is 
impossible for the authority to censor the news today! I don’t think censorship is 
ever effective in this age of information. That’s another reason that has made me 
argue that the situation in China is not as awful as outsiders think.  
 
 
This illusion has convinced many of my informants that each time they clicked 
the little “share” at the bottom of their computer screen, they actually had done 
something remarkable for their society. This self-comforting way of thinking could 
easily slacken their vigilance and make them pay less attention to real social movements. 
Even though my informants claimed that they were highly educated people that have 
seen both sides of “the Great Firewall” and are constantly receiving information from 
multiple sources, from what I’ve seen, most of them are defiantly complicit in this 
illusion that they are helping to change their society.  
In chapter two, I mentioned a few scholars who share a similar view with 
Tommy on the development of technology. Some argue in their works that mass media 
will end China’s closed regime and will foster democratization. I agree that new media 
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channels, from WikiLeaks to Facebook, Twitter to YouTube, are persistently 
challenging the traditional way of governing. Moreover, we can see that cyber-
disobedience is exposing the weaknesses of the current government. The Chinese 
government is scrambling to counter those new media’s influences. According to the 
report of the 17
th
 National Congress of the Communist Party of China, more than 530 
billion RMB were used on the project of “harmonious society construction” [创建和谐
社会] (Hu 2007), with a considerable amount used for operating internet censorship. Yet, 
in the end it is people that initiate a revolution, not technologies. Technologies can only 
be utilized to support a revolution. Without the enthusiasm for activism, a real “Jasmine 
movement” can never take place in today’s China. That is why I argue that resistances 
and so-called anti-censorship actions found among my informants were like carnivals. 
The “fights” between cyber-policemen and my informants were a catharsis of released 
dissatisfactions that they felt in daily life, and were like games that entertained most of 
them. For example, around the 20
th
 anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Protest of 
1989, the internet police censored anything that directly and indirectly was linked to the 
protest. Many of my informants deliberately provoked internet policemen by creating 
new symbols and net language to talk about the protest, during which the initial purpose 
of creating these new expressions was twisted. Instead of focusing on revealing the truth 
of the protest, they were focusing on competing to create new expressions that can pass 
censorship. Similar situations can be found in China’s cyberspace around any “sensitive 
date”.  
My informants believed that sensitive dates are marked on the government’s 
calendar. The National Day, the memorial day of the Tiananmen Square Protest of 1989, 
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and so on became key periods for censorship practices as well as anti-censorship 
activities. These have been discussed in chapter five. On the one hand, censorship made 
my informants frustrated. On the other hand, it also became “playful” to them. The 
conflicts between the state and its citizens are indirect during these occasions. However, 
the conflicts between internet policemen and internet users are direct. While cursing the 
internet policemen for the inconvenience caused by the deletion of their information and 
the censoring of sensitive words, my informants also showed sympathy to this group of 
people. As one of them, Molly, said: 
Although I hate those internet policemen, they are also ordinary people who are 
used by the government. For them, censoring information is just a job. They 
don’t have to support censorship to do the job. I think it is quite possible that 
they are doing it for the sake of money. I hate censorship. But from another 
perspective, it creates job opportunities. I think it has already become an industry 
in today’s China. Tens of thousands of people are relying on it. While we 
criticize censorship, we should also realize that if the government stops 
censorship entirely, a large number of people will lose their jobs, their financial 
recourses. If every individual is a saint, we won’t have people to work for the 
tobacco or alcohol industry or anything bad. But clearly that is not the reality. 
We are only human after all. I don’t know how to judge them [the internet 
policemen]. I may not do better if I were put in their position. Should we fight 
for some ideal that may never be realized in our lifespan or should we just focus 
on making our material life better within our lifespan?  
 
I think China’s cyberspace is being transformed from a technological concept 
into a social one filled with tensions. Conflicts are inevitable. Although people like my 
informants who post banned information or spread censored stories seemed to be trying 
to chip away at the very system of censorship and don’t seem to be helping censorship to 
continue, their resistance is not leading towards a revolution. First, the use of VPN could 
be seen as a ritual of rebellion because it functions as a safety valve that makes the 
desire to dismantle censorship unnecessary by providing VPN users an alternative way 
of getting information. Second, the cat and mouse game between netizens and the 
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internet police is essential in the practice of censorship. Although sharing news may 
have the effect of making other netizens become more aware of civil rights, which 
would lead to the overthrow of censorship, this practice also assured the legality and 
legitimacy of the existence of the internet police. Censorship in today’s China is not 
merely a policy but an industry. Without a certain amount of rebellious activity, internet 
police would lose their raison d'être, and might result in the abolition of censorship.  
The concept of “ritual of rebellions” was first brought out by Max Gluckman in 
1952, in which he stressed the difference between revolution and rebellion. According to 
him, in the latter “there is dispute about particular distributions of power, and not about 
the system itself” (Gluckman 1963: 112). Gluckman was influenced by Marx and Freud, 
and agreed that there are conflicts that occur within the individual as well as within 
groups of people. However, unlike Marx, who saw conflicts and rebellion leading to 
revolution, Gluckman argued that conflicts lead to resolution instead. In his article 
“Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa” (1963), Gluckman described two major 
conflict lines among the South African Zulu: one between men and women and the other 
between the king and the subjects. For the first one, he argued that Zulu women, while 
suffering from the patriarchal system “became temporarily lewd viragoes, and their 
daughters martial herdsmen; but they accepted the social order and did not form a party 
of suffragettes” (Gluckman 1963: 127). As for the second kind of rituals of rebellion, 
Gluckman used the incwala ceremony of the Swazi people (Kuper 1947) to explain his 
point. Incwala ceremony consisted of “a public humiliation of the king, songs of hatred 
and a ritual threatening of the king who had to flee into a sacred enclosure” (Schroter 
2004). However, all these public conflicts and actions of rebellions were never direct 
against the institution of the kingdom but just against a particular person or a particular 
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social event. Therefore, Gluckman argued that although there are conflicts and rebellions 
in a society, the system won’t change, but just the people in power (Gluckman 1963).  
In a way analogous to Gluckman’s argument, most of the time, when 
resistance/protest happened online, it was aimed at getting certain concrete results, such 
as requiring the government to compensate a particular group of victims of a particular 
social event, for example the milk powder scandal. According to my informants, this is 
also true in their practice of resisting censorship. In most cases, they challenged 
censorship for a very specific reason, such as to log in to Facebook, or to search for 
information of a very specific news article. The social structure itself was rarely 
challenged. This precisely fits Gluckman’s notion of rebellions, while the exchanges and 
“wrestling” between netizens and the government in cyberspace are the “rituals”: no 
more than “rituals of rebellion.”   
       Finally, as in many cases around the world (Nozaki 2008), the intention of the 
Chinese government’s practice of censorship was to increase its citizens’ nationalistic 
feelings by controlling information which is interpreted as a possible disturbance to 
social stability (Blum 2010). The practice of anti-censorship, which is generally 
considered an action of political liberation to those who can get information from 
blocked sources, is assumed to result in a weakening of the sense of nationalism of the 
“oppressed”. However, as I have argued throughout the thesis, this is not always the case. 
Because of my informants’ experiences overseas and their “rebellious” practice of 
fanqiang after their return to China, they were exposed to the kinds of blocked 
information the government would rather obfuscate.  This information was then 
interpreted by my informants already established sense of political awareness, which 
was built up throughout their formative years in the Chinese education system. Hence, 
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such an interpretation resulted in their defense of the Chinese government’s practice of 
censorship as a tool for ensuring social stability, even though it is a policy that some 
may resent and all found to be personally inconvenient. Moreover, their political 
awareness also generated their negative responses to international critiques of Chinese 
censorship and clearly aroused a sense of nationalism among my informants.  Thus this 
particular ritual of rebellion resulted precisely in the illusion of resisting those in power 
while ultimately reinforcing the current social structure. 
 
Collective Memory Construction 
Mass media has been playing an essential role in constructing collective memory during 
the past few hundred years. One example is how newspapers helped form “imagined 
communities” in Europe (Anderson1983). Additionally, the arrival of film and television 
in the last century has brought images, scenes, quotes and music into our life. Those 
pieces became familiar to us and remain in our collective memory. For the generation 
that grows up with the internet, without a doubt, cyber-events, cyber languages and 
anything cyber-related will have contributed to our collective memories. From my 
fieldwork, it was apparent that events like the Google-China affair, the case of Liu 
Xiaobo, and the case of Ai Weiwei have already been parts of my informants’ collective 
memory. From their online posts that I reviewed, net language is already commonly by 
them during their daily cyber activities, which the elder generation can’t fully 
understand.   
What is the role that censorship is playing in constructing collective memory? 
My informant Bin, a law school student, put it this way: 
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I think somehow exactly because of censorship we know more, not less. I am 
usually not interested in politics. However, this “battle with internet policemen” 
during the 20
th
 anniversary of the1989 affair triggered my interests. I started to 
pay close attention to it. Knowing what happened in 1989 became a by-product 
of this “battle”. During this battle, in order to resist censorship, many innovative 
ways of expression have been invented by netizens. Some of them involve using 
ancient Chinese, while others involve using mathematical equations just to spell 
out the two characters of “six” and “four” (referring to June 4, 1989). My friends 
and I enjoyed discussing the latest progress of the battle every day during that 
period. Meanwhile, I became more interested in finding out what happened in 
1989 and did some extra research on it. While I can’t say that I know the truth 
now, at least I know more than before.  
 
This quotation supports my argument on the “repressive hypothesis”, and also 
presents an example of how censorship is contributing to the construction of a new 
social memory of the generation who grew up with the internet. The nationalism I have 
discussed in this thesis resembles Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined 
communities,” which means more than a simple idea of “loving one’s country”. 
According to Anderson, imagined communities were formed because of the 
development of “mass media”. Back in the time period that Anderson focused his study 
on, nationalism emerged along with the growing popularity of the printing industry. In 
today’s China, the internet is playing a similar role as the newspaper did in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the practice of censorship has made China’s cyberspace looks like a little 
like Foucault’s “panopticon” (Foucault 1977: 317 citing Bentham). With their 
“unorthodox information”, netizens to some degree are actually encouraged to engage in 
online participation. But their online activities are “guided” by internet surveillance. 
China’s cyberspace is like a school in which netizens’ behaviors are being “corrected” 
and through which the sense of belonging to the same “imagined community/family” 
has been enhanced. Even though my informants were never punished for evading the 
internet police, nonetheless, their online behaviors were monitored and their intentions 
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of being more rebellions were discouraged by the fact that public intellectuals were 
arrested for acting against censorship. Stories like Liu Xiaobo’s and Ai Weiwei’s were 
used as a warning to people like my informants. Apparently, most of my informants had 
a clear sense of where the government’s bottom line is. They objected and rebelled 
against censorship to the degree that they felt safe, but rarely went further.    
 
Conclusion: Censorship and Nationalism  
In each of the previous three chapters, I have looked at how Chinese returnees view the 
Google-China affair from different angles. They expressed their opinions on censorship-
related issues that were brought out by the Google-China affair. In this chapter, as a 
conclusion, I have pointed out some patterns observed across previous chapters  
To briefly review the content of this thesis, after earlier chapters’ introduction 
and literature review, in chapter three, I focused on the Google-China affair. I reviewed 
how the affair happened and what both Google and China had been through during the 
affair. Then I discussed responses towards this affair from my informants; their 
perspectives were reviewed and analyzed. From their reactions, we can see that most of 
my informants were empathetic towards Google. The majority of my informants started 
their comments on the affair by complementing Google’s attempt to resist Chinese 
censorship. However, when I pushed them and tried to make them choose a side to 
support, usually they defended the Chinese government and its censorship policy and 
used different arguments to justify their support of the government.   
At first glance, their discourse seemed inconsistent. How can one support 
something that he/she admitted is wrong? Actually, there are two issues here that have 
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been blended together. The first issue is whether my informants agree that “freedom of 
information and speech” is a good thing. On this matter, everyone agreed that it is a 
basic civil right to which an individual is entitled. The second issue is which side my 
informants would choose during this “battle between Google and the Chinese 
government”. On this matter, what caused the battle became less important than who 
was involved. That’s why many of my informants, although supportive of Google’s 
“doctrine”, chose to support the government even though the government was doing 
something “wrong” according to my informants’ own definition. Nationalistic emotion 
was clearly found during interviews about the Google-China affair, causing my 
informants to be logically inconsistent.  
In chapters four and chapter five, discussion focused specifically on issues of 
“freedom of information” and “freedom of speech”. I used different approaches to 
discuss these two issues. Chapter four discussed “universal human rights vs. cultural 
relativism”, “individual agency vs. state control”, “market domination vs. state control”, 
“the concept of rationality”, and “moral discipline”, concepts that were all brought out 
by my informants during our interviews. By borrowing their own words/concepts to 
discuss the situation of “the freedom of information” in China’s cyberspace, I could 
understand how my informants view the issue from an emic perspective. In chapter five, 
the discussion of freedom of speech was carried out by discussing specific cases: the 
cases of Liu Xiaobo, Ai Weiwei, and the Chinese Jasmine Movement. In general, my 
informants cared about internet censorship to some degree and most of them claimed 
that they resist it. However, few were activists. Most of my informants, although 
expressing many dissatisfactions with censorship, were trying to create a distance in 
order to avoid direct confrontation with the Chinese government. Only a few were 
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passionate enough to attempt making real changes, for example by returning to mainland 
China and working for the internet industry after graduating overseas. Others chose just 
to be weiguan zhe [围观者; observers] and adjust themselves to the situation. Some of 
them even suggested that the best way of resisting is to “run away from it”, for example, 
by immigrating to another country.  
At the end of chapter five, I pointed out that many of my informants had 
confused civil rights with consumer’s rights. I suspect that might be one of the reasons 
why many think that censorship is not a big problem. As many of them claimed, as long 
as they can solve the problem through market practice [mainly referring to buying VPNs 
to get around “the Great Firewall”], they would be fine with it. The idea of marketization 
was well adopted by most of my informants. I think the belief in the market can be one 
of the major reasons that many of them were satisfied with just being “observers.” As 
some who gave credit to the market said to me, “the market could be a good solution to 
the problem of censorship”. Last but not the least, from these two chapters we can tell 
that although my informants were annoyed with censorship, somehow they managed to 
cope with it. I think censorship is already a part of the pathological normalcy in today’s 
China as well as in my informants’ daily life.  
In this very last chapter, the relationship between censorship and Chinese 
nationalism was highlighted. When I argued that internet censorship is contributing to 
Chinese nationalism, I didn’t mean that because of censorship, Chinese netizens love 
their country more than before. Actually, from my fieldwork, I can sense that people like 
my informants are becoming more and more cynical nowadays. The nationalistic 
enthusiasm that I found among my informants was more subtle. Some may argue that 
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my informants are special because of their social backgrounds. Since they are not the 
ones who are suffering in Chinese society, they have no reason to hate the government 
and may feel that of course should love their country. My argument against this is that, 
although usually when people think about nationalism, they tend to picture it as a kind of 
“unconditional” love that makes an individual want to die for his/her country, in 
contemporary societies, even if this “unconditional” love still exists, in most cases it 
does not appear in such a blunt form. The strong sense of “belonging to the same 
imagined community/family” is more visible.  The nationalism I found among my 
informants emphasized the “non-government sponsored” feature of this ideology (Xu 
chapter 2: 37-38). The nationalism I found among my informants was not directly taught 
to them through formal education channels. It was fostered in cyberspace in a more 
subtle way. Through the practice of playing “games” with the internet police, and 
defending their own country and culture when encountering “others”, my informants’ 
identity of being a Chinese was reinforced.  
According to Hans Morgenthau, “Nationalism as a political phenomenon must be 
understood as the aspiration for two freedoms, one collective, the other individual: the 
freedom of a nation from domination by another nation and the freedom of the 
individual to join the nation of his choice” (Morgenthau 1957: 481). Therefore, 
nationalism is fundamentally based on the freedom of the nation itself. Chinese 
nationalism gained its vitality exactly from the humiliated history of being invaded. The 
processes of seeking national independence in the late 19
th
 century and recognized by 
the international community in the 20
th
 century are also the processes of the first and 
second round of the development of Chinese nationalism. But despite the success in 
attaining collective freedom, more importantly, nationalism also was thought to mean 
 155 
 
the triumph of individual liberty. However, when nationalism was introduced to China 
and to Chinese people, individual freedom was replaced by national freedom. From a 
macroscopic perspective, this explained why, although my informants hated censorship, 
they still tried to legitimize it for the government. From a microscopic view, the 
interesting dynamic that I found between the practice of censorship and Chinese 
nationalism highlights the social negotiation that occurs between individuals and the 
society/state. By practicing “rituals of rebellion”, netizens throw themselves into 
different kinds of cyber-events that helped create new collective memories. Those new 
memories, in turn, helped reinforce the sense of belonging that contributes to today’s 
Chinese nationalism.  
Censorship can be understood from different angles, and of course this research 
has its limitations. Since Chinese returnees after all are a tiny minority in China, the 
findings of this research shouldn’t be seen as a full representation of the whole 
population of Chinese netizens. Nonetheless, through their perceptions of  censorship, 
and multiple social issues in today’s China, the dynamic between censorship and 
Chinese nationalism has provided a lens through which we can better understand how 
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